Event Notification Report for November 03, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/02/2025 - 11/03/2025
Part 21
Event Number: 57981
Rep Org: Paragon Energy Solutions
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: Fort Worth State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: Fort Worth State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 10/11/2025
Notification Time: 08:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2025
Notification Time: 08:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Young, Matt (R1DO)
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Miller, Geoffrey (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Young, Matt (R1DO)
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Miller, Geoffrey (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/3/2025
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - POSITIVE BATTERY POST SEPARATION
The following is a summary of information provided by Paragon Energy Solutions via email:
In May 2025, Quad Cities experienced positive battery post separation from three cells in a safety related battery string at the post seal nut region. Paragon dispatched engineering resources to provide technical assistance to the station during battery string replacement and to perform an initial assessment of the condition. The current postulated cause of the post separation is due to a corrosion mechanism that is still under investigation. In September 2025, Calvert Cliffs reported separation of a positive post from a cell upon initiation of a service test discharge resulting in electrical arcing at the cell post area.
Paragon has not yet identified a defect in the cell post design or manufacturing process which, if corrected, would prevent or mitigate this condition. The affected battery cells have been in service for 14 years and 11 years, respectively. This phenomenon only affects the positive posts on the battery, and the area of the post where corrosion occurs is not visible during routine inspection. Paragon is not stipulating that high cell voltage is the primary indication of the corrosive effect in the positive post, but this indication may allow sites to ensure cells are adequately evaluated for post integrity. Paragon recommends licensees continue normal battery maintenance procedures contained in station instructions.
Affected Plants
Region 1 - Beaver Valley, Calvert Cliffs, Fitzpatrick, Ginna, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, Seabrook
Region 2 - Brunswick, Catawba, McGuire, Robinson, Shearon Harris, Turkey Point
Region 3 - Davis Besse, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities
Region 4 - Callaway, Comanche Peak, Palo Verde, River Bend, South Texas Project
Paragon Contact Information:
Richard Knott
Vice President, Quality Assurance
(518) 450-9706 (C)
*** UPDATE ON 10/31/2025 AT 0711 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO SAMUEL COLVARD ***
The following information summary was provided by email:
Further analysis is needed and expected to be completed by 12/15/2025. Oconee was added to the list of affected nuclear power plants. Interim advice to licensees was given.
Notified R1DO (Young), R2DO (Mckown), R3DO (Ziolkowski), R4DO (Vossmar), and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors group.
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - POSITIVE BATTERY POST SEPARATION
The following is a summary of information provided by Paragon Energy Solutions via email:
In May 2025, Quad Cities experienced positive battery post separation from three cells in a safety related battery string at the post seal nut region. Paragon dispatched engineering resources to provide technical assistance to the station during battery string replacement and to perform an initial assessment of the condition. The current postulated cause of the post separation is due to a corrosion mechanism that is still under investigation. In September 2025, Calvert Cliffs reported separation of a positive post from a cell upon initiation of a service test discharge resulting in electrical arcing at the cell post area.
Paragon has not yet identified a defect in the cell post design or manufacturing process which, if corrected, would prevent or mitigate this condition. The affected battery cells have been in service for 14 years and 11 years, respectively. This phenomenon only affects the positive posts on the battery, and the area of the post where corrosion occurs is not visible during routine inspection. Paragon is not stipulating that high cell voltage is the primary indication of the corrosive effect in the positive post, but this indication may allow sites to ensure cells are adequately evaluated for post integrity. Paragon recommends licensees continue normal battery maintenance procedures contained in station instructions.
Affected Plants
Region 1 - Beaver Valley, Calvert Cliffs, Fitzpatrick, Ginna, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, Seabrook
Region 2 - Brunswick, Catawba, McGuire, Robinson, Shearon Harris, Turkey Point
Region 3 - Davis Besse, Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities
Region 4 - Callaway, Comanche Peak, Palo Verde, River Bend, South Texas Project
Paragon Contact Information:
Richard Knott
Vice President, Quality Assurance
(518) 450-9706 (C)
*** UPDATE ON 10/31/2025 AT 0711 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO SAMUEL COLVARD ***
The following information summary was provided by email:
Further analysis is needed and expected to be completed by 12/15/2025. Oconee was added to the list of affected nuclear power plants. Interim advice to licensees was given.
Notified R1DO (Young), R2DO (Mckown), R3DO (Ziolkowski), R4DO (Vossmar), and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors group.
Agreement State
Event Number: 58009
Rep Org: Louisiana Dept of Env. Quality
Licensee: Acuren Inspection, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Kenner State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7072-L02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Jim Pate
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: Acuren Inspection, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Kenner State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7072-L02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Jim Pate
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 10/27/2025
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2025
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WORKER POTENTIALLY EXCEEDED OCCUPATIONAL DOSE LIMIT
The following information was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (the Department) via email:
"On October 27, 2025, Acuren Inspection, Inc. notified the Department that an industrial radiography trainee dosimetry badge had been reported as an overexposure of 8 rem from Landauer. While talking with the radiation safety officer (RSO), the Department was informed that the radiographer trainee had only worked as a trainee in Louisiana for approximately seven weeks before being transferred to Orange, Texas. The RSO indicated that the trainee worked with at least three different crews at different job sites around their Kenner satellite office over the time period of mid-May to early July 2025."
Louisiana report ID number: LA20230011
The following information was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (the Department) via email:
"On October 27, 2025, Acuren Inspection, Inc. notified the Department that an industrial radiography trainee dosimetry badge had been reported as an overexposure of 8 rem from Landauer. While talking with the radiation safety officer (RSO), the Department was informed that the radiographer trainee had only worked as a trainee in Louisiana for approximately seven weeks before being transferred to Orange, Texas. The RSO indicated that the trainee worked with at least three different crews at different job sites around their Kenner satellite office over the time period of mid-May to early July 2025."
Louisiana report ID number: LA20230011
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58018
Facility: LaSalle
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Eric Pratt
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Eric Pratt
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 11/02/2025
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2025
Event Time: 13:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2025
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2025
Event Time: 13:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
Person (Organization):
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | 0 |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1346 CST with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on turbine control valve fast closure due to a generator lockout. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using emergency operating procedures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1346 CST with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on turbine control valve fast closure due to a generator lockout. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using emergency operating procedures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 58011
Rep Org: Arkansas Department of Health
Licensee: 3D Imaging Drug Design Development
Region: 4
City: Little Rock State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-1008-03214
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Hunter Broadway
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Licensee: 3D Imaging Drug Design Development
Region: 4
City: Little Rock State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-1008-03214
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Hunter Broadway
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 10/28/2025
Notification Time: 17:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2025
Notification Time: 17:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Kock, Andrea (NMSS)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Kock, Andrea (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The following is a summary of information provided by the Arkansas Department of Health (the Department) via email:
During a routine inspection on October 21, 2025, the Department was made aware that on two separate occasions, the production manager had performed repairs on the production line of F-18 fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) without wearing dosimetry.
On Tuesday, October 28, 2025, inspectors from the Department were following up on the concerns and confirmed that on one occasion, the production manager was not wearing dosimetry during the replacement of tubing on a cracked line inside a production hot cell. This repair was conducted along a 25.4 cm (10 inches) tubing line with one end being 10 cm (3.9 inches) from the source vial of F-18. The activity of the source was 118.4 GBq (3.2 Ci) as per the radiation safety officer (RSO). Re-enactment of the procedure was produced with the production manager to reconstruct similar parameters. The RSO initially was not made aware of the individual not wearing dosimetry. Dose estimation is currently being conducted by the RSO and by the Department. The licensee will also have an independent contractor perform a dose calculation for the event that was conducted without dosimetry.
While dose estimations are being calculated, the Department believes it has enough information to determine that this event threatens to cause an extremity exposure greater than or equal to 250 rads, and thus, are reporting immediately to the NRC in accordance with SA-300. This investigation is ongoing and updates will be provided.
Arkansas Event Number: ARK-2025-014
The following is a summary of information provided by the Arkansas Department of Health (the Department) via email:
During a routine inspection on October 21, 2025, the Department was made aware that on two separate occasions, the production manager had performed repairs on the production line of F-18 fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) without wearing dosimetry.
On Tuesday, October 28, 2025, inspectors from the Department were following up on the concerns and confirmed that on one occasion, the production manager was not wearing dosimetry during the replacement of tubing on a cracked line inside a production hot cell. This repair was conducted along a 25.4 cm (10 inches) tubing line with one end being 10 cm (3.9 inches) from the source vial of F-18. The activity of the source was 118.4 GBq (3.2 Ci) as per the radiation safety officer (RSO). Re-enactment of the procedure was produced with the production manager to reconstruct similar parameters. The RSO initially was not made aware of the individual not wearing dosimetry. Dose estimation is currently being conducted by the RSO and by the Department. The licensee will also have an independent contractor perform a dose calculation for the event that was conducted without dosimetry.
While dose estimations are being calculated, the Department believes it has enough information to determine that this event threatens to cause an extremity exposure greater than or equal to 250 rads, and thus, are reporting immediately to the NRC in accordance with SA-300. This investigation is ongoing and updates will be provided.
Arkansas Event Number: ARK-2025-014
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58020
Facility: Surry
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Scott Satterfield
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Scott Satterfield
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 11/03/2025
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2025
Event Time: 12:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2025
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2025
Event Time: 12:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | 0 | ||
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | 100 |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 3, 2025, at 1215 EST, the 'A' reserve station service transformer (RSST) pilot wire lockout actuated while restoring the 'A' RSST to service. This resulted in the electrical isolation of the 'A' RSST and the Unit 1 'J' emergency bus. The #3 EDG automatically started and loaded onto the Unit 1 'J' emergency bus, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal procedures and ensured stable conditions. All safety systems functioned as designed and all electrical parameters remained stable.
"No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the #3 EDG.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 3, 2025, at 1215 EST, the 'A' reserve station service transformer (RSST) pilot wire lockout actuated while restoring the 'A' RSST to service. This resulted in the electrical isolation of the 'A' RSST and the Unit 1 'J' emergency bus. The #3 EDG automatically started and loaded onto the Unit 1 'J' emergency bus, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal procedures and ensured stable conditions. All safety systems functioned as designed and all electrical parameters remained stable.
"No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the #3 EDG.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."