United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for February 23, 2000

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         FEBRUARY 23, 2000

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV                              X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 23, 2000

MR Number: H-00-0003

                           NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM
                           GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS



Information Notice 2000-02, "FAILURE OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL TO
PREVENT URANIUM DIOXIDE (UO2) POWDER ACCUMULATION," was issued on
February 22, 2000.

This notice was issued to all fuel-cycle conversion, enrichment, and
fabrication facilities to alert them to a problem recently noted with
saftey-significant level probes that are not self-checking.  A level
probe in a UO2 powder hopper failed without indicating a failed
condition.  This allowed UO2 powder to accumulate in the hopper and
approach the criticality safety mass limit before discovery.

Contact:  Sheryl A. Burrows, NMSS
          301-415-6667
          E-mail: sab2@nrc.gov

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HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          FEBRUARY 23, 2000

MR Number: H-00-0004

                           NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM
                           GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS



Information Notice 2000-03, "HIGH-EFFICIENCY PARTICULATE AIR (HEPA)
FILTER EXCEEDS MASS LIMIT BEFORE REACHING EXPECTED DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE," was issued on February 22, 2000.

This notice was issued to all fuel-cycle conversion, enrichment, and
fabrication facilities to alert them to a potentially significant risk
for HEPA filters which could accumulate special nuclear material (SNM)
beyond a safe mass.  Recently, the SNM mass limit was exceeded in a HEPA
filter housing because the differential pressure control was based on SNM
with significantly different flow restriction characteristics than the
actual SNM being processed.

Contact:  Dennis C. Morey, NMSS
          301-415-6107
          E-mail: dcm@nrc.gov

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