Event Notification Report for August 06, 2026

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On July 28, 2026, at approximately 0751 EDT during the production activities of Sr-82, a pressurized line used for argon burst inside the production hot cell. The burst resulted in the hot cell to be temporarily positively pressurized releasing radioactive material outside of the hot cell. Three operators that were part of the production activities became internally and externally contaminated. An additional operator that was not part of the production activities but assisted when the burst was escalated to the production manager also was internally and externally contaminated. The operators were unaware of the contamination and continued working for approximately 1.2 hours. One operator found contamination when performing a whole-body scan after donning his personal protective equipment (PPE) and exiting the production area. The operator alerted a radiation safety technician at 0922.

"The radiation safety technician communicated the incident to the principal health physicist (who was acting as the radiation safety officer (RSO)) at 0930. The principal health physicist communicated the incident to the director of the RSO at 1017. The director of the RSO immediately initiated a stop work. The principal health physicist communicated the stop work to production personnel and removed them from the production area. The principal health physicist, health physicist, and radiation safety technician performed contamination surveys of the affected individuals, collected air samples in the affected area, collected large area wipes, decontaminated the affected individuals and collected bioassay samples to estimate external and internal doses. The derived airborne concentration (DAC) in the affected area was measured to be 1.02E-08 microcuries/mL for Sr-82. The [10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 1 value for] DAC for Sr-82 is 2E-07 microcuries/mL. Health Physics also performed large area wipes of the affected area and estimated the total activity release to be approximately 135 mCi (July 29th at 1053).

"Immediately after the total activity was estimated, the principal health physicist communicated the results to the RSO. The principal health physicist and RSO called the NRC Operations Center to report the event under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1). At the time of this report, the occupational doses for the affected operators have not been completed. Based on area air samples, the total internal dose is expected to be approximately 1 mrem. The expected shallow-dose equivalent (SDE) to the whole-body is estimated to be 3.4 rem. The total intake, committed dose equivalent (CDE), committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE), and total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) will be estimated from the bioassay samples and additional count rate measurements.

"The affected area is access controlled using normal badging system and isolated. Health Physics implemented additional PPE requirements with a third layer of shoe covers and is initiating the decontamination of the area."

MEDICAL EVENT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A routine yttrium-90 (Y-90) microsphere radioembolization treatment performed in the hospital on July 29, 2026. The radiopharmaceutical used in this treatment, Y-90 microspheres, are manufactured under the brand name Therasphere, which is produced by Boston Scientific (Marlboro, MA, USA). In this procedure, a catheter is guided through the patient's vasculature until it reaches the blood vessels feeding a tumor in the liver. From this position, the radiopharmaceutical is administered to the tumor by injection through the catheter. During the procedure, the radiopharmaceutical was administered by an authorized user (AU) on July 29, 2026. The treatment was delivered as planned, with 13.5 mCi administered to a hepatocellular carcinoma tumor in the left lobe of a patient's liver. Post-treatment Bremsstrahlung imaging was performed to verify localization of the radiopharmaceutical. Later, an AU interpreted the post-treatment imaging and identified distribution of the radiopharmaceutical to the stomach and spleen. Dose projections are forthcoming due to the complexity of the procedure. The licensee is working through the investigation of the incident and will follow the NRC guidelines for communicating with the patient and submitting a written report."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On July 30, 2026, the Department was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that while performing a walk around of the equipment on a wellsite near Dilley, Texas, the technician noticed a Berthold LB8010 gauge with the shutter handle and shaft missing. Using a survey meter, they discovered that the shutter was in the open position and could not be closed. The gauge was transported to the Pearsall facility in a Type A container and placed into storage. The RSO stated the gauge will be transported to their Odessa, Texas facility where it will be disposed of at their next schedule disposal at the end of 2026. The source's activity is 20 mCi and the nuclide is Cesium-137. No overexposures occurred due to this event.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: 10314

Texas NMED Number: TX260029

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for the invalid actuation of an emergency diesel generator (EDG).

"On June 8, 2026, at approximately 0815 EDT, during prerequisite activities for system maintenance, the 'E' EDG started due to an invalid actuation of the EDG emergency mode start logic. This condition was caused by improper installation of a switch jumper that prevented isolation of the 'E' EDG emergency mode start logic. The 'E' EDG and its support systems functioned as designed. Since the actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the systems, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation."

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."