Morning Report for November 14, 2001
Headquarters Daily Report
NOVEMBER 14, 2001
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REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS NOV. 14, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
MR Number: H-01-0065
Part 21 Database Date: 11/14/01
Subject: Part 21 - Incompletely Threaded Screw on Terminal Block
Discussion:
VENDOR: Systems Control PT21 FILE NO: m1-25-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/08/01 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML012260207
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, Y. Diaz
The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 licensee reported finding a loose screw
belonging to a terminal block being installed in an emergency diesel
generator panel. The screw had not been fully threaded during manufacture
and could have fallen into safety-related equipment. The defective
terminal block was one of 400 supplied to the licensee in the 1980s by
Systems Control of Iron Mountain MI. All but 169 had been installed in
both Units 1 and 2 in various applications. The licensee concluded from
its inspection of the terminal blocks still in spare storage and review
of operational experience that the defective terminal block was an
isolated occurrence.
Contact: Y. Diaz, NRR
301-415-1175
E-mail: yks@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 14, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
MR Number: H-01-0066
Part 21 Database Date: 11/14/01
Subject: Part 21 - Excessive Disc Angular Movement in Swing Check Valves
Discussion:
VENDOR: Flowserve PT21 FILE NO: m1-27-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/23/01 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML012410030
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, E. Goodwin
The valve vendor Flowserve reported being notified by Arizona Public
Service of improper operation of a 4-inch, 1500 pounds per square inch
pressure class swing check valve. The potential problem, excessive disc
angular movement, is similar to the problem reported by the vendor's
predecessor, BW/IP International (Borg-Warner) in 1993. In 1993, some
disc assemblies were shipped with an excessive stud-to-disc weld that
could keep the disc washer too far from the back of the disc,
consequently permitting excessive angular movement of the disc. In the
present case, the vendor notified the customers who purchased 3-inch or
4-inch swing check valves or disc assemblies in 1977 or earlier,
recommending inspection of such valves at the earliest convenient time
and replacement of the disc assembly if evidence of interference is
found. The vendor notified the nuclear power utilities Southern
California Edison, Arizona Public Service, Texas Utilities Electric, Duke
Energy, Entergy, Rochester Gas and Electric, and Tennessee Valley
Authority.
Contact: E. Goodwin, NRR
301-415-1154
E-mail: efg@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 14, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
MR Number: H-01-0067
Part 21 Database Date: 11/14/01
Subject: Part 21 - Potential Loss of Backup Safety Function of Charging
Pump Air Lock Tank
Discussion:
VENDOR: David Brown Union Pumps PT21 FILE NO: m1-29-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/31/01 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML012490467
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, C. Petrone
The Turkey Point licensee received an incorrectly configured replacement
actuator from the vendor, David Brown Union Pumps. This type of actuator
was intended for use in controlling fluid drive speed for charging pumps.
The actuator was incorrectly configured in that a regulator included with
the actuator contained "hard seats" rather than the resilient seats
contained in the original actuator. This hard seat regulator was not
designed for use with a safety backup air lock tank like the one
originally supplied by the vendor with the charging pumps. Although this
hard seat regulator would work satisfactorily during normal operation,
during fail safe operation (following a loss of air supply pressure) it
would allow air from the air lock tank to bleed off in one to two hours.
This would result in the loss of the backup safety function of the tank
and the actuator would lose its ability to control the charging pump
fluid drive speed.
Contact: C. Petrone, NRR
301-415-1027
E-mail: cdp@nrc.gov
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