Morning Report for September 17, 1999
Headquarters Daily Report SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEP. 17, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Baltimore Gas & Elec Co. MR Number: 1-99-0033 Calvert Cliffs 1 2 Date: 09/17/99 Lusby,Maryland SRI PC Dockets: 50-317,50-318 PWR/CE,PWR/CE Subject: HURRICANE FLOYD Discussion: During the daylight hours of September 16, 1999, Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 experienced tropical storm weather associated with Hurricane Floyd, as the storm passed up the eastern coast of the United States. Heavy rain and high tropical storm winds occurred. Storm debris, which included small fish and grasses, affected the cooling water intake for the main turbines on both units, necessitating a power reduction to 85 percent power on Unit 1 and a preemptive reduction to 90 percent power on Unit 2. Safety systems remained operable during the storm. During the morning of September 17, 1999, with debris removed from the main condenser waterboxes, reactor power was restored to full power. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring licensee activities. Contact: Michele Evans (610)337-5224 Scott Stewart (410)586-2626 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-99-0034 Millstone 3 Date: 09/17/99 Waterford,Connecticut RI/telecon Dockets: 50-423 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MILLSTONE UNIT 3 POWER REDUCTION Discussion: On September 17, 1999, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Unit 3 control room operators decreased power from 100 percent to about 80 percent power. The power reduction was in response to a lowering main condenser vacuum. The causes of the lowering main condenser vacuum were two fold. Hurricane Floyd caused an increased ingress of debris into each of the six Unit 3 main condenser water boxes, decreasing main condenser heat transfer efficiency. In addition, a combination of storm and tide effects caused circulating water temperature to rise, decreasing the heat transfer capability of the main condenser. Power is currently being maintained between 80 percent and 90 percent, until routine water box cleaning and associated system alignment activities are completed. The resident inspectors observed portions of the down power and stabilization activities. No impact was noted on the safety related service water system or its attendant heat exchangers. Because the licensee routinely responds to the impacts of circulating water temperature and debris on plant operations, backwashing of condenser bays is routinely performed. Further licensee recovery activities will be monitored through the implementation of the routine resident inspection program. Contact: A. Cerne (860)447-3170 K. Jenison (610)337-5244 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Peco Energy Company MR Number: 1-99-0035 Peach Bottom 2 3 Date: 09/17/99 Philadelphia,Pennsylvania RI/PC Dockets: 50-277,50-278 BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4 Subject: POST STORM STATUS AT PEACH BOTTOM - EVENT NOs. 36173, 36179 Reportable Event Number: 36173 Discussion: On September 16, 1999, as a result of severe weather caused by Hurricane Floyd, Peach Bottom experienced three off normal conditions. First, Peach Bottom lost power to the technical support center due to a fault on the local power distribution line. A one hour non-emergency event notification was made to the NRC for a loss of emergency assessment capability. Power has been restored. Secondly, power outages caused 22 of the 96 emergency sirens to become inoperable. (Refer to Event No. 36179) The number of inoperable emergency sirens increased during the storm and currently the transmitter for siren activation is not in service. Lastly, bearing lube oil temperatures increased in the Unit 2 recirculation motor-generators due to service water flow restrictions from silt buildup in the lube oil cooler following the storm. Power was reduced to remove the 2B recirculation pump and motor-generator from service and to clean the lube oil cooler. As of 11:00 on September 17, 1999, Unit 2 is operating in single recirculation loop operation using the 2A recirculation pump and motor-generator. When the 2B lube oil cooler is cleaned, PECO plans to restart the 2B recirculation motor-generator set and recirculation pump and remove the 2A recirculation pump and motor-generator from service to clean the 2A lube oil cooler. PECO expects to have both lube oil coolers cleaned and both recirculation pumps and motor-generators in operation later today. Safety related equipment was not adversely affected. Contact: D. Florek (610)337-5185 A. McMurtray (717)456-7614 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Combustion Engineering MR Number: 3-99-0079 Hematite Fuel Manufact. Facility Date: 09/15/99 Hematite,Missouri Phone call - onsite NRC inspector Dockets: 07000036 Subject: Declaration of an Unusual Event Discussion: On the morning of September 15, 1999, the plant management declared an Unusual Event following the plant staff's observation of small uranium hexafluoride releases from vaporizer piping system valves in the Oxides Building. At the time of the releases to the building, the plant staff were troubleshooting problems with some of the system valves and were attempting to sublime uranium hexafluoride believed to be trapped within the isolated piping system. Upon noticing the releases, the plant staff evacuated the immediate area of the releases and measures were taken to stop the releases. Once the releases were secured, the plant management downgraded the event from an Unusual Event Classification. The systems are currently secured pending the plant staff's investigation of the circumstances which led to the releases. No injuries were known to have occurred as a result of the isolated releases within the vaporizer area. No releases were known to have occurred to the environs. Regional Action: At the time of the events, the Region III Deputy Regional Administrator, the Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Director, and a Region III inspector were onsite. Region III management has initiated a special inspection in order to understand the causes for the releases and to review the emergency response measures undertaken by the licensee as a part of the Unusual Event. Contact: K. G. O'Brien (630)829-9603 _
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021