United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment


ACCESSION #: 9703070014



GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER            EVENT NUMBER: 31879



LICENSEE: ENERTECH                      NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/03/97

    CITY: BREA           REGION: 4      NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45 (ET]

  COUNTY:                 STATE: CA     EVENT DATE:        03/03/97

LICENSE#:             AGREEMENT: Y      EVENT TIME:        00:00[PST]

  DOCKET:                               LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/03/97



                                             NOTIFICATIONS



NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN DEKLEINE          VERN HODGE, RVIB         NRR

HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE



EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE

10 CFR SECTION:

CCCC 21.21          UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH



                               EVENT TEXT



10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING HIGH FAILURE RATES OF BW/IP

(FORMERLY BORG-WARNER) PRESSURE SWITCHES INSTALLED ON BW/IP

ELECTRIC-

HYDRAULIC ACTUATORS USED IN THE GAS TREATMENT, SERVICE WATER, AND

HEATING

AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS AT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 (REFER TO EVENT

#31822

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)



ON FEBRUARY 20, 1997, NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 MADE A NOTIFICATION TO THE

NRC REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF A DEVIATION OR NON-CONFORMANCE

CONDITION

IN A BASIC COMPONENT THAT WAS REPORTABLE UNDER 10 CFR PART 21

GUIDELINES.

THE BASIC COMPONENT WAS IDENTIFIED AS A SAFETY-RELATED PRESSURE

SWITCH

SUPPLIED BY BW/IP THAT MAY BE IN ONE OF FIVE PART NUMBERS, AND THE

REPORT

SITED A HIGH FAILURE RATE OF THESE PRESSURE SWITCHES.



ENERTECH AND BW/IP ARE CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THIS ISSUE.  ENERTECH

IS

ALERTING ALL POTENTIALLY AFFECTED CUSTOMERS OF A REPORTED

SAFETY-RELATED

BASIC COMPONENT THAT IS CURRENTLY BEING INVESTIGATED BY NINE MILE

POINT

UNIT 2 UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 GUIDELINES.  SINCE ENERTECH WAS NOT PART OF

THE NINE MILE POINT EVALUATION PROCESS, ENERTECH HAS ALSO REQUESTED

HARDWARE AND DOCUMENTATION FROM NINE MILE POINT PERSONNEL FOR

BW/IP

EVALUATION OF THE STATED SITUATION.  ADDITIONALLY, ENERTECH

REQUESTED

FEEDBACK FROM POTENTIALLY AFFECTED CUSTOMERS.



(REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR CONTACT NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS.)



                                        FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET



                                                  Page 1  of  2

                                            Date: March 3, 1997

ENERTECH

          2950 Birch Street, Brea, CA 92621, USA

          Telephone (714) 528-2301 / Fax (714) 528-0128



TO:       Mr Greg Cwalina               FROM: John DeKleine

          Vendor Inspection Branch            Director Quality Assurance



COMPANY:  Nuclear Regulatory Comm.      TELEPHONE: 301) 415-2983

          Washington, DC



FAX NO.: (301) 816-5151                 Receipt Confirmation Requested

                                           []YES []NO



SUBJECT:  NRC Notification              REFERENCE: Niagara Mohawk, Nine

                                                   Mile Unit 2

                                                   DER # 2-96-3145



I have enclosed a letter from Enertech for your information.  Enertech is

alerting all potentially affected Customers of a reported safety related

basic component that is currently being investigated by NMPC-NM Unit 2

under 10 CFR Part 21 guidelines.  Since Enertech was not part of the Nine

Mile evaluation process, We have requested hardware and documentation

from Nine Mile personnel for BW/IP evaluation of the stated situation.



Additionally we requested feedback from our potentially affected

customers from the following inquiry: "If your facility has experienced

and documented similar situations related to the statements made in the

Nine Mile report, Enertech would appreciate someone from your facility

contacting us to discuss that information".



ENERTECH



ENERTECH                 Solutions for Today... Standards for Tomorrow

                                                        (714) 528-2301



                                2950 Birch Street, Brea, CA 92821-6235

                                                    FAX (714) 528-0126



March 3, 1997



Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Operations Center



RE:  Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.  Nine Mile Unit #2, Part 21 Notification,

     Report # DER 2-96-3145 High Failure Rates of BW/IP Pressure Switches

     Installed on BW/IP (formally Borg Warner) Electric-Hydraulic

     Actuators used In GTS, SWP, and HVK systems.



On February 20, 1997 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Nine Mile Point

Unit #2, submitted to the NRC Operations Center their sixty (60) day

evaluation report.  Whereas in that evaluation, in Nine Miles' opinion, a

deviation or non conformance condition exists in a basic component that

is reportable under Part 21 guidelines.  The basic component is

identified as a Safety Related Pressure switch supplied by BW/IP that may

be any one of five (5) part numbers.



The report sites a "High Failure Rate" of the pressure switches.

Enertech and BW/IP are investigating this issue.  Enertech has requested

from Nine Mile additional items for BW/IP evaluation.  This evaluation

will determine specific effected part numbers, failure mechanism, and

failure history.  The report will be available 30 days from receipt of

the requested Nine Mile items that will address the specific issues

raised by Niagara Mohawk Nine Mile Unit #2 Facility personnel.



In the past pressure switch issues have been crossed with reference to

maintainability, adjustability, and long term reliability.  Enertech and

BW/IP have been proactive in addressing these issues by developing a new

qualified switch that is easier to set and maintain.  In 1994 BW/IP and

Enertech introduced this newly qualified switch as a replacement.  These

upgrade kits have been installed and the customer feedback supports the

successful mission of the new switch.  Conversely some sites specifically

request the original switch as a replacement claiming they continue to

operate acceptably in their application.



If you have questions or need additional information.  Please contact me

at your convenience at Enertech (714) 528-2301 extension 200.



Sincerely.



Frank U.  Erlach

President



Doc #: 95351.1



POWER REACTOR                                EVENT NUMBER: 31822



FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT  REGION: 1      NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/20/97

UNIT: [ ]  [2]  [ ]         STATE: NY     NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13 [ET]

RX TYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                EVENT DATE:        02/18/97

                                          EVENT TIME:        14:30[EST]

NRC NOTIFIED BY: K. LAMPMAN, M. McCORMICK LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/20/97

HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE



                                                  NOTIFICATIONS

EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE

10 CFR SECTION:                           LARRY NICHOLSON    RDO

CCCC 21.21     UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH

                                          VERN HODGE, RVIB   NRR



UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE   CURR PWR  CURR RX MODE



 2     N          Y       100    POWER OPERATION   100    POWER OPERATION



                               EVENT TEXT



10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE EXCESSIVE FAILURE RATE OF

BORG-WARNER (BWIP) PRESSURE SWITCHES USED IN THE GAS TREATMENT,

SERVICE

WATER, AND HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS (REFER TO EVENT #31879

FOR

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)



SEVERAL BWIP PRESSURE SWITCHES FAILED DURING OPERATION AND INITIAL

CALIBRATION, AND AN EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT THE SWITCHES ARE

UNABLE TO

MAINTAIN THE CORRECT RESET POINT WHEN THE SETPOINT IS ADJUSTED.

ACCORDING TO THE MANUFACTURER, THE SUBJECT SWITCHES DO NOT HAVE

AN

ACCURATELY ADJUSTABLE RESET VALUE.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

SETPOINT

OF THE SWITCHES AND THEIR RESET POINT IS NOT LINEAR NOR CONSISTENT

BETWEEN DIFFERENT SWITCHES OF THE SAME MODEL.  THEY ARE DESIGNED TO

OPERATE WITH A MAXIMUM SETPOINT AND MINIMUM RESET WINDOW ONLY. 

AS A

RESULT, THE SWITCHES ARE NOT CONSISTENTLY ABLE TO BE INITIALLY

CALIBRATED

TO THE DESIRED SETPOINT; AND ONCE INSTALLED AND CALIBRATED, MINOR

SETPOINT DRIFT MAY PLACE THE SWITCHES OUTSIDE THEIR ACCEPTABLE

TOLERANCES.



THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 40 QUESTIONABLE BWIP PRESSURE SWITCHES

INSTALLED IN

THE PLANT (22 IN THE GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM, 6 IN THE SERVICE WATER

SUPPLY

TO COOLERS AND CHILLERS, AND 12 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION

SYSTEM).  EACH OF THE ASSOCIATED VALVES HAS TWO OR THREE OF THE

SWITCHES

WITHIN ITS HYDRAULIC CONTROLS.  THE TYPE OF FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH

THE

SWITCH DEPENDS ON WHICH SWITCH HAS FAILED.  THE EFFECTS OF A FAILED

SWITCH CAN BE A VALVE FAILING TO OPEN AND BEING UNABLE TO CLOSE OR A

VALVE FAILING CLOSED AND BEING UNABLE TO OPEN.



THE LICENSEE PERFORMED AN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION AND CONCLUDED

THAT

THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE SWITCHES WILL OPERATE AS

REQUIRED.



                        (Continued on next page)



FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT               PAGE # 2 OF EVENT NUMBER: 31822



THIS DETERMINATION WAS BASED ON SUCCESSFUL INITIAL CALIBRATION

TESTING,

POSITIVE TEST DATA OF INSTALLED CALIBRATIONS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO SHORTEN THE CALIBRATION

FREQUENCY.



THE LICENSEE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ENERTECH (THE VENDOR) IN

CALIFORNIA

AND WITH BORG-WARNER (THE MANUFACTURER).  THE LICENSEE ALSO

BELIEVES THAT

ENERTECH HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE NRC.



THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  (REFER TO

THE

HOO LOG FOR SITE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBERS.)



NIAGARA

MOHAWK



NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION

P.O.  BOX 63, LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093



FAX COVER LETTER



NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2



FROM:     FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER:    (315) 349-1400



          NAME:



          DEPARTMENT:    LICENSING/ENVIRONMENTAL



          TELEPHONE NUMBER:



                                             FAX #

TO:



TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES FAXED (INCLUDING COVER LETTER):



DATE:          TIME:



MESSAGE:



                               ENCLOSURE 1

         EVALUATION OF DEVIATION, DEFECT, FAILURE TO COMPLY FORM



PART I - REPORTING



Nine Mile Point 2 (Affected Unit)       DER No.  2-96-3145

                                        Date of Discovery 12/19/96

TYPE OF CONDITION



A.   Deviation                     B.   Defect



     1.  Basic Component  ()            1.   Deviation           ()



          a.  Structure   ()            2.   Other Condition     ()



          b.  System      ()       C.  Failure to Comply



          c.  Component   ()            1.  Atomic Energy Act    ()



          d.  Design      ()            2.  Rule                 ()



          e.  Inspection  ()            3.  Regulation           ()



          f.  Testing     ()            4.  Order                ()



          g.  Consulting                5.  License              ()

              Service



     2.   Other Condition ()



Description: Excessive failure rate of BWIP pressure switches used in the

GTS, SWP, and HVK systems.



PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST



A deviation related to a Basic Component or a failure to comply shall be

evaluated to determine if it presents a substantial safety hazard.  A

condition is a substantial safety hazard if it causes a major reduction

in the degree of protection to the public.  Criteria for determining

substantial safety hazards include: a) Moderate exposure to or release of

licensed material; b) Major degradation of essential safety-related

equipment; and c) Major deficiencies involving design, construction,

inspection, test or use of license facilities or materials (see NUREG-

302).



The following checklist is used to determine if a major reduction in

safety exists.  If the answer is "yes" to any of the following, it may be

reportable per 10CFR part 21 and requires further evaluation.



                                                             NLAF-IRG-140

                                Page 10                          Rev.  01



                           ENCLOSURE 1 (Cont)



PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Cont)



               CONSEQUENCE                        YES            NO



1.   Exposures received in excess of 10CFR20

     limits for immediate notification.



2.   Exposure of an individual in an

     unrestricted area in excess of 10CFR20

     limits.



3.   Release of radioactive material to an

     unrestricted area in excess of 10CFR20

     limits.



4.   Exceeding a safety limit as defined in

     the facility technical specifications.



5.   A condition which could disable or prevent

     operation of a system required for safe

     shutdown, emergency core cooling, post

     accident containment heat removal or post

     accident containment atmosphere cleanup.



6.   A condition which could disable or reduce

     the safety margins for the reactor coolant

     pressure boundary, core or reactor intervals,

     functions or operation.



7.   A condition which could disable or prevent

     operation of the spent fuel storage pool

     cooling and storage including the fuel racks.



8.   A condition which could disable or prevent

     operation of redundant Class 1E electrical

     systems, including electric and mechanical

     devices and circuitry.



9.   A condition which could disable or prevent

     operation of the reactivity control systems;

     that is, control rods, control rod drives,

     and boron injection systems.



10.  A condition which could disable or prevent

     operation of radioactive waste system that

     could create offsite doses greater than Part

     100.



11.  A condition which could disable or prevent

     operation of the primary and secondary

     containment.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 11                          Rev.  01



                           ENCLOSURE 1 (Cont)



PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Cont)



          CONSEQUENCE                                  YES            NO



12.  A condition which could disable or

     prevent operation of structures,

     components, or systems whose continued

     function is not required, but whose

     failure could reduce or disable systems

     that are required.



13.  A condition involving the security

     system which could cause a substantial

     safety hazard.



14.  Other deviations in Basic Components or

     failures to comply which cause a substantial

     safety hazard.



15.  A condition that creates an unreviewed

     safety question (10CFR50.59).



16.  A condition which does not meet a rule,

     regulation, license or order and crates

     a substantial safety hazard.



PART III - EVALUATION (to be completed by Nuclear Licensing)

                              (check applicable category)



[ ]  Condition does not meet criteria for a potential defect or failure

     to comply because (attach additional sheets as necessary):



[ ]  Condition does not involve a substantial safety hazard because

     (attach additional sheets as necessary):



[x]  Condition involves a potential substantial safety hazard (attach

     additional sheets as necessary):  See attached



[ ]  Condition does not meet criteria for Potential Defect or Failure to

     Comply, but is reportable under 10CFR50.9.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 12                          Rev.  01



PLANT:    Nine Mile Point Unit 2                  DER NO.  2-96-3145



TITLE:    High Failure Rate - BWIP Pressure Switches



DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION:



Several BWIP pressure switches have failed during operation and initial

calibration.  An evaluation has concluded that the switches are unable to

maintain the correct reset point when the setpoint is adjusted.

According to the manufacturer, the subject switches do not have an

accurately adjustable reset value.  The relationship between the setpoint

of the switches and their reset point is not linear nor consistent

between different switches of the same model.  They are designed to

operate with a maximum setpoint and minimum reset window only.  As a

result, the switches are not consistently able to be initially calibrated

to the desired setpoint, and once installed and calibrated, minor

setpoint drift may place the switches outside their acceptable

tolerances.



The subject switches were supplied and recommended by the vendor as

replacement switches.  The vendor is aware of the specific setpoints

associated with each switch part number ordered by Niagara Mohawk.

However, instead of providing switches designed to operate at the

specific setpoint and reset range for all switches of this type.



Each of the associated valves has 2 or 3 of the switches within its

hydraulic controls.  The type of failure associated with a switch depends

on which switch has failed.  The effects of a failed switch can be a

valve failing open and unable to close, or a valve failing closed and

unable to open.



For the HVK or SWP systems, due to their design and application, an

assumed switch failure would cause the associated valve to fail open.

SWP valves 2SWP*TV35A and 35B provide temperature control for the control

and relay room chillers.  HVK valves 2HVK*TV21A, 21B, 22A, and 22B

provide individual temperature control for air conditioning units in both

the control room and relay rooms.  If these valves were to fail,

control/relay room temperature could increase potentially beyond its

acceptable design range.  Redundant air conditioning units are available

in addition to the ability to manually control cooling flow if required,

however, under design basis assumptions neither are credited as being

available.



For GTS (2GTS*MOV2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 28A, and 2GTS*PV5A, 5B) should an

associated pressure switch fail by not actuating at the desired setpoint,

the setpoint overlap would prevent correct actuator response.  Since the

subject valves are located on the entrance, exit, bypass and

recirculation lines around each Standby Gas Filter Train, the system may

not be able to perform its intended safety functions.



Notwithstanding the fact that all systems are designed redundant and the

ability exists to manually control flow around SWP valves 2SWP*TV35A and

35B, a deviation exists with the pressure switches for HVK, SWP, and GTS

systems that assuming the coincident failure of all switches or a second

unrelated single, failure (as required by the design basis and Part 21

guidelines), the presence of the switches created a substantial safety

hazard as defined by Part 21.  Presently an engineering operability

determination is in place that documents reasonable assurance that the

switches will operate as required.  This determination is based on having

passed initial calibration testing, positive test data trends of

installed calibrations and implementation of additional administrative

controls to shorten the calibration frequency.



This evaluation concludes that although operable at this time, under the

guidance of Part 21, the BWIP pressure switches are reportable.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 13                          Rev.  01



SWITCH    PRESSURE, OPERATOR MODEL NUMBER 85430,       2GTS*MOV2A-ACT

          ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED ON NMPC PURCHASE         2GTS*MOV2B-ACT

          ORDER NOS.  NMP2-P304Y. SPARE / REPLACEMENT  2GTS*MOV3A-ACT

          PARTS ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED UNDER NMPC         2GTS*MOV3B-ACT

          PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER NMP2-P304Y SHALL BE

          QUALIFIED TO BORG WARNER TEST REPORT NUMBER

          2125, REV B



SWITCH    PRESSURE, OPERATOR MODEL NUMBERS 85960,      2GTS*MOV28A-ACT

          86060, AND 86040, ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED ON     2GTS*MOV28B-ACT

          NMPC PURCHASE ORDER NOS.  NMP2-P304Y AND     2TCS*PCV115-ACT

          NMP2-C051M, BWIP P/N 00739.  SPARE /           2SWP*TV35A

          REPLACEMENT PARTS ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED          2SWP*TV35B

          UNDER NMPC PURCHASE ORDER NUMBERS NMP2-

          P304Y AND NMP2-C051N SHALL BE QUALIFIED

          TO BORG WARNER TEST REPORT NUMBERS 2125,

          REV B AND 2140 REV A.



SWITCH    PRESSURE, OPERATOR MODEL NUMBERS 85960,      2GTS*MOV28A-ACT

          86060, 86080, AND 86040, ORIGINALLY          2GTS*MOV28B-ACT

          SUPPLIED ON NMPC PURCHASE ORDER NOS.         2TCS*PCV115-ACT

          NMP2-P304Y AND NMP2-C051M, BWIP P/N            2SWP*TV35A

          86819. SPARE / REPLACEMENT PARTS ORIGINALLY    2SWP*TV35B

          SUPPLIED UNDER NMPC PURCHASE ORDER NUMBERS

          NMP2-P304Y AND NMP2-C051M SHALL BE QUALIFIED

          TO BORG WARNER TEST REPORT NUMBERS 2125, REV

          B AND 2140 REV A.



*** END OF DOCUMENT ***



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