Event Notification Report for May 01, 2026

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/1/2026

EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION - PELLETS FOUND IN DRAIN PIPING

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On April 22, 2026, at approximately 0700 EDT, engineering initiated planned integrity inspections of the pellet sintering furnace cooling water drain piping as part of the established aging management program. This evaluation of piping conditions supports long-term refurbishment or replacement planning. At approximately 0930 EDT, inspection activities were stopped when personnel observed approximately nine fuel pellets embedded in scale within a section of 4-inch drain piping, along with two isolated pellets located a few feet farther downstream where the piping diameter increases to 6 inches.

"The condition was reported to environmental, health, and safety. Inspection activities were halted, and the system was placed in a safe condition. Pelleting area operations were already down for the upcoming inventory period and will remain down pending further investigation. The condition was entered into the corrective action program for further analysis and evaluation. At this time, the investigation is ongoing, and this report is being submitted per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (b)(1), as a potential unanalyzed condition in the integrated safety analysis (ISA). There is no impact to the public or the environment."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The sintering furnace cooling water drain piping drains to a monitored chemical cooling tower. No pellets are expected in the drain piping. There was no spread of contamination or environmental release.

* * * RETRACTION ON 04/30/2026 AT 0912 EDT FROM STEPHEN SUBOSITS TO CHRISTOPHER PRESCOTT * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"In response to a potential unanalyzed condition reported on April 23, 2026, Westinghouse conducted additional camera inspection of the cooling water drain piping, completed an engineering calculation to determine the fluid dynamics condition of the cooling water piping, and performed a criticality safety evaluation (CSE) to assess the potential for special nuclear material accumulation. The revised CSE determined that a credible upset condition did not exist. Westinghouse is retracting the event report based on the determination that a criticality scenario was not credible for the condition found on April 22, 2026."

Notified R2DO (Williams) and NMSS Events Notification (email)

LOST SOURCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On March 26, 2026, at 2003 EDT, during a required semiannual source inventory, Hatch discovered that a radioactive source was missing. The source had been positively accounted for during the September 2025 inventory.

"The material involved is a National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable mixed-gamma calibration source (source ID 0091-00-00). It is a solid epoxy source contained in a 125 mL plastic bottle and was decay-corrected to approximately 0.22 microcuries at the time of discovery.

"The lost radioactive material includes americium-241 in excess of 10 times the quantity specified in appendix C to part 20. Therefore, this is reported as a nonemergency loss of licensed material under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On April 23, 2026, the Department was notified by the licensee that during routine testing, the shutter of a Ronan Engineering model SA-F37 gauge failed to close. Open is the normal position of the shutter. The gauge contains a 100 mCi (original activity) cesium-137 source. The licensee reported the gauge does not present an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee reported that a service company has been contacted to repair the gauge.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."

Texas incident number: 10283

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via phone and email:

"On April 23, 2026, the Agency received notification from the licensee regarding a stuck source shutter on a fixed nuclear gauge. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega SHF1A model, containing a 20 millicurie cesium-137 sealed source. The licensee reported that during routine plant maintenance checks conducted on April 23, 2026, technicians identified a shutter that was sticking and determined that one of the bolts on the shutter had broken, causing the shutter to become stuck in the open position. Open is the normal operating position. No workers or members of the public were exposed to radiation because of this event. The licensee further stated that arrangements had been made for a service provider to repair the gauge on April 27, 2026.

"Additional Information will be provided in accordance with SA300 reporting requirements."

Texas Incident Number: 10284

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On April 23, 2026, the licensee reported that one of their radiography crews was unable to retract a source back into a QSA 880D exposure device. The device contains an 88.4 curie iridium-192 source. The radiation safety officer (RSO) reported the crew was conducting an exposure when a pipe rolled onto the guide tube crimping it to a point where they were unable to retract the source beyond the crimp. The radiographers drove the source back into the collimator. The radiographers isolated the area and contacted the site RSO. The RSO responded to the location and placed bags of lead shot over the source/collimator. The RSO tapped on the crimp in the guide tube until the guide tube was open enough for the source to be retracted into the fully shielded position in the exposure device. No overexposures occurred due to this event.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300"

Texas incident number: 10285

STUCK SHUTTER

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone:

The license reported that the normally open shutter on a fixed gauge could not be closed during semiannual testing. The gauge is a Vega model SHF1 with a 10 mCi Cs-137 source. Access to the refiner vessel where the gauge is installed has been restricted by protective tagging to prevent inadvertent exposures.

The licensee has contacted the manufacturer for repair or replacement of the gauge.