United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

95125
ACCESSION #: 9505240268

                                   ABB

RECORD OF EVALUATION

SUBJECT:  10CFR 21 Report of Product Defect - Mismarked AMP
#12-10
Insulated Lugs at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station -
Southern
California Edison.

1.)  Description of Deficiency:
     AMP Inc. #12-10 insulated lugs were found to have been used
with #14
     gauge wire in ABB 4160V-5HK and 480V K-Line Switchgear,
supplied by
     ITE in 1976.  The yellow barrel of the mismarked lugs had 3
black
     stripes indicating for use with #16-14 gauge wire.  The lugs
were
     stamped #12-10.  The use of the oversize lugs led to out-of-
     specification measurements during pull tests


2.)  Location and Date:
     This deficiency was discovered at the San Onofre Nuclear
Generating
     Station - Southern California Edison on March 14, 1995.  The
     switchgear was shipped in 1976.

3.)  Analysis of Safety Implication:
     A thorough analysis was conducted by San Onofre Nuclear
personnel
     (see attachment #1).  The oversize lug connections have not
failed
     and are not of an immediate reliability concern based on
this
     laboratory analysis and the extended time frame the lugs
have
     performed satisfactorily.  However, the mismarked lugs
represent a
     potential source of failure from pullout due to any unusual
load
     application (such as a seismic event) that could effect
Safety
     Related Equipment.

4.)  Conclusions:
     Research indicates that the mis-marked lugs were probably
delivered
     in a lot and were issued to manufacturing floor stock. 
Therefore,
     other equipment supplied by ITE and Gould ITE in the
1975-1977 time
     frame might have the same type of mis-marked lugs, including
     equipment in 1E applications (see attachment #3).  K-Line
and HK
     switchgear equipment with Amp insulated lugs should be
inspected for
     mis-marked/oversized lugs and changed to the proper size lug
during
     the next scheduled outage.  Contact Components Marketing at
(407) -
     323-8220 x130, x131, x132, or x157.

5.)  Reference Documents:
     Attachment #1 - Report generated by San Onofre Nuclear
personnel.
     Attachment #2 - Acknowledgment from AMP Inc. in regard to
their
     evaluation of samples of the mismarked lugs.
     Attachment #3 - Customer List.

6.)  Corrective Action:
     All AMP lugs currently in inventory at ABB, Distribution
Systems
     Division were inspected for this discrepancy on May 3, 1995. 
No
     mismarked lugs were found.  Training was held with QA
personnel on
     this finding.

                      ABB Power T & D Company Inc.

Distribution Systems Division      Telephone:     Telefax:
201 Hickman Drive                  407 323-8220   407 322-8934
Sanford, FL 32771-8201                           
(Marketing/Engineering)
                                                  407 322-8938
                                                  (Operations)
                                                  407 328-9264
                                                  (Human
Resources)

                                   ABB

7.)  Action to Prevent Recurrence:
     All AMP lugs utilized on Nuclear Safety Related switchgear
will be
     subject to 100% inspection.

8.)  Point of Contact:
     Point of contact for ABB, Distribution Systems Division in
Sanford,
     FL is David Stone, Quality Assurance Manager, (407)323-8220,
ext.
     159.

9.)  Prepared By:
     This report prepared by David Stone.

10.) Reviewed By:

Aubrey Jackson - Total Quality Manager

Norb Hagenhoff - Vice President/General Manager

                      ABB Power T & D Company Inc.

Distribution Systems Division      Telephone:     Telefax:
201 Hickman Drive                  407 323-8220   407 322-8934
Sanford, FL 32771-8201                           
(Marketing/Engineering)
                                                  407 322-8938
                                                  (Operations)
                                                  407 328-9264
                                                  (Human
Resources)

                      Initial Root Cause Evaluation
                       of 2A04/2B04 Oversized Lugs
                             April 12, 1995

On March 14, 1995 during the 2A04 bus outage, an associated bus
conductor
wire was pulled free of it's crimped lug.  The replacement of the
DC
control power molded case circuit breakers was in progress at the
time of
failure and closer examinaton revealed that the affected lugs
were those
attached to the control power breaker.  These lugs were
distinctly marked
by a yellow jacket trimmed with three black stripes and a #10
size
terminal ring.  The problem lugs were manufactured by AMP but
other
unaffected Hollingsworth lugs were also removed for comparison
with the
odd-sized AMP lugs.  The wiring was part of original panel
equipment
supplied to SCE by the vendor, ITE.

The removed AMP lugs were stamped AMP 12-10 and contained a
yellow barrel
with three black stripes.  Mr. Steve Bortner, AMP Inc, Jacobus,
PA,
confirmed that the yellow/black striped barrel lug should
represent a 16-
14 heavy duty (HD) lug, not a 12-10 lug.  The mismarked 12-10
lugs were
also confirmed by the #10 ring with a thickness of about .041".

All lugs were inspected and replaced as necessary on the two
cleared
busses (2A04 and 2B04) under NCR's 95030100 and 95030097.  Only
the AMP
lugs were found to be mismarked whereas the Hollingsworth 16-14
HD lugs
were correctly marked and of no safety concern.  The other Safety
Busses
have been scheduled for inspection per the following NCR's: 
95030105
(2A06); 95030106 (2B06); 95030107 (3A04); 95030108 (3B04);
95030109
(3A06); and 95030110 (3B06).

Three oversized lugs (12-10 mismarked lugs with #14 wires
attached) were
removed from 2B04 and cut open for physical examination in the
laboratory.  The three lugs showed no signs of arcing, burning,
overheating or other electrical degradation.  There were
indentations on
all three lugs which showed the wires had physically pressed into
the
lugs while flattening on one side.  A transfer of material from
the lug
to the wire had also occurred in all three samples.

Pull tests were performed on both oversized lugs (12-10) from
2B04 and
three normal 16-14 HD lugs taken from the 2BE15 motor starter. 
The pull
tests revealed that the oversized lug connections were not as
strong as
the normal ones.  The oversize 12-10 lug failed at a load of 32.7
lbs.
where the wire pulled out.  Three additional oversized lugs were
tested
and those wires all pulled loose at about 30 lbs.  The three
normal 16-14
HD lug connectors didn't pull loose until the load exceeded 100
lbs (109
to 121 lbs).  AMP specifications list 70 lbs as the minimum
pullout force
expected on a normal connection involving a 16-14 HD lug and #14
wire.
The NEMA Standard lists 40 lbs as the minimum force required for
wire
pullout.

Attachment #1

The conclusions from this examination are:  1) the oversized lugs
have
not electrically degraded and 2) there is some mechanical
strength
developed in the oversized connections although it is only about
75% of
the NEMA Standard.  Laboratory examination of the inside surface
of three
oversized lugs revealed no evidence of overheating, corrosion or
oxidation.  The metal to metal connections were intact and there
was
evidence of crimp compression on both the wires and inside of the
lugs.

The oversize lug connections are not of an immediate reliability
concern
based on this initial laboratory analysis and the extended
timeframe (14
years plus) the lugs have performed satisfactorily.  However, the
mismarked lugs represent a potential source of failure from
pullout due
to any unusual load application (such as a seismic event) that
could
effect Safety Related equipment.  Additional testing and
evaluation will
be preformed in support of a Failure Analysis Report to be
prepared on
this subject.  It was concluded that all oversized lugs initially
provided by ITE in similar switchgear should be changed out at
the very
next bus outage of sufficient length.

ITE (now ABB) should consider preparing a Part 21 Report or other
appropriate means of warning other potentially affected users of
the
above described defect.  Please notify us and other affected
companies of
your decision concerning the Part 21 Report.

AMP

250 N. Main Street
Jacobus, PA 17407-1098
Phone: 717-428-4500

Automotive/Consumer Business Group

April 24, 1995

Tom Graham
Southern California Edison Company
P.O. Box 126
San Clemente, CA 92674
Fax: 714-368-9167

Dear Tom:

I received the samples of our terminals that you found in your
ITE
circuit breakers.  The samples were incorrectly marked.  The wire
barrel
body was a 12-10 size and they had 16-14 HD sleeves on them.  The
sleeves
were yellow with 3 black stripes.  This is not an industry
standard for
marking 16-14 HD.

In examining these samples, it should be noted that they were
manufactured many years ago.  Although I have no explanation how
this
happened, I do know that this error was very rare.  In checking
our
history files I did not discover any complaints of this nature.

If I can be of assistance, please do not hesitate to call.

Respectfully,

Steve Bortner
RBY Team Eng.
Phone: 717-428-4542

copy:  Roger Stoker, Fax: 714-368-(illegible)

SB/mj file: sbll

Attachment #2

Table "ABB DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS DIVISION" omitted.

Attachment #3

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