Morning Report for July 8, 1999
Headquarters Daily Report
JULY 08, 1999
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REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JULY 8, 1999
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-99-0058
General Electric Date: 07/08/99
Subject: Part 21 - Magne-Blast circuit breaker failure
surveillance test
Discussion:
VENDOR: GE PT21 FILE NO: 99-24-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 04/15/99 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9904210170
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: LETTER, EN 35677 REVIEWER: REXB, D. Skeen
NEW ISSUE. On April 15, 1999, the Summer licensee reported by letter
that a General Electric (GE) Magne-Blast circuit breaker failed to close
during surveillance testing. On May 5, 1999, the licensee reported (Event
Notification 35677) under 10 CFR Part 21 a potential substantial safety
hazard due to 7.2-kV breakers that failed to close, representing a
potential common-mode failure for safety-related Magne-Blast breakers.
The licensee used high speed videography to identify the problem. The
video showed that the legs of a cotter pin were apparently not bent close
enough to the shaft, which allowed the cotter pin to sometimes strike the
latch check switch mounting bracket and bend it forward. Inspection of
the cotter pin showed wear marks where the pin was striking the bracket.
Bending the bracket removed the factory set clearance between the bracket
and the switch-actuating paddle, resulting in the paddle, which is bolted
to the trip shaft, rolling the trip shaft to the trip position on a
closure signal.
The licensee asked GE if removal of the latch check switch would affect
breaker qualification. GE replied that the purpose of the latch check
switch is to enable rapid repeated breaker closure, a feature that is not
used in any nuclear power applications, and removal of the switch would
not affect breaker qualification or operation. The licensee subsequently
removed the switches from all of the safety related breakers.
At this time, it appears that only Summer has experienced this problem.
The breakers in question were refurbished by GE within the last year. The
explanation seems to be that there is no specification on bending the
cotter pins and it is possible that if the pin is not bent close enough
to the shaft during breaker reassembly, it can stick out far enough to
strike the latch check switch mounting bracket. GE is still investigating
the issue and has not yet made any generic recommendations concerning the
latch check switch or the cotter pin.
Contact: Dave Skeen, NRR
301-415-1174
Email: dls@nrc.gov
HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 8, 1999
MR Number: H-99-0058 (cont.)
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 8, 1999
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-99-0059
Not Available Date: 07/08/99
Subject: Part 21 - Source range power supply would not work properly
in -25 VDC slot as expected
Discussion:
VENDOR: Not Available PT21 FILE NO: 99-25-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 04/23/99 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9904300200
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, T. Koshy
NEW ISSUE. The Ginna licensee reports that a power supply procured for
use in the nuclear instrument system source ranges did not work properly
when installed in the -25 VDC slot but did work properly when installed
in the +25 VDC slot, contrary to expectation that the supply would work
properly in both slots. The licensee will return the power supply to the
vendor, which was not identified in the report, for evaluation, estimated
to be complete by October 1, 1999.
Contact: Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301) 415-1176
Email: txk@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JULY 8, 1999
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-99-0060
Ginna/Eaton Date: 07/08/99
Subject: Part 21 - Incorrectly wired coils in relay
Discussion:
VENDOR: Eaton PT21 FILE NO: 99-27-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 05/18/99 ACCESSION NUMBER:
SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 35731 REVIEWER: REXB, T. Koshy
NEW ISSUE. The Ginna licensee reports identifying a manufacturing
deficiency in control relays (NBFD65NR), manufactured by Eaton
Corporation, during testing before installing them in the reactor trip
logic. The relay coil was incorrectly wired such that the pickup coil and
the hold coil would oppose each other at low voltages, prohibiting
holding coil actuation. This resulted in excessive relay chatter. No
deficient relays were installed.
Contact: Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301) 415-1176
Email: txk@nrc.gov
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REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JULY 8, 1999
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
An Agreement State Licensee MR Number: 2-99-0012
Atc Group Services, Inc. Date: 07/08/99
Miami,Florida
Subject: RECOVERY OF STOLEN GAUGE
Discussion:
Florida, an Agreement State, informed the NRC that the licensee reported
the theft and subsequent recovery of a portable moisture density gauge.
The device was stolen during the night of July 2, 1999, from a truck
located at the employee's home in Homestead, Florida. The device was a
Troxler model 3411B, serial number 15140, containing 40 millicuries of
americium-241 and 6 millicuries of cesium-137. Local authorities were
notified. An individual reported finding the device and called 911. A
local hazmat team responded to the call and returned the device to the
owner. The owner reported that the device was not damaged and performed
a leak test on the device. The State Bureau of Radiation Control
conducted an inspection and has the event under review.
Contact: R. Woodruff (404)562-4704
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 JULY 8, 1999
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-99-0061
Potter & Brumfield Date: 07/08/99
Subject: Part 21 - Insufficient welding attachment of contact pads
in relays
Discussion:
VENDOR: Potter & Brumfield PT21 FILE NO: 99-26-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 05/06/99 ACCESSION NUMBER:
SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 35685 REVIEWER: REXB, T. Koshy
NEW ISSUE. The San Onofre Unit 2 licensee reports a manufacturing defect
in lot 913501 of Potter & Brumfield relays, model KUP93-14A32-120. The
vendor supplied these relays as commercial grade items that the licensee
dedicated for safety-related service in the auxiliary building emergency
chiller system. The licensee's laboratory analysis revealed insufficient
welding of contact pads to contact arms. The licensee determined that
this defect is specific to this lot and replaced the installed relays
from this lot with new Potter & Brumfield relays containing contact pads
that are riveted to their contact arms.
Contact: Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301) 415-1176
Email: txk@nrc.gov
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021