Current Event Notification Report for May 09, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/9/2025

EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) ACCUMULATORS INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0028 EDT on 4/20/2025, it was discovered that all trains of the ECCS accumulators were simultaneously inoperable. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The safety function was restored at 0028 on 04/20/2025 and all required trains have been declared operable. There was no impact to the other unit.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The sample lines for each accumulator cold leg were open for inspection, which crossties the cold leg accumulator gas spaces. Upon discovery of this condition, the sample lines were subsequently closed, and the accumulators were declared operable.

* * * RETRACTION ON 05/08/2025 AT 1716 EDT FROM HUNTER LAUSTED TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This report retracts the 8-hour notification made on April 20, 2025, for NRC Event Number 57673.

"NRC Event Report Number 57673 describes a condition at McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 where all trains of ECCS accumulators were declared inoperable. This condition was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further engineering review, all four ECCS accumulators were operable and would have performed their specified safety functions with all four nuclear sampling system (inside containment) isolation valves open, concurrent with the most limiting large break loss of coolant accident and worst-case single failure. Therefore, this event is not reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and is hereby retracted.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Franke)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIATION EXPOSURE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On May 1, 2025, a crew made up of a radiographer trainee and a trainer were working on a job site near Orla, Texas. They were using a 58 Ci Ir-192 source [probably with] a Source Production and Equipment Company (SPEC) 150 device. The radiation safety officer (RSO) stated they had completed a shot and the trainer went to look at the digital picture of the weld. The trainee went to the pipe to setup the next shot. The trainee removed the source collimator and set it down. The trainee began to remove the imaging device when the trainer walked up, and the trainer's alarming rate meter went off. The two radiographers left the area, went back to the crank out handle, and found the source was still cranked out and in the collimator. The radiographers retracted the source to the fully shielded position. The trainee's self-reading dosimeter was off scale. The radiographers contacted the RSO and informed them of the event.

"The local RSO had the radiographers reenact the event. It was determined that the trainee was near the exposed source for about three minutes. The trainee reported the collimator was strapped to a stand. The trainee did not touch the collimator when he was moving the source. The majority of the dose would have been to the trainee's knee because of the way the trainee carried the stand with the source. They believe the trainee would have been at least 18 inches from the source during the event. They also believe the trainee was exposed to the source for three minutes. The calculated dose to the knee ranges between 500 millirem and 7.8 rem, depending on what direction the collimator port was facing.

"The trainee's alarming rate meter was tested after the event and functioned properly. The trainee's dosimeter is being sent in for processing, but the results will probably not be received until May 5, 2025.

"[The Department] requested pictures of the hands of the individual involved in the event to be taken and submitted daily for the next week. The RSO agreed to submit a written report on Monday May 5, 2025."

Texas incident report number: 10195
Texas NMED number: TX250026

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE REMOVAL

The following is a summary of information provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program (the Department) via email:

On May 2, 2025, the Department was notified via email by the licensee, of an incident where a Kay-Ray Cs-137 source was removed from its installation location by an unauthorized contractor. The source is secured under lock and key and is being stored by the licensee. Upon receipt of further information, the Department will update this report as more information comes in.

Georgia Incident Number: 95

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE

The following information was provided by the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) via email:

"The NYSDOH Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection (BERP) received an email from the radiation safety officer of Westchester County Department of Laboratories and Research (DOLR) on May 1, 2025, to report a leaking Ni-63 electron capture device (ECD) from an Agilent 5890GC [Control Module] that was decommissioned pending disposal. The ECD has been locked in storage and not in service.

"Device: Agilent
"Device Model: 5890GC
"Serial No.: U3284
"Isotope: Ni-63

"The licensee was conducting a leak test and wipe of the decommissioned gas chromatography unit. The wipe test for the ECD housing had removable contamination detected at 7,741 pCi when analyzed using a proportional counter. The device is in the initial stages of returning to Agilent and the licensee was performing the wipe test prior to shipment. The licensee is contacting Agilent for additional guidance.

"NYSDOH BERP is actively monitoring this event under Incident Number 1530. Additional information will be provided to NMED once available."

Event Report ID Number: NYSDOH-25-06

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PACKAGES

The following information was provided by the Massachusetts Radioactive Material Unit (the Agency) via email:

"On 4/30/25, four radioactive material packages were to be received by the licensee, Boston University and Boston Medical Center (MA license number 44-0062). Two packages showed up just after 1000 EDT, but one package containing 7mCi of S-35 and another package containing 0.5 mCi of P-32 were not received. The packages were shipped from Revvity Health Sciences, Inc. (MA license number 00-3200).

"An investigation was opened with the common carrier, which is currently ongoing.

"The reporting requirement is within 30 days and is of 105 CMR [Code of Massachusetts Regulations] 120.281(A)(2), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 10 times quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C.

"The Agency considers this event to be open."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The following is a summary information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax:

At 2108 EDT, on May 6, 2026, with Unit 3 in mode 5 at zero percent power, the plant received main steam line isolation, containment isolation phase 'A', and a safety injection signal which caused the emergency diesel generator to automatically start. The initiation signals were cause by inadvertent clearing of the pressurizer pressure low interlock during maintenance. There was no impact to decay heat removal, no injection into the core, and no loading of the emergency diesel generator. Operations staff responded and returned the plant to normal mode 5 operations.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

DEGRADED CONDITION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On May 6, 2025, with Callaway Plant in mode 3 ascending from refueling outage 27, plant personnel identified a dry white residue resembling boric acid at the interface between the reactor vessel and bottom-mounted instrument nozzle No.48. At 2220 CDT, the shift manager determined that a reactor coolant pressure boundary leak had been identified. The determination was based on the residue appearing to be in the annulus of the nozzle where it penetrates the bottom head and the residue did not previously exist during earlier inspections of the area during refueling outage 27.

"Detailed examination of the apparent leak has not yet been performed due to radiological conditions, but the condition is being treated as a reactor coolant pressure leak. As such, the condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The apparent leak placed the plant in LCO 3.4.13.B. The plant is evaluating the leak repair corrective actions and preparing for cooldown.

PART 21 - CIRCUIT BREAKER DEFECT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On March 7, 2025, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) issued 10 CFR Part 21 Communication SC 25-01 for a molded case circuity breaker (MCCB), in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b). Testing performed by GEH identified a deviation in two (2) breakers; specifically, GEH part number DD148C6151P004 (Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) part number: TB13030BWE05). These MCCBs failed to instantaneously trip at the designated current/time.

"James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) completed an evaluation of this deviation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1) on May 6, 2025, and concluded this condition is a defect which could create a substantial safety hazard. The instantaneous trip function of this component protects safety-related buses from tripping on an overcurrent condition.

"JAF was listed as the only affected plant. It was determined that the defect does not exist in any installed plant equipment because bench testing performed prior to installation includes overcurrent trip testing and would have identified this defect. The components affected by this defect have been restricted to prevent them from being installed pending corrective action resolution.

"This letter is submitted as a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). Additional details will be provided in a written report within 30 days, in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii).

"There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector at JAF has been notified. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mark Hawes, Regulatory Assurance, at (315) 349-6659."

Known affected power plants:
James A. FitzPatrick