Event Notification Report for September 10, 2026

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/10/2026

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLIANT INSULATED CONDUCTOR

* * * This is not a new Part 21 condition. This EN will document all updates for this Part 21 condition, originally documented in EN 57243 and described below, that are made after November 2025. Refer to EN 57243 for updates made after the initial notification through November 2025. * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:

A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to nine plants.
Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse.

Reporting company point of contact:
RSCC Wire and Cable LLC
dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure
20 Bradley Park Road
East Granby, CT 06026

Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager
Phone: 860-653-8376
Fax: 860-653-8301
Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com

* * * UPDATE ON 12/04/2025 AT 1602 EST FROM CAROL GROSSO TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The vendor provided an update on their ongoing evaluation. The vendor continues to receive product from their customers to perform testing and evaluations. Test results for completed testing have been forwarded to customers. The process is still ongoing.

Notified R1DO (Schussler), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Deese), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 01/12/2026 AT 1351 EST FROM CAROL GROSSO TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The vendor provided an update on their ongoing evaluation. The vendor continues to receive product from their customers to perform testing and evaluations. Test results for completed testing have been forwarded to customers. The process is still ongoing.

Notified R1DO (Schussler), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Dixon), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 02/05/2026 AT 1313 EST FROM CAROL GROSSO TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"RSCC is awaiting samples from customers to complete our evaluation. As such, the evaluation is ongoing. To date, there has been no issues with the product we've received and tested. Test results have been forwarded to customers who have provided samples. We will continue this evaluation until all samples have been provided and we complete our testing."

Notified R1DO (Bickett), R3DO (Nguyen), R4DO (O'Keefe), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 03/06/2026 AT 1239 EST FROM CAROL GROSSO TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"RSCC is still awaiting samples from customers required to complete RSCC's verification testing. Therefore, the evaluation is ongoing. To date, there has been no issues with the product that have been received and tested. Test results have been forwarded to customers who have provided samples. RSCC will continue this evaluation until all samples have been provided and testing has been completed."

Notified R1DO (Eve), R3DO (Edwards), R4DO (Dixon), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 04/07/2026 AT 1310 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"RSCC is still awaiting samples from customers required to complete our verification testing. Therefore, the evaluation is ongoing. To date, there has been no issues with the product that have been received and tested. Test results have been forwarded to customers who have provided samples. RSCC will continue this evaluation until all samples have been sent to the facility for testing and the results will be forwarded to each customer."

Notified R1DO (Dentel), R3DO (Stoedter), R4DO (Bloodgood), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/07/2026 AT 0930 FROM CAROL GROSSO TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The evaluation and verification testing is still ongoing. The company is awaiting samples from the remaining customers to conclude this activity. To date, there have been no issues with the products that have been received and tested. Test results have been forwarded to customers who have provided samples. The company will continue this evaluation until all samples have been sent to the company's facility for testing and the results forwarded to each customer."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Stoedter), R4DO (Agrawal), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 06/05/2026 AT 1318 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The evaluation and verification testing is still ongoing. To date, there has been no issues with the product we've received and tested. Test results have been forwarded to customers. We will continue this evaluation until everything is resolved."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Zurawski), R4DO (Bloodgood), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 08/13/2026 AT 1422 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"Our evaluation and verification testing is still ongoing. We are awaiting samples from one remaining customer. To date, there has been no issues with the product returned and tested. All results were sent to customers. We will continue this evaluation until all samples have been sent to our facility for testing and the results forwarded to each customer."

Notified R1 Reactor Events Notification (email), R3 Reactor Events Notification (email), R4 Reactor Events Notification (email), and Part 21 group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 09/09/2026 AT 1609 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"Our evaluation and verification testing is still ongoing. To date, there has been no issues with the product returned and tested. All results were sent to customers. We will continue this evaluation until all samples have been sent to our facility for testing and the results forwarded to each customer."

Notified R1 Reactor Events Notification (email), R3 Reactor Events Notification (email), R4 Reactor Events Notification (email), and Part 21 group via email.

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/10/2026

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE

The following is a summary of information provided by Alabama Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) via email:

Agency staff received a preliminary report of an overexposure to an industrial radiographer assistant. The radiation safety officer (RSO) reported discovering the overexposure when the monthly personnel dosimetry report indicated the individual received a dose in excess of 5 rem.

Investigation by the licensee determined that the assistant radiographer had been performing the setup function for multiple exposures on a job. The assistant radiographer apparently did not verify source retraction with a survey meter before performing setup activities for the next exposure and, upon returning to the exposure device after setup, noticed it was unlocked. The assistant radiographer did not report the incident to the responsible radiographer or the RSO and waited until the end of the monitoring period to turn in their dosimeter.

The date and location of the incident were not provided by the licensee in their preliminary report. The licensee is preparing a detailed report with planned corrective actions.

Alabama incident: 26-013

* * * UPDATE ON 09/09/2026 AT 1035 EDT FROM SEAN WILLIAMS TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

The following information was provided by Alabama Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) via email:

"On August 25, 2026, Agency staff received an initial report of an overexposure to an occupational worker exceeding 5 rem. All known details were reported to the [NRC] Headquarters Operations Officer on August 26, 2026. Additional information was received from the licensee on September 3, 2026. Landauer [an occupational radiation monitoring company] issued an exposure notification to the licensee on August 20, 2026, for a chest dosimeter worn by individual 'A' from July 1-31, 2026. Landauer indicated that both the wear period and year-to-date override levels were exceeded. The results (in millirem) were as follows:

"Monitoring Period: July 1-31, 2026
[Deep-Dose Equivalent] DDE 8776
[Lens-Dose Equivalent] LDE 8898
[Shallow-Dose Equivalent] SDE 8898

"2026 year to date:
DDE 8842
LDE 8964
SDE 8957

"Note that while the DDE exceeded annual limits, neither the LDE nor the SDE did. The licensee treated the reported results as valid and performed a badge evaluation and exposure reconstruction. The radiation safety officer (RSO) found that the overexposure occurred at Elite Industrial between July 23, 2026, and July 26, 2026. Upon reviewing daily documentation, he further found that the only day on which radiographic exposures were performed was July 23, 2026, and that radiographic devices were in storage for July 24-26. The exposure device was a QSA 880D, serial number D15645, having an Iridium-192 source, serial number 30487P. The survey meter was an NDS Products ND-2000, with serial number 116019.

"The RSO conducted interviews with all the individuals involved with industrial radiography performed at the location on July 23, 2026. Work was elevated pipe work using a man basket. Radiography staff described more than one occasion where they were near the source assembly and at least one occasion when the survey meter was left on the ground while work was performed aloft.

"The inspector notes that the RSO stated that individual 'A', a trainee who experienced the overexposure, was terminated for an unrelated reason before the licensee learned of the overexposure. Additionally, individual 'A' was an assistant radiographer with less than one year of experience.

"The RSO determined that the direct cause of the overexposure was the radiography staff's failure to fully complete and independently verify the source retraction sequence before approaching the work area or preparing the next exposure. Specifically, the required confirmation steps - full mechanical retraction, lock and indicator verification, and survey meter confirmation at the device and guide tube - were not consistently completed as one continuous post-exposure check. Additionally, he determined that contributing factors included inadequate control of the survey meter during elevated work and movement between work elevations and tasks before completing the post-exposure survey.

"Corrective Actions:

1. Retrain staff to ensure that they are aware that they must have a calibrated and functional survey meter with the radiographic crew, regardless of the work elevation, and under direct control whenever a source may be exposed. - In progress (to be completed before the next elevated job).
2. Retrain radiographers and trainees prior to allowing them to return to duty. Retraining included training on source retraction, post-exposure surveys, elevated work planning, distance/shielding, abnormal event response/reporting, trainee supervision, and stop-work authority. - Completed.
3. Ensure that a qualified radiographer provides enhanced trainee supervision. - Policy put into effect immediately.
4. Conduct random management field audits at least monthly for the next 90 days. - In progress.
5. Perform an effectiveness review after 90 days of the implementation of these corrective actions to verify that the corrective actions were effective. - To be completed.

"Site Visit/Event Follow-Up:

"A site visit was performed on September 8, 2026, to assess the licensee's use of radioactive material, this incident, and implementation of corrective actions. The licensee was informed at this time that the following violations would be issued for the overexposure event:

1. Failure of the licensee to control the occupational dose to an individual adult. 420-3-26-.03(6)(a)1.(I). Severity Category III - Operations (financial penalties considered).
The cited rule stipulates that the licensee shall control the occupational dose to individual adults, except for planned special exposures pursuant to 420-3-26.03(11), to a total effective dose equivalent of 0.05 Sv (5 rem).
2. Failure of the radiographer and the radiographer's assistant to conduct a survey of the radiographic exposure device. 420-3-26-.04(20)(b). Severity Category III - Operations (financial penalties considered).
The cited rule stipulates that the licensee or registrant shall conduct a survey of the radiographic exposure device or guide tube. The survey must determine that the sealed source has returned to its shielded position before exchanging films, repositioning the exposure head, or dismantling equipment.

"As part of this investigation, a field inspection was performed of radiographic operations. This inspection was performed at the Irvington, Alabama, location. The licensee did not have any other scheduled work within the Agency's jurisdiction and stated that they are currently only performing call-out work (day-of). No issues were noted during the field audit. Lastly, the inspector informed the licensee that the effectiveness review would be assessed at the next inspection."

Notified: NMSS Events Notification (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The following information was provided by the New York State Department of Health, Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection (the Department), via email:

"On the morning of September 2, 2026, the Department received notification from the parent company of subsidiary O-AT-KA Milk Products for a fixed gauge missing from their most recent annual inventory. A third-party company was hired to auction off equipment from the building and they believe the gauge was auctioned off. They have attempted contacting the auctioning company but have not been able to determine where the gauge ended up at this time. The Department is independently seeking to determine this device's whereabouts and will provide updates once they are available."

Gauge Information:
Industrial Dynamics model FT-50-C, S/N 117327
Industrial Dynamics model 06110 source (S/N 2366), 100 mCi Am-241, purchased: 2008

NY Incident Number: 1568
NY Event Report ID Number: NY-26-04

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf