Event Notification Report for December 31, 2025
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Event Text
Event Text
Event Text
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/30/2025 - 12/31/2025
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58036
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jeffrey Myers
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jeffrey Myers
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 11/12/2025
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2025
Event Time: 12:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2025
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2025
Event Time: 12:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/30/2025
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 12, 2025, at approximately 1250 EST, during surveillance testing of the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system the HPCI minimum flow valve (E4150F012) would not open during stroke testing. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0957, November 12, 2025. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1250 when a stroke time test was attempted, and the valve did not reposition. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. Reactor core isolation cooling was and has remained operable. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The failure is currently under investigation."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Limiting conditions for operation 3.5.1 and 3.6.1.3 were entered to address HPCI inoperable. The site remains on normal offsite power, and all emergency diesel generators remain available.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/2025 AT 0931 EST FROM BOBBY HART TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"Following the initial [event notification] EN, further analysis of the condition identified that the HPCI system would have been able to perform its safety function with the minimum flow valve failed closed. Therefore, HPCI is considered operable.
"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 58036 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified R3DO (Sanchez Santiago)
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 12, 2025, at approximately 1250 EST, during surveillance testing of the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system the HPCI minimum flow valve (E4150F012) would not open during stroke testing. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0957, November 12, 2025. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1250 when a stroke time test was attempted, and the valve did not reposition. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. Reactor core isolation cooling was and has remained operable. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The failure is currently under investigation."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Limiting conditions for operation 3.5.1 and 3.6.1.3 were entered to address HPCI inoperable. The site remains on normal offsite power, and all emergency diesel generators remain available.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/2025 AT 0931 EST FROM BOBBY HART TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"Following the initial [event notification] EN, further analysis of the condition identified that the HPCI system would have been able to perform its safety function with the minimum flow valve failed closed. Therefore, HPCI is considered operable.
"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 58036 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified R3DO (Sanchez Santiago)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58101
Facility: McGuire
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Michael Grembecki
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Michael Grembecki
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 12/29/2025
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2025
Event Time: 12:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2025
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2025
Event Time: 12:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Nielsen, Adam (R2DO)
Nielsen, Adam (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/30/2025
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1229 EST on 12/29/2025, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a lockout of the main generator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip.
"Operations manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps due to anticipation of automatic actuation and has stabilized Unit 1. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser. Unit 2 was not affected.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical and actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1229 EST on 12/29/2025, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a lockout of the main generator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip.
"Operations manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps due to anticipation of automatic actuation and has stabilized Unit 1. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser. Unit 2 was not affected.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical and actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58102
Facility: LaSalle
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Brock Pollmann
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Brock Pollmann
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 12/29/2025
Notification Time: 21:08 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2025
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2025
Notification Time: 21:08 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2025
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Degraded Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Degraded Condition
Person (Organization):
Sanchez Santiago, Elba (R3DO)
Sanchez Santiago, Elba (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DEGRADED CONDITION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1600 CST on 12/29/2025, it was determined that a through-wall leak identified on a three-quarter inch vent valve off of the bonnet of the Unit 1 'B' reactor recirculation flow control valve qualifies as pressure boundary leakage resulting in a degraded reactor coolant system pressure boundary. Leakage repair will be completed prior to plant startup from the current outage. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.? The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois will be notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
This event is related to EN 58100.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1600 CST on 12/29/2025, it was determined that a through-wall leak identified on a three-quarter inch vent valve off of the bonnet of the Unit 1 'B' reactor recirculation flow control valve qualifies as pressure boundary leakage resulting in a degraded reactor coolant system pressure boundary. Leakage repair will be completed prior to plant startup from the current outage. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.? The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois will be notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
This event is related to EN 58100.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated December 31, 2025