Event Notification Report for August 03, 2026

EN Revision Imported Date: 8/3/2026

EN Revision Text: INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - VALVE ASSEMBLY MOTOR FAILURE

The following is a summary of information provided by ABB Motors and Mechanical (ABB) via phone and email:

Potential defects were identified in safety-related motors supplied via Flowserve. Flowserve and ABB were informed that during commissioning of a new SBD-3 actuator and valve assembly, the actuator motor failed to operate. A summary of a third-party failure analysis provided by Bruce Power indicated that the likely cause of the failure was attributable to mechanical interference between a rotor balance weight and the stator winding causing insulation damage and turn-to-turn short. To date, the subject motor has not been returned to ABB for inspection.

Affected Plants: Unknown

Component Information:
Component Type: Safety-related AC electric motors for motor-operated valve (MOV) applications.
Motor Serial Number: GG215020118 supplied to Flowserve Corp.- Limitorque Actuation.
Motor Identifier: Flowserve part# R-403-F03-080000A20
Description: 100 ft-lb, 3/60/575, 2-pole motor

Contact Information:
Sam Bosworth
ABB Motors and Mechanical Inc.
Interim Quality Manager
Office: (678) 947-7274
Email: sam.bosworth@us.abb.com
Address: 4349 Avery Drive, Flowery Branch, GA, 30542

* * * UPDATE ON 07/31/2026 AT 1705 EDT FROM SAM BOSWORTH TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by ABB Motors and Mechanical (ABB) via email:

"ABB continues to perform an extent of condition analysis to identify motor designs which could potentially be affected. Subsequently, a review of available borescope inspections of the motor lot size procured on this specific order was completed eliminating motors which could be visually verified to have no weights added to the rotor during the balancing process. As an engineering enhancement of the motor design, balance weights have been eliminated. Work instructions have been revised accordingly. Inspection checks have also been implemented to verify no balance weights have been used.

"ABB has identified seven motors at risk using several parameters including but not limited to ship date and inspection records. The list of motors below, identified by serial number, is being shared with our customer Flowserve for assistance identifying the location and end user of the motor. This information will be provided when available. It should be noted that if a motor has been in service and operating without issue there is minimal risk for this condition. ABB recommends performing a megger test on the following serial numbers which can be found on the motor nameplate. If utility has a defined preventative maintenance program for insulation resistance follow that protocol.

"Testing Guidance:
 Compare new megohm readings to historical baseline data
 Consistent readings confirm motor integrity
 For motors without baseline data: acceptable minimum is 5 megaohms (new condition)
 Results at or above baseline = Motor can be cleared from this nonconformance

"List of Motors
GG215120026
GG201320128
GG194420114
GG194020217
GG184220163
89160683-010-002
81199658-010-001

"This is the second Interim notification. Per the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(d) a follow-up notification of evaluation status will be submitted on or before August 14, 2026."

Notified R1DO (Haney), Part 21 Reactors (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On July 24, 2026, the licensee notified the Department of a lost industrial radiography device. The device, a SPEC 150 camera, contains a 16 Ci Ir-192 source. The licensee reported that it was lost by [the common carrier] during shipment from its Midland, Texas offices to the vendor in Louisiana for a source change. The licensee stated that it was notified by [the common carrier] that the device was missing on July 21, 2026, and has been working with the vendor and [the common carrier] since then to locate the device. The licensee also stated that [the common carrier] had closed the ticket opened to locate the source before the source was recovered. Additional information will be made available in accordance with SA 300 reporting requirements."

Texas Incident Number: 10311
Texas NMED Number: TX260026

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program (the Program) via email:

"At 0909 EDT on July 15, 2026, the Program was notified of a damaged shutter on a fixed gauge. This notification is being submitted in accordance with applicable Georgia Radiation Control regulations requiring prompt notification and written follow-up regarding equipment malfunctions affecting licensed radioactive material. On July 14, 2026, at approximately 1930 EDT, during the required six-month inventory and shutter inspection, damage was identified on an Ohmart shutter, model SH-100 (SN 60423), with a 20 mCi Cs-137 source. Upon discovery, the facility's Ohmart/Vega service representative was contacted immediately to assess the condition and determine appropriate corrective actions. Area leadership was notified of the issue, and it was communicated that if vessel entry became necessary, the source would have to be removed and could not be reinstalled. No damage to the source holder itself was identified. The service representative arrived onsite on July 16, 2026, at approximately 0730 EDT to evaluate the shutter malfunction. During the assessment, it was determined that the lead component used to shield the radiation beam had worn and shifted from its intended position. The lead was secured to restore shutter operation; however, the repair did not return the device to original manufacturer specifications. As a result, the shutter can no longer be utilized to lock out the source for vessel entry. The source holder remains in a safe operating condition and continues to be suitable for process measurement applications. The source is installed on a vessel with no routine personnel access. Because of the device's location and operating requirements, lockout of the source is not anticipated to be necessary in the foreseeable future. A tag is placed at the source holder identifying that it cannot be locked out for vessel entry. The service representative is currently developing options for either shutter replacement or replacement and disposal of the existing source. Additional evaluation is also underway to determine whether the source can be removed from service entirely."

Georgia Incident Number: 126

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MEDICAL SEED

The following is a summary of information provided by the PA Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

On July 24, 2026, the licensee notified the Department of a lost prostate seed. It was discovered that the seed was missing on July 23, 2026. It is reportable under 10 CFR 20.2201 and 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(2)(i).

On July 23, 2026, a patient was receiving a prostate treatment with Theragenics Cs-131 seeds (3.31 mCi per seed). During the treatment, the Mick applicator became disengaged from the needle hub. The total number of seeds to be implanted was five. However, it was discovered after post implant imaging that only two seeds were implanted. The rest of the seeds were thought to have ended up in the needle or the stabilization equipment. A survey located an additional two seeds with one seed left missing. At the time of discovery, the procedure room, equipment, patient transport bed, linens, trash and surrounding areas to the procedure room were surveyed with a survey meter to attempt to locate the missing seed. The survey was unsuccessful in locating the remaining seed. The Department will perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided as received.

Pennsylvania Event Number: PA260013

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On June 8, 2026, at 1259 PDT, Columbia Generating Station's leak detection monitor '1A' (LD-MON-1A) caused an isolation of RWCU-V-4 (reactor water cleanup outboard isolation valve) and RCIC-V-8 (reactor core isolation cooling outboard steam supply isolation valve).

"Based on a review of available information by engineering, the actuations were determined to be invalid and likely the result of an intermittent nuclear measurement analysis and control (NUMAC) bus communication fault as plant conditions for a valid actuation did not exist.

"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, this was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.

"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written licensee event report. This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for invalid actuations reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The following information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:

(a) Containment Isolation Valves RWCU-V-4 and RCIC-V-8 isolated.

(b) All expected isolations based on the as-found condition of the leak detection monitor were completed.

(c) The isolation of RWCU-V-4 and RCIC-V-8 completed successfully.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN

The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

The licensee reported that one exit sign, containing 9.21 Ci of tritium, was lost in Westminster, Colorado.

Manufacturer: SRB Technologies
Model number: BX-10-GY

Colorado event number: CO260014

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf