Event Notification Report for May 02, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/01/2025 - 05/02/2025
Agreement State
Event Number: 57679
Rep Org: Maryland Dept of the Environment
Licensee: AB Consultants, Inc.
Region: 1
City: Upper Marlboro State: MD
County: Prince George's
License #: MD-33-161-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Krishnakumar D. Nangeelil
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Licensee: AB Consultants, Inc.
Region: 1
City: Upper Marlboro State: MD
County: Prince George's
License #: MD-33-161-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Krishnakumar D. Nangeelil
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Notification Date: 04/24/2025
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2025
Event Time: 12:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2025
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2025
Event Time: 12:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Ford, Monica (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Ford, Monica (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) via email:
"On April 23, 2025, at 1240 EDT, the radiation safety officer of AB Consultants, Inc. reported an incident to the MDE involving damage to a portable nuclear gauge Troxler model 3440 (serial number 78275, 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sources). The incident took place at a road construction site near the Upper Marlboro area. The gauge was not in use at the time of the incident and the technician was present near the gauge. A multipurpose compactor, operated via radio remote control, accidentally struck the plastic housing of the gauge causing visible damage. According to the gauge technician, the compactor lost control during the remote operation, resulting in an unintended collision with the gauge.
"No personal injuries were reported. The area was immediately secured, and emergency personnel, including firefighters, responded to the scene. MDE staff arrived thereafter, conducted a site survey, interviewed personnel, and inspected the damaged gauge. The radioactive sources within the device were confirmed to be intact. As a precaution, the gauge was safely packaged and transported to North East Technical Services Inc. (NETS) for leak testing and further evaluation. Decisions regarding repair or disposal will be based on NETS' findings. A follow-up radiation survey of the area was conducted after the gauge's removal, and no radiation levels above background were detected.
"MDE has requested that the licensee submit documentation of the leak test results, calibration details of the gauge and provide transfer and/or disposal certificates upon completion of the evaluation by NETS. MDE radiological health program will follow up this reactive investigation until the device is repaired or disposed of."
The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) via email:
"On April 23, 2025, at 1240 EDT, the radiation safety officer of AB Consultants, Inc. reported an incident to the MDE involving damage to a portable nuclear gauge Troxler model 3440 (serial number 78275, 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sources). The incident took place at a road construction site near the Upper Marlboro area. The gauge was not in use at the time of the incident and the technician was present near the gauge. A multipurpose compactor, operated via radio remote control, accidentally struck the plastic housing of the gauge causing visible damage. According to the gauge technician, the compactor lost control during the remote operation, resulting in an unintended collision with the gauge.
"No personal injuries were reported. The area was immediately secured, and emergency personnel, including firefighters, responded to the scene. MDE staff arrived thereafter, conducted a site survey, interviewed personnel, and inspected the damaged gauge. The radioactive sources within the device were confirmed to be intact. As a precaution, the gauge was safely packaged and transported to North East Technical Services Inc. (NETS) for leak testing and further evaluation. Decisions regarding repair or disposal will be based on NETS' findings. A follow-up radiation survey of the area was conducted after the gauge's removal, and no radiation levels above background were detected.
"MDE has requested that the licensee submit documentation of the leak test results, calibration details of the gauge and provide transfer and/or disposal certificates upon completion of the evaluation by NETS. MDE radiological health program will follow up this reactive investigation until the device is repaired or disposed of."
Agreement State
Event Number: 57682
Rep Org: Florida Bureau of Radiation Control
Licensee: Watson Clinic, Lakeland Florida
Region: 1
City: Lakeland State: FL
County:
License #: 0387-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Jason Nicholson
HQ OPS Officer: Jordan Wingate
Licensee: Watson Clinic, Lakeland Florida
Region: 1
City: Lakeland State: FL
County:
License #: 0387-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Jason Nicholson
HQ OPS Officer: Jordan Wingate
Notification Date: 04/25/2025
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2025
Event Time: 18:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2025
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2025
Event Time: 18:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Ford, Monica (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Ford, Monica (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST I-125 SEED
The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:
"The BRC received a notification of a lost 0.140 mCi I-125 seed from Watson Clinic at 1815 EDT on April 25, 2025. The sample was previously implanted and lost during a recent surgery. The facility states that they surveyed all locations between the operating room, patient room, and the patient belongings. An X-ray confirmed the material was removed from the patient."
FL Incident Number: FL-25-039
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:
"The BRC received a notification of a lost 0.140 mCi I-125 seed from Watson Clinic at 1815 EDT on April 25, 2025. The sample was previously implanted and lost during a recent surgery. The facility states that they surveyed all locations between the operating room, patient room, and the patient belongings. An X-ray confirmed the material was removed from the patient."
FL Incident Number: FL-25-039
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57689
Facility: Callaway
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Zach Milligan
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Zach Milligan
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 05/04/2025
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2025
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2025
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2025
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Agrawal, Ami (R4DO)
Agrawal, Ami (R4DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | N | N | 0 | 0 |
BOTH TRAINS OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On May 4, 2025, with the plant in mode 4 during restart from a refueling outage, operators were flushing the chemical volume and control system [CVCS] `B' train mixed bed demineralizers, with makeup [water] from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). During the evolution at 1230 CDT, it was discovered that the borated water level in the RWST had been inadvertently lowered to less than the technical specification (TS) limit of 394,000 gallons. Under TS 3.5.4, `Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST),' surveillance requirement (SR) 3.5.4.2 requires verifying that the RWST borated water volume is [greater than or equal to] 394,000 gallons (93.7 percent level). The minimum level (volume) reached in the tank during the flushing operation was 93 percent.
"Upon discovery of the lowered level in the RWST, the flushing activity was terminated, and water level in the RWST was restored to above the TS limit by 1427.
"The RWST supplies borated water to the CVCS during abnormal operating conditions, and to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the containment spray system during accident conditions. The RWST supplies both trains of the ECCS and the containment spray system through a common suction supply header during the injection phase of a loss of coolant accident recovery. During mode 4, in accordance with TS 3.5.3, `ECCS - Shutdown,' only one ECCS train is required to be operable.
"With the RWST declared inoperable, the one required ECCS train in mode 4 was not supported. Therefore, the identified condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On May 4, 2025, with the plant in mode 4 during restart from a refueling outage, operators were flushing the chemical volume and control system [CVCS] `B' train mixed bed demineralizers, with makeup [water] from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). During the evolution at 1230 CDT, it was discovered that the borated water level in the RWST had been inadvertently lowered to less than the technical specification (TS) limit of 394,000 gallons. Under TS 3.5.4, `Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST),' surveillance requirement (SR) 3.5.4.2 requires verifying that the RWST borated water volume is [greater than or equal to] 394,000 gallons (93.7 percent level). The minimum level (volume) reached in the tank during the flushing operation was 93 percent.
"Upon discovery of the lowered level in the RWST, the flushing activity was terminated, and water level in the RWST was restored to above the TS limit by 1427.
"The RWST supplies borated water to the CVCS during abnormal operating conditions, and to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the containment spray system during accident conditions. The RWST supplies both trains of the ECCS and the containment spray system through a common suction supply header during the injection phase of a loss of coolant accident recovery. During mode 4, in accordance with TS 3.5.3, `ECCS - Shutdown,' only one ECCS train is required to be operable.
"With the RWST declared inoperable, the one required ECCS train in mode 4 was not supported. Therefore, the identified condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.