Event Notification Report for January 09, 2026
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Event Text
Event Text
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/08/2026 - 01/09/2026
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58049
Facility: Limerick
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Derek Herr
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Derek Herr
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 11/19/2025
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2025
Event Time: 03:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2026
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2025
Event Time: 03:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/9/2026
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF REACTOR ENCLOSURE RECIRCULATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 18, 2025, at 0328 CST, as the licensee was initiating the standby gas treatment system in support of planned maintenance on normal reactor building ventilation, the '2A' reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) fan failed to establish flow upon the system initiation signal. The '2B' RERS fan was previously inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. Technical specification action statement 3.6.5.4.B was entered with both Unit 2 RERS fans inoperable. The '2B' RERS fan was restored to operable at 0523 EST. The licensee returned normal reactor building ventilation to service to restore secondary containment differential pressure.
Due to inoperability of both RERS trains, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(C).
The licensee reported there was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * RETRACTION ON 01/08/2026 AT 0838 EST FROM BRAD SMITH TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"Limerick completed a review and confirmed that '2B' RERS fan operability was established following routine maintenance, prior to the '2A' RERS fan being declared inoperable.
"Consequently, the '2B' RERS fan remained capable of performing its safety-related function during the period when the '2A' RERS fan was unavailable, thereby ensuring the overall RERS safety function was maintained. As such, no condition existed that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Based on this assessment, event notification 58049 is being retracted.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Seeley).
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF REACTOR ENCLOSURE RECIRCULATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 18, 2025, at 0328 CST, as the licensee was initiating the standby gas treatment system in support of planned maintenance on normal reactor building ventilation, the '2A' reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) fan failed to establish flow upon the system initiation signal. The '2B' RERS fan was previously inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. Technical specification action statement 3.6.5.4.B was entered with both Unit 2 RERS fans inoperable. The '2B' RERS fan was restored to operable at 0523 EST. The licensee returned normal reactor building ventilation to service to restore secondary containment differential pressure.
Due to inoperability of both RERS trains, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(C).
The licensee reported there was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * RETRACTION ON 01/08/2026 AT 0838 EST FROM BRAD SMITH TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"Limerick completed a review and confirmed that '2B' RERS fan operability was established following routine maintenance, prior to the '2A' RERS fan being declared inoperable.
"Consequently, the '2B' RERS fan remained capable of performing its safety-related function during the period when the '2A' RERS fan was unavailable, thereby ensuring the overall RERS safety function was maintained. As such, no condition existed that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Based on this assessment, event notification 58049 is being retracted.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Seeley).
Agreement State
Event Number: 58106
Rep Org: Colorado Dept of Health
Licensee: Park Hill Caf? LLC
Region: 4
City: Denver State: CO
County:
License #: GL002736
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kathryn Kirk
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Licensee: Park Hill Caf? LLC
Region: 4
City: Denver State: CO
County:
License #: GL002736
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kathryn Kirk
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 01/02/2026
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2026
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
Roldan-Otero, Lizette (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS
The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
The licensee reported two exit signs, containing 7.5 Ci of tritium each, were lost in Denver, Colorado.
Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation
Model number: SLX60
Colorado event number: CO260001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
The licensee reported two exit signs, containing 7.5 Ci of tritium each, were lost in Denver, Colorado.
Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation
Model number: SLX60
Colorado event number: CO260001
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Page Last Reviewed/Updated January 09, 2026