United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for September 23, 1999

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         SEPTEMBER 23, 1999

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS                           X
REGION I            X
REGION II           X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV                              X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - REGION I  SEP. 23, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Baltimore Gas & Elec Co.               MR Number: 1-99-0036
Calvert Cliffs 1                       Date: 09/23/99
Lusby,Maryland                         RI PC
Dockets: 50-317
PWR/CE

Subject: REACTOR TRIP

Discussion:

On September 22, at 9:08 a.m., Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 (CCNPP 1) was
manually tripped from 100 percent power upon a loss of main feedwater.
All control rods fully inserted and an auxiliary feedwater actuation
signal (AFAS) occurred due to low steam generator water level.  The
preliminary cause was determined to be personnel error (plant
electrician) during the performance of maintenance which resulted in the
loss of non-vital motor control center (MCC)- 106 and MCC-116.  The
de-energization of these MCCs resulted in a loss of control oil to both
turbine driven steam generator feed pumps (SGFP).  In addition, the
condenser air removal (CAR) pumps powered from MCC-106 and MCC-116 were
lost, resulting in a loss of main condenser vacuum and the ability to
dump steam to the main condenser.  All plant equipment operated as
designed during and following the shutdown.  The main steam isolation
valves were closed by the operators following the trip and remained
closed during the event.  Plant cooldown was performed by using the
atmospheric dump valves and the auxiliary feedwater system.  As of
8:00 a.m. this morning, the unit was in Mode 3 Hot Standby, with plans to
restart this afternoon.

The resident inspectors were on site and responded to the shutdown and
have been monitoring licensee activities.



Contact:  William Cook               (610)337-5074
          Fred Bower                 (410)586-2626
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REGION I  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          SEPTEMBER 23, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Northeast Utilities                    MR Number: 1-99-0038
Millstone 3                            Date: 09/23/99
Waterford,Connecticut                  SRI/PC
Dockets: 50-423
PWR/W-4-LP

Subject: INOPERABLE SUMP PUMPS

Discussion:

During surveillance testing of two air driven safety-related pumps
located in the recirculation spray system (RSS) cubicle sumps on
September 22, the "A" pump failed to start.  The licensee entered a
technical specification (TS) action statement to shut the plant down in 3
days because a support system for the RSS was inoperable.  The pump was
replaced with a spare pump and tested satisfactorily.  When the "A" pump
was disassembled, the licensee discovered growth of the plastic rotating
air blades that caused the pump to mechanically bind.  Even though the
"B" pump passed its surveillance test, the licensee is currently removing
it for an inspection of its air blades to determine if this condition is
a generic problem.  The licensee exited the action statement, based upon
the successful completion of surveillance testing of the replacement
pumps.

The function of the pumps is to remove ground water that drains from
under the primary containment basemat to sumps located in the engineered
safeguards features (ESF) building.  However, the resultant operability
concerns are not significant from an overall plant risk perspective.
Factors that reduce the risk significance include the amount of time
available to take compensatory measures in the event both sump pumps
failed.  There would be more than 65 days before the water level around
the containment would rise to a level where hydrostatic forces on the
containment liner would be a concern.  Also, although not environmentally
qualified, two non-safety-related sump pumps could be powered and provide
ground water removal capability, further extending the time available to
provide compensatory measures in the event the safety-related pumps
failed.  Additionally, since the ground water communicates in common with
both sumps, it would be expected that one sump pump in operation, either
the air driven or electric driven pump, would be capable of keeping both
RSS cubicles dry.


Regional Action:

The resident inspectors and an NRC engineering team that is onsite are
following licensee actions.

Contact:  A. Cerne                   (860)447-3170
          James Linville             (610)337-5129
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REGION II  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          SEPTEMBER 23, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Carolina Power & Light Co.             MR Number: 2-99-0014
Brunswick 1 2                          Date: 09/23/99
Southport,North Carolina
Dockets: 50-325,50-324
BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4

Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES

Discussion:

Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) announced on September 22, 1999, that
Neil Gannon will become the new plant general manager at Brunswick
effective September 22, 1999.  This position had previously been occupied
by Jeff Lyash, also the Brunswick director of site operations (DSO).
Mr. Lyash will retain the position of DSO and Mr. Gannon will report to
him.  Mr. Gannon had been serving as operations manager at Brunswick.

Regional Action:

For information only.

Contact:  Geoffrey West              (404)562-4660
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