Event Notification Report for July 31, 2026

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS

The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

The licensee declared eight exit signs as lost on July 9, 2026. The exit signs were manufactured by SRB Technologies, model number BXU20GS, and contained 17.5 Ci of tritium each.

Colorado Event Number: CO260012

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

MEDICAL EVENT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On 7/22/26, three prostate seed implants were scheduled at the Delaware Surgery Center, 200 Banning Street, Dover, DE, NRC license number 07-35521-01.

"The first implant was with I-125 seeds in preloaded cartridges (vendor Theragenics) used with a Mick applicator. It was completed successfully.

"The second case was with a Pd-103 (200) anchor-seed in preloaded cartridges (Theragenics) with a Mick applicator. During the beginning of this second case (first needle seed deployment), the sixth seed could not be deployed. The Mick plunger would not advance past the cartridge. It was felt that the cartridge might be defective, and an attempt was made to remove it, so that a new cartridge could be used. The cartridge did not slide out easily, and when it did the Mick plunger was pushed a few times. It was noticed that a seed had broken in half and fell onto the table. Both of the pieces were retrieved and stored in a shielded container. The Mick gun was surveyed and showed background activity level. The difficulty in pushing seeds through the cartridges persisted with a new cartridge and a new Mick gun. After the sixth seed was deployed, the plunger would not advance again. While checking the Mick gun and the cartridges at the table to identify the issue, it was observed that the plunger would advance with difficulty, and when the seeds pushed out of the cartridge, they seemed to be adhering to the gun components. At this point, it was decided to abort the case due to the difficulty with this lot of seeds and cartridges, and so that the procedure can be more easily successfully completed at a later date as only 6 out of the 97 planned seeds were implanted. After all the seeds were counted and stored in their shielded container, the area was thoroughly surveyed, and no trace of residual radioactivity was detected on the table, Mick applicators and the surrounding areas in the room, indicating that the broken seed had not contaminated any of the surroundings. The room was subsequently cleared for the next case.

"The third implant was with I-125 seeds in preloaded cartridges (vendor Theragenics) used with a Mick applicator. It was completed successfully.

"The vendor, Theragenics, was notified immediately, and will be conducting their investigation."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The total intended dose was approximately 125 gray from the implants. Approximately 6 percent of the intended dose was received by the patient before the procedure was aborted.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

CONCURRENT REPORT - FIRE IMPAIRMENT

The following information was provided by the Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas via phone and email:

"At approximately 1500 EDT on July 28, 2026, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the fuel manufacturing operation (FMO) was impaired. The backup diesel fire pump was determined to have incorrect fuel in its fuel tank. As a result, the diesel fire pump was removed from service, and recovery activities started. The electric fire pump remained fully operational and available to perform its safety function.

"Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c)."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The backup diesel fire pump tank was drained, and the lines and filter will be changed and refilled with the correct fuel.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On July 24, 2026, the licensee notified the Department of a lost industrial radiography device. The device, a SPEC 150 camera, contains a 16 Ci Ir-192 source. The licensee reported that it was lost by [the common carrier] during shipment from its Midland, Texas offices to the vendor in Louisiana for a source change. The licensee stated that it was notified by [the common carrier] that the device was missing on July 21, 2026, and has been working with the vendor and [the common carrier] since then to locate the device. The licensee also stated that [the common carrier] had closed the ticket opened to locate the source before the source was recovered. Additional information will be made available in accordance with SA 300 reporting requirements."

Texas Incident Number: 10311
Texas NMED Number: TX260026

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program (the Program) via email:

"At 0909 EDT on July 15, 2026, the Program was notified of a damaged shutter on a fixed gauge. This notification is being submitted in accordance with applicable Georgia Radiation Control regulations requiring prompt notification and written follow-up regarding equipment malfunctions affecting licensed radioactive material. On July 14, 2026, at approximately 1930 EDT, during the required six-month inventory and shutter inspection, damage was identified on an Ohmart shutter, model SH-100 (SN 60423), with a 20 mCi Cs-137 source. Upon discovery, the facility's Ohmart/Vega service representative was contacted immediately to assess the condition and determine appropriate corrective actions. Area leadership was notified of the issue, and it was communicated that if vessel entry became necessary, the source would have to be removed and could not be reinstalled. No damage to the source holder itself was identified. The service representative arrived onsite on July 16, 2026, at approximately 0730 EDT to evaluate the shutter malfunction. During the assessment, it was determined that the lead component used to shield the radiation beam had worn and shifted from its intended position. The lead was secured to restore shutter operation; however, the repair did not return the device to original manufacturer specifications. As a result, the shutter can no longer be utilized to lock out the source for vessel entry. The source holder remains in a safe operating condition and continues to be suitable for process measurement applications. The source is installed on a vessel with no routine personnel access. Because of the device's location and operating requirements, lockout of the source is not anticipated to be necessary in the foreseeable future. A tag is placed at the source holder identifying that it cannot be locked out for vessel entry. The service representative is currently developing options for either shutter replacement or replacement and disposal of the existing source. Additional evaluation is also underway to determine whether the source can be removed from service entirely."

Georgia Incident Number: 126

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MEDICAL SEED

The following is a summary of information provided by the PA Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

On July 24, 2026, the licensee notified the Department of a lost prostate seed. It was discovered that the seed was missing on July 23, 2026. It is reportable under 10 CFR 20.2201 and 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(2)(i).

On July 23, 2026, a patient was receiving a prostate treatment with Theragenics Cs-131 seeds (3.31 mCi per seed). During the treatment, the Mick applicator became disengaged from the needle hub. The total number of seeds to be implanted was five. However, it was discovered after post implant imaging that only two seeds were implanted. The rest of the seeds were thought to have ended up in the needle or the stabilization equipment. A survey located an additional two seeds with one seed left missing. At the time of discovery, the procedure room, equipment, patient transport bed, linens, trash and surrounding areas to the procedure room were surveyed with a survey meter to attempt to locate the missing seed. The survey was unsuccessful in locating the remaining seed. The Department will perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided as received.

Pennsylvania Event Number: PA260013

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On June 8, 2026, at 1259 PDT, Columbia Generating Station's leak detection monitor '1A' (LD-MON-1A) caused an isolation of RWCU-V-4 (reactor water cleanup outboard isolation valve) and RCIC-V-8 (reactor core isolation cooling outboard steam supply isolation valve).

"Based on a review of available information by engineering, the actuations were determined to be invalid and likely the result of an intermittent nuclear measurement analysis and control (NUMAC) bus communication fault as plant conditions for a valid actuation did not exist.

"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, this was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.

"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written licensee event report. This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for invalid actuations reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The following information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:

(a) Containment Isolation Valves RWCU-V-4 and RCIC-V-8 isolated.

(b) All expected isolations based on the as-found condition of the leak detection monitor were completed.

(c) The isolation of RWCU-V-4 and RCIC-V-8 completed successfully.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."