Morning Report for November 16, 2006

Headquarters Daily Report

• N/A
• REGION I

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Part 21 2006-0023 - Incorrect Identification of the Material Used to Manufacture Y-Globe Valve

Licensee/Facility: FARLEY FLOWSERVE Dockets: License No:

Notification: MR Number: H-2006-0018 Date: 10/31/2006

Discussion:

On September 18, 2006, Flowserve was notified via e-mail by Farley Nuclear Power Plant that a 3/4 NPS Class 1500 Y-Globe Valve in their inventory had the outward appearance and characteristics of a carbon steel valve body whereas the valve body was identified as ASME SA 182, Type 316 stainless steel material. Flowserve performed an alloy analyzer check on the valve body and confirmed it to be a non-stainless material. A subsequent chemical and physical analysis of the valve body confirmed it to be a carbon steel material (UNS G10450).

The valve body in question (Heat Code - "FS12") was forged by DeKalb Forge Company of Dekalb, IL for Flowserve. DeKalb Forge Company forgings were limited to Kerotest and BWIP (Borg Warner) valve bodies and bonnets. These forgings were made from bar material supplied to them by Flowserve Corporation or Charles E. Larson & Sons. DeKalb Forge company was a limited scope supplier and had an audited and approved quality program for Material Identification and Control at the time these materials were being processed. Flowserve records revealed that a total of six (6) nuclear power plants received valves with valve bodies from this heat of material. The NRC contacted Flowserve and the six plant sites notified are: Arkansas Nuclear One, Beaver Valley, Braidwood, Catawba, Farley and one site in South Korea.

To date, no other instances of incorrectly identified materials have been discovered, however not all valves supplied have been verified as of this report. Flowserve also checked the materials in its inventory supplied by this vendor. A total of 660 pieces, representing 60 heats of material, have been checked and there was no further evidence of mixed materials.

After investigating this issue and visiting its suppliers' facilities, Flowserve concluded that although the evidence does not indicate that these deficiencies occurred often, however, there is no way to conclude that all incidents have been identified prior to forged valve bodies or bonnets being provided to the nuclear industry. Flowserve would recommend that Kerotest and BWIP (Borg Warner) valves be inspected at the earliest convenient time to determine that the materials are carbon steel or stainless steel as required. A magnet check is suggested. Flowserve Corporation is presently researching the customers who may be affected and will be notifying them directly once its research is completed.

To see the complete report, please see ML063120160.

Accession Numbers:

Accession No	Accession Date
ML063120160	10/31/2006

Contacts:

Name	Office Abbrev	Phone No	E-Mail
TABATABAI, OMID	NRR	(301) 415-6616	OTY@nrc.gov

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REGION I

Part 21 2006-0021 - Potential Defect in Otek Panel Meters

Licensee/Facility: OTEK CORPORATION SOUTHERN TESTING SERVICES KNOXVILLE, Tennessee Dockets: License No:

Notification: MR Number: H-2006-0017 Date: 10/05/2006

Discussion:

Southern Testing Services (STS) has identified a potential failure cause for the HI-Q class meters (OTEK part numbers HI-Q114, HI-Q116, HI-Q117, HI-Q118, and HI-Q119) that would result in a frozen indicator with no indication that the failure has occurred. The specific failure mode is a failure of the main processor (only) that freezes the display processor. The frozen display inhibits the detection of the main processor failure except by cycling power to the Panel Meter.

On September 18, 2006, OTEK notified STS that one (1) OTEK Panel Meter had experienced a main processor failure which resulted in a frozen display indicator. This Panel Meter was reportedly in a non-nuclear application. OTEK determined that the likely cause of this failure was a high frequency spike on the power lines caused by running the meter off of a DC generator.

STS determined that 294 units were provided to nuclear plants in potentially safety related applications where EMI/RFI requirements were imposed. The following plants were effected purchasers: Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim, St. Lucie, and Brown's Ferry.

OTEK is currently in the process of updating the display board processor programming to detect a failure of the main processor, and provide an indication on the display that a main processor failure has occurred. STS will coordinate with the above utilities when this update becomes available.

STS's entire report is available in NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) with accession number ML062850360.

Accession Numbers:

Accession No	Accession Date
ML062850360	10/05/2006

Contacts:

Name	Office Abbrev	Phone No	E-Mail
TABATABAI, OMID	NRR	(301) 415-6616	OTY@nrc.gov