Event Notification Report for November 20, 2025
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Event Text
Event Text
Event Text
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/19/2025 - 11/20/2025
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58043
Facility: Dresden
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: Bora Tuncer
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: Bora Tuncer
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 11/18/2025
Notification Time: 00:28 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2025
Event Time: 16:13 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2025
Notification Time: 00:28 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2025
Event Time: 16:13 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Orlikowski, Robert (R3DO)
Orlikowski, Robert (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 2 | 2 |
HPCI INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1613 CST on November 17, 2025, it was discovered that the single train of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The isolation condenser was operable during this time period.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
A fuse in the turbine stop valve circuit blew during initial system testing for unit startup.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1613 CST on November 17, 2025, it was discovered that the single train of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The isolation condenser was operable during this time period.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
A fuse in the turbine stop valve circuit blew during initial system testing for unit startup.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58046
Facility: Palisades
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: Paul Rhodes
HQ OPS Officer: Jordan Wingate
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: Paul Rhodes
HQ OPS Officer: Jordan Wingate
Notification Date: 11/18/2025
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2025
Event Time: 09:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2025
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2025
Event Time: 09:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Orlikowski, Robert (R3DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Orlikowski, Robert (R3DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | 0 |
FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 18, 2025, [non-licensed] supervisor violated the station's fitness for duty (FFD) policy. The employee's unescorted access to Palisades Nuclear Plant has been terminated. The event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 18, 2025, [non-licensed] supervisor violated the station's fitness for duty (FFD) policy. The employee's unescorted access to Palisades Nuclear Plant has been terminated. The event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58049
Facility: Limerick
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Derek Herr
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Derek Herr
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 11/19/2025
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2025
Event Time: 03:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2025
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2025
Event Time: 03:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | 10 |
LOSS OF REACTOR ENCLOSURE RECIRCULATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 18, 2025, at 0328 CST, as the licensee was initiating the standby gas treatment system in support of planned maintenance on normal reactor building ventilation, the '2A' reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) fan failed to establish flow upon the system initiation signal. The '2B' RERS fan was previously inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. Technical specification action statement 3.6.5.4.B was entered with both Unit 2 RERS fans inoperable. The '2B' RERS fan was restored to operable at 0523 EST. The licensee returned normal reactor building ventilation to service to restore secondary containment differential pressure.
Due to inoperability of both RERS trains, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(C).
The licensee reported there was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 18, 2025, at 0328 CST, as the licensee was initiating the standby gas treatment system in support of planned maintenance on normal reactor building ventilation, the '2A' reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) fan failed to establish flow upon the system initiation signal. The '2B' RERS fan was previously inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. Technical specification action statement 3.6.5.4.B was entered with both Unit 2 RERS fans inoperable. The '2B' RERS fan was restored to operable at 0523 EST. The licensee returned normal reactor building ventilation to service to restore secondary containment differential pressure.
Due to inoperability of both RERS trains, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(C).
The licensee reported there was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated November 20, 2025