United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment


ACCESSION #: 9706090047

                       LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)



FACILITY NAME:  James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear              PAGE: 1 OF 4

                Power Plant



DOCKET NUMBER:  05000333



TITLE:  Failure of Safety Relief Valve to Open During Set Point

        Verification Testing Due to Foreign Material Intrusion



EVENT DATE:  04/28/97   LER #:  97-004-00   REPORT DATE:  05/30/97



OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED:                          DOCKET NO:  05000



OPERATING MODE:  N   POWER LEVEL:  100



THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR

SECTION:

OTHER: 10 CFR 21



LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:

NAME:  Mr. Gordon J. Brownell, Licensing    TELEPHONE:  (315) 349-6360

       Engineer



COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

CAUSE:  E   SYSTEM: SB    COMPONENT:  RV   MANUFACTURER:  T020

REPORTABLE NPRDS:  Y



SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED:  NO



ABSTRACT:



During testing of actuating mechanisms (pilot assemblies) for Main Steam

Safety Relief valves (02RV-71A through L) at Wyle Laboratories, valve

02RV-71J (pilot serial number 1217), would not lift at applied test

pressures.  The Authority completed an equipment failure evaluation on

the subject pilot assembly to determine the cause of the failure.  During

the pilot valve disassembly and inspection, a small screw was found

wedged in the valve operator subassembly, causing the valve not to open

when pressurized.



The source of the loose screw was not established, however, the screw was

identified as material similar to that which is typically removed from

the pilot assembly prior to testing and reattached following completion

of testing.



The laboratory has implemented a test procedure revisions to minimize the

potential for foreign material intrusion into the valve bonnet area

during testing evolutions.



END OF ABSTRACT



TEXT                                                          PAGE 2 OF 4



EIIS Codes are in [ ]



EVENT DESCRIPTION



During the plants Fall 1996 Refuel Outage, the actuating mechanisms

(pilot assemblies) for Main Steam [SB] line Safety Relief valves

(02RV-71A through L) were removed and replaced.  The subject removed

pilot assemblies were sent to Wyle Laboratories for "as-found" set point

verification testing in accordance with Technical Specifications sections

2.2.1.B and 4.6.E (valve nominal set point 1110 psig).  During diagnostic

testing activities, subject pilot for valve 02RV-71J (serial number 1217)

failed to open (lift) at up to a 1250 psig applied test pressure.  This

performance characteristic was considered unusual in that: (1) the valve

had been manually opened during a plant shutdown one month prior to

commencing the Refuel Outage; and (2) the valve had a platinum alloy

pilot disc installed to inhibit valve disc to seat oxide bonding.



In an effort to determine the cause of the test failure, the Authority

completed an equipment failure evaluation on the failed pilot assembly.

On April 02, 1997, the pilot was disassembled first by removal of the

stabilizer and related parts in order to permit visual inspection of the

seated pilot disc.  No oxide bonding bridge was noted at the interface.

Next, the set point sub-assembly was detached.  During its removal, it

was noted that a screw was present and wedged between the lower spring

retainer and the bonnet inside wall.  The screw was determined to be

similar to a ball lock pin retaining screw (valve part number 050-0024)

used in the pilot assembly.



CAUSE OF EVENT



Based on the above noted observations and evidence, it was concluded that

the cause for failure of 02RV-71J to lift during "as-found" set point

testing was due to the presence of a ball lock pin retaining screw wedged

between the lower spring retainer and bonnet of the valve pilot assembly.



TEXT                                                          PAGE 3 OF 4



CAUSE OF EVENT (cont.)



It was noted that the ball lock pin and retaining screws are typically

removed from the pilot assemblies by Wyle Laboratories prior to valve

testing and reattached upon completion of testing.  An examination of the

subject valve upon initial receipt (February 1997) by Wyle Laboratories,

prior to testing, determined that all parts and materials, including its

ball lock pin retaining screws were installed in place.  Therefore, the

source of the screw was not established.  However, reviews of previous

(set point) test data for valve pilot assembly serial no.  1217 indicate

the last scheduled pressure test was conducted at Wyle Laboratories in

November 1994.  Therefore, it was concluded that the most probable cause

for the foreign material intrusion into the valve bonnet area was less

than adequate material controls at Wyle Laboratories during installation

of the ball lock pin lanyards, prior to pilot shipment from Wyle

Laboratories in November/December 1994.



ANALYSIS



This report identifies the potential failure of Wyle Laboratories'

testing facility to maintain material controls which could have resulted

in the failure of a safety function of a Main Steam System Safety Relief

Valve during operating cycle number 12 (November 30, 1994 to October 26,

1996.



The safety relief valves are self-actuated on Main Steam System

overpressurization or pilot assembly actuated by an air operator on

Automatic Depressurization System logic or manual operation.  Manual

operation of the 02RV-71J occurred during a September 1996 plant

shutdown.  Although the valve functioned as designed, during the pilot

disassembly at Wyle Laboratories on April 02,1997, it was found that the

bearing area between the pilot rod and retainer had indication of

abnormal wear.



Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation require at

least nine of eleven SRVs be operable and maintain an nominal setting of

1110 psig with an allowable setpoint error of plus or minus three

percent.  "As-found" diagnostic test results for setpoint verification

from Wyle Laboratories dated March 06,1997 demonstrated that nine of

eleven SRVs were within Technical Specifications limits.



CORRECTIVE ACTIONS



1.   Wyle Laboratories has revised Target Rock 2-Stage SRV Assembly test

     procedures to provide instructions for controlling the covering of

     the pilot valve vent hole, located in the bonnet valves, to minimize

     the potential for foreign material intrusion into the bonnet area.



TEXT                                                          PAGE 4 OF 4



CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT.)



2.   New York Power Authority's (NYPA) Quality Assurance (QA) Department

     now requires notification by Wyle Laboratories prior to conducting

     valve testing.  This requirement will be maintained until Wyle

     Laboratories completes the next scheduled refurbishment and testing

     of pilot assemblies at which time QA will conduct a surveillance of

     work practice activities.



ADDITIONAL INFORMATION



A.   Failed Component



     Component Identification -    Main Steam System Safety Relief Valve

                                   Pilot

     Mark Number              -    02RV-71J

     Manufacturer             -    Target Rock Two Stage Safety Relief

                                   Valve

     NPRDS Code               -    T020

     Serial Number            -    1217



ATTACHMENT TO 9706090047                                      PAGE 1 OF 1



James A.  FitzPatrick

Nuclear Power Plant

P.O.  Box 41

Lycoming, New York 13093



315-342-3840



New York Power                               Michael J.  Colomb

Authority                                    Site Executive Officer



May 30, 1997

JAFP-97-0195



United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attn: Document Control Desk

Mail Station P1-137

Washington, D.C.  20555



Subject:  Docket No.  50-333

          LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: LER-97-004



          Failure of Safety Relief Valve to Open During Set Point

          Verification Testing Due to Foreign Material Intrusion



Dear Sir:



This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of

Defects and Noncompliances".



There are no commitments contained in this report.



Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr.  Gordon J.

Brownell at (31 5) 349-6360.



Very truly yours,



MICHAEL COLOMB



MJC:GJB:las Enclosure



cc:  USNRC, Region 1

     USNRC Resident Inspector

     INPO Records Center



*** END OF DOCUMENT ***





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