Event Notification Report for June 29, 2026

INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - VALVE ASSEMBLY MOTOR FAILURE

The following is a summary of information provided by ABB Motors and Mechanical (ABB) via phone and email:

Potential defects were identified in safety-related motors supplied via Flowserve. Flowserve and ABB were informed that during commissioning of a new SBD-3 actuator and valve assembly, the actuator motor failed to operate. A summary of a third-party failure analysis provided by Bruce Power indicated that the likely cause of the failure was attributable to mechanical interference between a rotor balance weight and the stator winding causing insulation damage and turn-to-turn short. To date, the subject motor has not been returned to ABB for inspection.

Affected Plants: Unknown

Component Information:
Component Type: Safety-related AC electric motors for motor-operated valve (MOV) applications.
Motor Serial Number: GG215020118 supplied to Flowserve Corp.- Limitorque Actuation.
Motor Identifier: Flowserve part# R-403-F03-080000A20
Description: 100 ft-lb, 3/60/575, 2-pole motor

Contact Information:
Sam Bosworth
ABB Motors and Mechanical Inc.
Interim Quality Manager
Office: (678) 947-7274
Email: sam.bosworth@us.abb.com
Address: 4349 Avery Drive, Flowery Branch, GA, 30542

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2030 EDT on June 26, 2026, it was determined that the primary, backup, and alternate methods for site emergency response organization (SERO) notifications were lost.

"This event constitutes a major loss of off-site communications capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2255 EDT on June 26, 2026, with the unit operating at 100 percent power, V. C. Summer staff was notified by the nuclear licensing and emergency preparedness group, that a nationwide Dominion Energy Emergency Notification System (DEENS) Everbridge outage resulted in the loss of the primary and alternate methods for emergency response organization (ERO) notifications.

"This event constitutes a major loss of off-site communications capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2115 EDT on June 26, 2026, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power, North Anna Power Station operations was notified by the corporate emergency preparedness organization that a nationwide Dominion Energy Emergency Notification System (DEENS) Everbridge outage resulted in a loss of the primary, backup, and alternate methods for emergency response organization (ERO) notifications per VPAP-2802.

"This event constitutes a major loss of off-site communications capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2121 EDT on June 26, 2026, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power, Surry Power Station Operations was notified by the corporate emergency preparedness organization that a nationwide Dominion Energy Emergency Notification System (DEENS) Everbridge outage resulted in a loss of the primary, backup, and alternate methods for emergency response organization (ERO) notifications per VPAP-2802.

"This event constitutes a major loss of off-site communications capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On June 26, 2026, at 2242 EDT, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station control room personnel were notified of a nationwide outage impacting the mass notification system (Everbridge). The outage resulted in complete loss of all notification methods to emergency response organization (ERO) personnel. Control room personnel were subsequently notified that Everbridge was restored at 2300.

"This event constitutes a major loss of offsite communications capability between the site and ERO personnel assigned offsite and is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), loss of emergency preparedness capabilities.

"This event had no adverse impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."