Event Notification Report for April 07, 2026

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/7/2026

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT

The following information was provided by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) via phone:

On March 9, 2026, at approximately 1430 CDT, while attempting to retract the source assembly following an exposure, the licensee radiography crew noted that the camera auto locking feature did not engage and the crew survey meter showed elevated readings. The radiography crew expanded their boundary at the job location and placed lead blankets over the source in an attempt to reduce area dose rates. The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) was contacted to respond to the job site to perform source recovery, as the RSO is qualified in that activity but not the radiography crew. The RSO recovered the source at 1934 CDT. The drive cable was found broken.

The highest personal dose reported by the radiography crew was 41 mrem. The RSO received 4 mrem.

Camera: QSA 880
Source: 18 Ci Ir-192

* * * UPDATE ON 04/06/2026 AT 1533 EDT FROM MICHAEL GRIES TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

The following 30-day report summary was received from DHHS via email:

On March 9, 2026, PROtect, LLC experienced a source disconnect incident during industrial radiography work at a customer's manufacturing facility in York, Nebraska. During a routine exposure at approximately 1424 CST, the radiography crew determined that the Ir-192 source had become disconnected from the drive cable. The crew identified the problem through their dosimetry readings and immediately established the required 2 mR/hr emergency boundaries.

The regional radiation safety officer (RRSO) was notified at 1437 CST and instructed the crew to maintain control of the restricted area. The Nebraska RSO arrived onsite at 1558 to verify the source location and inspect the drive cable. Inspection revealed that the 550-connector had broken off the drive cable and remained attached to the source pigtail.

The corporate radiation safety officer (CRSO) and RRSO instructed all personnel to wait for their arrival before proceeding. They arrived at 1903. Following PROtect's source retrieval procedures, the RSO team successfully returned the source to the 880 Delta exposure device at 1934. No member of the public received a dose above regulatory limits.

After confirming normal radiation levels and securing the source, the restricted area boundaries were removed. Three trained and QSA-certified employees participated in the retrieval.

Their recorded doses were:

CRSO: 2 mR
RRSO: 1.6 mR
Nebraska RSO: 8.1 mR

The incident was caused by mechanical failure of the drive cable directly behind the 550-connector assembly, resulting in separation of the connector from the cable. Although the exact root cause could not be definitively determined, contributing factors may have included:

1. Excessive mechanical force when cranking the source in or out of the exposure device.
2. Pulling on crank assemblies to move the exposure device, placing tension on the control cable.
3. Improper handling during connection/disconnection that stressed the connector and adjacent cable.
4. Insufficient or ineffective daily equipment inspections, potentially missing early signs of wear.

PROtect implemented a companywide inspection and maintenance campaign outside of the normal quarterly schedule. Certified site RSOs are inspecting and servicing all crank assemblies, drive cables, guide tubes, and related components. All activities are fully documented.

All employees received mandatory in-person safety standdown training emphasizing daily inspections and proper equipment handling. Attendance for all sessions has been documented. As of March 31, 2026, all standdowns and retraining activities were completed.

All three personnel onsite were carded radiographers.

Equipment Involved:

QSA Global 880 Delta Exposure Device - s/n D17550
QSA Global Ir-192 Source (18 Ci), Model A424-9 - s/n 17518P
QSA Global 35 ft Control Cables - s/n 12594
QSA Global 7 ft Guide Tube Extensions - s/n PRO-1984 & PRO-2046
QSA Global 24 in Rigid Guide Tube - s/n DBI-1227
QSA Global 4HVL Collimator - s/n PRO-1703

NE Item Number: NE260001

Notified R4DO (Bloodgood), NMSS Events Notification (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following is a summary of information provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via email:

The licensee reported that a normally open Berthold model P2623-100 fixed gauge (S/N 2571-8-90) with a 250 mCi Cs-137 source was found stuck in the open position during an annual maintenance shutdown. After the shutdown the licensee plans to move the source to their radiation storage trailer. The source will ultimately be sent for proper disposal.

Georgia incident number: 118

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST I-125 SEED

The following information was provided by the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:

"The Department received notification from the licensee of a lost I-125 seed used for localization. A patient was implanted with a 0.133 millicurie I-125 seed on March 18, 2026, with the placement of the seed verified by x-ray. The patient returned on March 27, 2026, to have the tissue and seed removed. The tissue with seed was verified by x-ray and then sent to pathology, where no seed was [found]. The operating room was surveyed, but the seed was not located. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION

The following is a summary of information provided by the Defense Health Agency via phone:

On March 30, 2026, at 0730 MDT, a nuclear technician dropped a vial containing 200 millicuries of technetium-99m in the hot lab. The technician's shoes, lab floor, and surrounding areas were contaminated. The technician's shoes and the lab floor were decontaminated. Areas that still had detectable levels of contamination were covered with a lead apron. The spread of contamination was limited to the hot lab. Access to the hot lab has been restricted.

* * * RETRACTION ON 03/31/2026 AT 0913 EDT FROM RICARDO REYES TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Based on reporting requirements in 10CFR30.50(b), the spill does not meet the criteria for reporting an unplanned contamination event. Please retract event notification EN 58223."

Notified R4DO (Deese), R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification (email).

LOST RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN TRANSIT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:

On March 5, 2026, at 1224 CST, River Bend declared a radioactive materials shipment lost after it was supposed to be delivered by February 2, 2026. The last time the shipment was scanned in the tracking system was on February 11, 2026, at the [common carrier] distribution warehouse in Pearl, MS. The device is a digital acquisition unit inside a Pelican case which contains 122 microcuries of Co-60. River Bend plans on notifying the State of Mississippi regarding the lost material. Because the quantity of radioactive material lost exceeds 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to part 20, this is being reported as a non-emergency loss of licensed material.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On February 3, 2026, Unit 3 experienced a loss of 'A' reactor protection system (RPS). The 3A RPS motor generator (MG) set was found tripped and coasting down. This condition resulted in a half-scram on channel 'A' as well as primary containment isolation system (PCIS) group 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations. RPS 'A' was placed on alternate in accordance with 3-AOI-99-1. All systems responded as expected.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 2 and 8 actuations are reactor vessel low water level and high drywell pressure. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 3 actuations are reactor vessel low water level and reactor water cleanup area high temperature. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 6 actuations are reactor vessel low water level, high drywell pressure, or reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation (reactor zone or refuel zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"Upon investigation, a conductor was found broken inside the crimp of a ring lug, most likely due to overtightening and high cyclic fatigue. The lug was on the conductor between the contacts of the thermal overload relays. This opened the circuit to the 1K relay, and the motor starter, which was the cause of the loss of the MG set. The lug was repaired, the condition was cleared, and all systems were realigned as necessary.

"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

"This event was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2065520.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."