Event Notification Report for December 11, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/11/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program (the Department) via email:

"On October 8, 2025, a leaking source was discovered while performing a routine leak test. The leak test revealed more than 0.005 mCi of removable contamination of Cs-137. The definitive cause of the leakage was not determined, however cracks in the source were noticed through visible inspection. The leaking source was placed in a lead pig. The pig and cleanup waste were placed in a double bagged plastic bag and stored behind lead bricks. Removable contamination surveys were performed at the site of the leaking source and on the hands of the physicists. All areas and personnel were found to be free of removable contamination. The licensee will contact a company for waste disposal and will notify the department when the disposal is completed. The incident was reported to our office on October 10, 2025."

GA Incident Number: 109

* * * UPDATE ON 12/10/2025 AT 1358 EST FROM PAUL REEDUS TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program (the Department) via email:

"On December 9, 2025, [redacted], Health Physicist, West Physics submitted a copy of a purchase order for the disposal of the leaking source. The purchase order is addressed to Bionomics from Piedmont Healthcare. [The Health Physicist] will let the Department know once the source has been disposed of."

Notified R1DO (Warnek) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

LOST AND RECOVERED RADIOACTIVE WASTE

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:

On 8/26/25, waste was collected from the Central Missouri Cardiology clinic (CMC) and sent to a landfill. Later that day, the Missouri Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) was notified that a radiological alarm was triggered at the landfill. DHSS agents responded to the incident on 8/28/25. Surveys were taken of the truck, resulting in a maximum reading of 3.8 mR/hr on contact. The truck was opened, and the radioactive trash bag was identified. The trash bag contained common waste items like napkins, food wrappers, nitrile gloves, and some medical packaging. The radioactive items were segregated from the rest of the waste.

On 9/3/25, the waste was collected and transferred to the CMC. The DHSS team placed the contaminated items into a bucket with a lid and secured the waste at their facility. The bucket was then placed in a large plastic trash bag and stored in the lead cave in the locked hot lab. The radiation safety staff investigation confirmed that no individual member of the public exceeded the annual dose limit of 100 mrem per 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1). However, it may be possible that individuals could have received 2 mrem in any one hour per 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(2), if they were standing next to the dumpster prior to the pickup of the waste. The waste was identified as Rb-82, most likely in equilibrium with Sr-82, and possibly containing Sr-85. Based on all collected evidence, the most likely source of the radioactive waste was a routine exchange of a Sr-82/Rb-82 generator that was externally contaminated. The nuclear medicine technologist performing the exchange assumed their gloves were not contaminated and disposed of them in the non-radioactive trash.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health via email:

"On December 4, 2025, the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Anbessaw Consulting, Inc., contacted the California Department of Public Health about a stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge was a CPN MC-3 Elite (S/N M30500858, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am-241/Be). The gauge was located on the floor of the rear seat of a locked pickup. The gauge was not secured to the vehicle frame, was not inside the gauge transportation box, and the trigger lock was not secured. The truck was located in the parking lot of the [gauge user's hotel] in Alameda, CA. The gauge was left in the vehicle around 1700-1745 PST on December 3, 2025, and was discovered missing around 0650 PST on December 4, 2025. After discovery of the missing gauge, the gauge user contacted their office to report the missing gauge [to the RSO around 0725 PST]. The gauge user went to the hotel front desk to see if they had any security cameras and was told they did not. The gauge user contacted the Alameda Police Department and filed a police report. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health."

California 5010 number: 120425

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/11/2025<br><br>EN Revision Text: CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE VIOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On December 8, 2025, at 1424 EST, it was confirmed that a primary neutron source assembly (NSA) was loaded into a multi-purpose canister contrary to the requirements stated in the Certificate of Compliance (CoC, Renewed Amendment 11). Specifically, one primary NSA was loaded in the incorrect fuel storage location. Table 2.1-1 of the CoC requires fuel assemblies containing NSAs to be loaded in fuel storage locations 13, 14, 19, and/or 20. The primary NSA, however, was loaded into fuel storage location 32 in April, 2024. This condition is reportable in accordance with section 2.2 of the CoC.

"It has been verified that the total heat load of the fuel cask remains bound by the requirements of the CoC. There are also no adverse impacts to criticality since the primary NSA is in the outer region of the fuel cask, which is more conservative than the inner region. All other NSAs were verified to be in their approved fuel storage locations. All offsite and occupational dose remain within regulatory limits.

"This condition poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0818 EST on December 9, 2025, it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

60-DAY REPORT OF INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This sixty-day telephone notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) under the provision 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), as an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. On October 11, 2025, while in mode 5 for a refueling outage, an invalid actuation signal occurred while performing preventative maintenance on a 120V AC inverter.

"At the time of the event, one channel of the refuel floor exhaust (RFE) high radiation monitor was tripped due to a scheduled electrical bus outage. This electrical bus outage, in combination with the unexpected loss of power from the 120V AC inverter on another channel, caused the actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. The actuation was not the result of an actual plant condition and, therefore, is invalid.

"The containment isolation valves functioned as designed for the actuation signal received. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."