Morning Report for January 10, 2001
Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 10, 2001 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JANUARY 10, 2001 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Nuclear Generation Company MR Number: 1-01-0001 Pilgrim 1 Date: 01/05/01 Plymouth,Massachusetts RI PC Dockets: 50-293 BWR/GE-3 Subject: THIRD PARTY DEDICATOR (TRENTEC) MISSED IDENTIFICATION OF INCORRECTLY ASSEMBLED JOSLYN CLARK TIME DELAY RELAYS Discussion: On January 2, 2001, the licensee identified improperly configured relays installed in the B-6 (480 volt AC) emergency load center transfer logic scheme. The specific application required a time delay function on four contacts in the relays, however, the installed relays had a time delay function on only two of the four contacts as specified. The licensee had installed the 125 volt DC time delay relays for the B-6 load center during RFO-12 (5/8/99 - 7/13/99). A total of five relays, manufactured by Joslyn Clark Controls, were purchased commercially and dedicated by a third party vendor (Trentec) for the safety-related application in the plant. The relays can be configured for different applications specified by the purchaser. In this case, the relays required a time delay on four contacts. The relays were delivered, labeled to indicate that the time delay was installed on the specified contacts (indicated by an "E" suffix on the part number X 714UPD E). Trentec, Inc., performed the dedication of the relays, however, the functional testing did not physically verify the time delay functionality for all four contacts. As a result, the dedication process did not reveal that four of the five relays were missing the right hand time pole contact opening link (part KPMT-1), which provides the time delay function on two of the four contacts. The licensee subsequently installed two of the relays that were improperly configured in the B-6 load center transfer logic. This configuration could have resulted in load center B-6 remaining de-energized on certain loss of offsite power (LOOP) sequences. In turn, this could have caused a loss of low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), since load center B-6 powers several LPCI supply valves. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee declared LPCI inoperable and tagged open one of two vital bus feeder breakers to the B-6 load center to prevent the improperly configured relays from having the potential to cause a loss of load center B-6 on a LOOP. On January 7, 2001, the licensee installed the missing piece for the relays and successfully tested the relays to show the plant design was met. The licensee is reviewing the issue for reportability under 10 CFR 21. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: James Linville (610)337-5129 Russell Arrighi (508)747-0565 _
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021