Part 21 Report - 1997-430

ACCESSION #: 9706090047 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FACILITY NAME: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear PAGE: 1 OF 4 Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER: 05000333 TITLE: Failure of Safety Relief Valve to Open During Set Point Verification Testing Due to Foreign Material Intrusion EVENT DATE: 04/28/97 LER #: 97-004-00 REPORT DATE: 05/30/97 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: DOCKET NO: 05000 OPERATING MODE: N POWER LEVEL: 100 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION: OTHER: 10 CFR 21 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER: NAME: Mr. Gordon J. Brownell, Licensing TELEPHONE: (315) 349-6360 Engineer COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION: CAUSE: E SYSTEM: SB COMPONENT: RV MANUFACTURER: T020 REPORTABLE NPRDS: Y SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO ABSTRACT: During testing of actuating mechanisms (pilot assemblies) for Main Steam Safety Relief valves (02RV-71A through L) at Wyle Laboratories, valve 02RV-71J (pilot serial number 1217), would not lift at applied test pressures. The Authority completed an equipment failure evaluation on the subject pilot assembly to determine the cause of the failure. During the pilot valve disassembly and inspection, a small screw was found wedged in the valve operator subassembly, causing the valve not to open when pressurized. The source of the loose screw was not established, however, the screw was identified as material similar to that which is typically removed from the pilot assembly prior to testing and reattached following completion of testing. The laboratory has implemented a test procedure revisions to minimize the potential for foreign material intrusion into the valve bonnet area during testing evolutions. END OF ABSTRACT TEXT PAGE 2 OF 4 EIIS Codes are in [ ] EVENT DESCRIPTION During the plants Fall 1996 Refuel Outage, the actuating mechanisms (pilot assemblies) for Main Steam [SB] line Safety Relief valves (02RV-71A through L) were removed and replaced. The subject removed pilot assemblies were sent to Wyle Laboratories for "as-found" set point verification testing in accordance with Technical Specifications sections 2.2.1.B and 4.6.E (valve nominal set point 1110 psig). During diagnostic testing activities, subject pilot for valve 02RV-71J (serial number 1217) failed to open (lift) at up to a 1250 psig applied test pressure. This performance characteristic was considered unusual in that: (1) the valve had been manually opened during a plant shutdown one month prior to commencing the Refuel Outage; and (2) the valve had a platinum alloy pilot disc installed to inhibit valve disc to seat oxide bonding. In an effort to determine the cause of the test failure, the Authority completed an equipment failure evaluation on the failed pilot assembly. On April 02, 1997, the pilot was disassembled first by removal of the stabilizer and related parts in order to permit visual inspection of the seated pilot disc. No oxide bonding bridge was noted at the interface. Next, the set point sub-assembly was detached. During its removal, it was noted that a screw was present and wedged between the lower spring retainer and the bonnet inside wall. The screw was determined to be similar to a ball lock pin retaining screw (valve part number 050-0024) used in the pilot assembly. CAUSE OF EVENT Based on the above noted observations and evidence, it was concluded that the cause for failure of 02RV-71J to lift during "as-found" set point testing was due to the presence of a ball lock pin retaining screw wedged between the lower spring retainer and bonnet of the valve pilot assembly. TEXT PAGE 3 OF 4 CAUSE OF EVENT (cont.) It was noted that the ball lock pin and retaining screws are typically removed from the pilot assemblies by Wyle Laboratories prior to valve testing and reattached upon completion of testing. An examination of the subject valve upon initial receipt (February 1997) by Wyle Laboratories, prior to testing, determined that all parts and materials, including its ball lock pin retaining screws were installed in place. Therefore, the source of the screw was not established. However, reviews of previous (set point) test data for valve pilot assembly serial no. 1217 indicate the last scheduled pressure test was conducted at Wyle Laboratories in November 1994. Therefore, it was concluded that the most probable cause for the foreign material intrusion into the valve bonnet area was less than adequate material controls at Wyle Laboratories during installation of the ball lock pin lanyards, prior to pilot shipment from Wyle Laboratories in November/December 1994. ANALYSIS This report identifies the potential failure of Wyle Laboratories' testing facility to maintain material controls which could have resulted in the failure of a safety function of a Main Steam System Safety Relief Valve during operating cycle number 12 (November 30, 1994 to October 26, 1996. The safety relief valves are self-actuated on Main Steam System overpressurization or pilot assembly actuated by an air operator on Automatic Depressurization System logic or manual operation. Manual operation of the 02RV-71J occurred during a September 1996 plant shutdown. Although the valve functioned as designed, during the pilot disassembly at Wyle Laboratories on April 02,1997, it was found that the bearing area between the pilot rod and retainer had indication of abnormal wear. Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation require at least nine of eleven SRVs be operable and maintain an nominal setting of 1110 psig with an allowable setpoint error of plus or minus three percent. "As-found" diagnostic test results for setpoint verification from Wyle Laboratories dated March 06,1997 demonstrated that nine of eleven SRVs were within Technical Specifications limits. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. Wyle Laboratories has revised Target Rock 2-Stage SRV Assembly test procedures to provide instructions for controlling the covering of the pilot valve vent hole, located in the bonnet valves, to minimize the potential for foreign material intrusion into the bonnet area. TEXT PAGE 4 OF 4 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT.) 2. New York Power Authority's (NYPA) Quality Assurance (QA) Department now requires notification by Wyle Laboratories prior to conducting valve testing. This requirement will be maintained until Wyle Laboratories completes the next scheduled refurbishment and testing of pilot assemblies at which time QA will conduct a surveillance of work practice activities. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. Failed Component Component Identification - Main Steam System Safety Relief Valve Pilot Mark Number - 02RV-71J Manufacturer - Target Rock Two Stage Safety Relief Valve NPRDS Code - T020 Serial Number - 1217 ATTACHMENT TO 9706090047 PAGE 1 OF 1 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 315-342-3840 New York Power Michael J. Colomb Authority Site Executive Officer May 30, 1997 JAFP-97-0195 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject: Docket No. 50-333 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: LER-97-004 Failure of Safety Relief Valve to Open During Set Point Verification Testing Due to Foreign Material Intrusion Dear Sir: This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances". There are no commitments contained in this report. Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. Gordon J. Brownell at (31 5) 349-6360. Very truly yours, MICHAEL COLOMB MJC:GJB:las Enclosure cc: USNRC, Region 1 USNRC Resident Inspector INPO Records Center *** END OF DOCUMENT ***

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