Event Notification Report for April 14, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/13/2025 - 04/14/2025
Agreement State
Event Number: 57646
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: High Mountain Inspection
Region: 4
City: Odessa State: TX
County:
License #: L-07197
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Bruce Hammond
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: High Mountain Inspection
Region: 4
City: Odessa State: TX
County:
License #: L-07197
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Bruce Hammond
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 04/04/2025
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2025
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Agrawal, Ami (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Agrawal, Ami (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On April 4, 2025, the Department was notified by the licensee of a telephonic overexposure report they received from their dosimetry provider. The licensee radiation safety officer stated the report had one of their employees with an exposure of 7.7 rem for the month of February 2025. The licensee had other readings (pocket dosimeters) that did not match this level of exposure. The licensee removed the employee from the work environment until the dose can be confirmed. The employee affected is an assistant, and neither of the other two radiographers had any exposure near this level. The licensee is still investigating.
"More information will be made available according to SA-300 requirements."
Texas incident number: 10189
NMED number: TX250022
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On April 4, 2025, the Department was notified by the licensee of a telephonic overexposure report they received from their dosimetry provider. The licensee radiation safety officer stated the report had one of their employees with an exposure of 7.7 rem for the month of February 2025. The licensee had other readings (pocket dosimeters) that did not match this level of exposure. The licensee removed the employee from the work environment until the dose can be confirmed. The employee affected is an assistant, and neither of the other two radiographers had any exposure near this level. The licensee is still investigating.
"More information will be made available according to SA-300 requirements."
Texas incident number: 10189
NMED number: TX250022
Agreement State
Event Number: 57649
Rep Org: NC Div of Radiation Protection
Licensee: UNC Hospitals
Region: 1
City: Chapel Hill State: NC
County:
License #: 068-0565-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Travis Cartoski
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Licensee: UNC Hospitals
Region: 1
City: Chapel Hill State: NC
County:
License #: 068-0565-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Travis Cartoski
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Notification Date: 04/07/2025
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2025
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following is a summary of information provided by the North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch via email:
On April 4, 2025, Y-90 SIR-spheres therapeutic split dose administration resulted in a patient being underdosed per the written directive. One of three doses administered was 27 percent or less of the prescribed dose. The referring physician and patient were notified on the same day of treatment. The cause of the underdose was a catheter clog or kink. Corrective actions consisted of retraining of personnel.
NC Event Number: 250004
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following is a summary of information provided by the North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch via email:
On April 4, 2025, Y-90 SIR-spheres therapeutic split dose administration resulted in a patient being underdosed per the written directive. One of three doses administered was 27 percent or less of the prescribed dose. The referring physician and patient were notified on the same day of treatment. The cause of the underdose was a catheter clog or kink. Corrective actions consisted of retraining of personnel.
NC Event Number: 250004
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 57650
Rep Org: White Forest Resources
Licensee: Clearco Preparation Plant
Region: 1
City: Clearco State: WV
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dustin Smith
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Licensee: Clearco Preparation Plant
Region: 1
City: Clearco State: WV
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dustin Smith
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Notification Date: 04/04/2025
Notification Time: 18:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2025
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2025
Notification Time: 18:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2025
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
Person (Organization):
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
STUCK OPEN GAUGE SHUTTER
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone:
The licensee discovered a stuck-open shutter during routine checks on a gauge with a normally open shutter. The gauge is a Berthold model LB444 with a 500 mCi Cs-137 source. The area around the gauge has been flagged and there are no concerns about radiation exposure. The manufacturer will be contacted to repair the gauge.
* * * UPDATE ON 04/09/2025 AT 1257 EDT FROM DUSTIN SMITH TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone:
The licensee has been in contact with Berthold technologies, who will be sending a technician to repair the gauge. A finalized date has not yet been confirmed. Additional information will be provided as it becomes available.
Informed R1DO(Schussler) and NMSS Events Notifications (email).
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone:
The licensee discovered a stuck-open shutter during routine checks on a gauge with a normally open shutter. The gauge is a Berthold model LB444 with a 500 mCi Cs-137 source. The area around the gauge has been flagged and there are no concerns about radiation exposure. The manufacturer will be contacted to repair the gauge.
* * * UPDATE ON 04/09/2025 AT 1257 EDT FROM DUSTIN SMITH TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone:
The licensee has been in contact with Berthold technologies, who will be sending a technician to repair the gauge. A finalized date has not yet been confirmed. Additional information will be provided as it becomes available.
Informed R1DO(Schussler) and NMSS Events Notifications (email).
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 57651
Rep Org: Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp
Licensee: Novartis Manufacturing LLC
Region: 3
City: Indianapolis State: IN
County:
License #: 13-35658-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C.J. Eastman
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Licensee: Novartis Manufacturing LLC
Region: 3
City: Indianapolis State: IN
County:
License #: 13-35658-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C.J. Eastman
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Notification Date: 04/07/2025
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2024
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2025
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2024
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - Unplanned Contamination
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - Unplanned Contamination
Person (Organization):
Hills, David (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Hills, David (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
During an ongoing inspection, the licensee determined that the following event had not been previously reported.
On March 29, 2024, at approximately 1800 EDT, a rejected batch of individual lead pots containing glass vials of Pluvicto (Lu-177) solution was being logged into the waste room. Each dose of Pluvicto was 5ml with an activity between 7 to 12 GBq.
An individual handling the lead pots accidentally lifted a lead pot by the lid instead of the bottom. The lead pot was taped shut but the tape failed, and the vial was dropped, breaking on the floor of the waste room. The individual's clothes were contaminated but no skin contamination occurred. Based on dosimetry records the individual has a current lifetime exposure of 1 mrem of deep-dose equivalent, 2 mrem of lens dose equivalent, 2 mrem of shallow-dose equivalent, and 11 mrem to the extremity.
The spread of contamination was limited to the radioactive waste room and the individual's clothing. The radiation safety officer secured access to the radioactive waste room for approximately 48 hours while room decontamination efforts were in progress.
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
During an ongoing inspection, the licensee determined that the following event had not been previously reported.
On March 29, 2024, at approximately 1800 EDT, a rejected batch of individual lead pots containing glass vials of Pluvicto (Lu-177) solution was being logged into the waste room. Each dose of Pluvicto was 5ml with an activity between 7 to 12 GBq.
An individual handling the lead pots accidentally lifted a lead pot by the lid instead of the bottom. The lead pot was taped shut but the tape failed, and the vial was dropped, breaking on the floor of the waste room. The individual's clothes were contaminated but no skin contamination occurred. Based on dosimetry records the individual has a current lifetime exposure of 1 mrem of deep-dose equivalent, 2 mrem of lens dose equivalent, 2 mrem of shallow-dose equivalent, and 11 mrem to the extremity.
The spread of contamination was limited to the radioactive waste room and the individual's clothing. The radiation safety officer secured access to the radioactive waste room for approximately 48 hours while room decontamination efforts were in progress.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57659
Facility: Palo Verde
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Tanner Goodman
HQ OPS Officer: Tenisha Meadows
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Tanner Goodman
HQ OPS Officer: Tenisha Meadows
Notification Date: 04/10/2025
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2025
Event Time: 07:11 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2025
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2025
Event Time: 07:11 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2025
Emergency Class: Unusual Event
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Monninger, John (R4RA)
King, Michael (NRR)
Erlanger, Craig (NSIR)
Crouch, Howard (IR)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Monninger, John (R4RA)
King, Michael (NRR)
Erlanger, Craig (NSIR)
Crouch, Howard (IR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | 0 |
UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF ALL BUT ONE AC POWER SOURCE TO EMERGENCY BUSES
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 4/10/2025, Unit 1 was defueled at 0 percent power. The `A' train class bus was being powered by the `A' diesel generator (DG) and the `B' train bus was out of service for maintenance. Additionally, the `A' train offsite power transformer is currently out of service for maintenance. Abnormal indication was observed on the `A' DG with lowering voltage and the decision was made to manually trip the `A' DG.
"Power was restored to the `A' class bus by crosstieing `B' train offsite power via engineering safety feature transformer NBN-X04. This resulted in a loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer which is an Unusual Event (UE) CU2.1. It is currently not known at this time what caused the abnormal voltage indications on the `A' DG."
State and local agencies were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Palo Verde Units 2 and 3 were not affected by this event. The licensee restored spent fuel pool cooling.
* * * UPDATE ON 4/10/2025 AT 1701 EDT FROM TANNER GOODMAN TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to the event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"Train `A' emergency diesel generator (DG) was supplying power to PBA-S03 bus. At 0658 MST on April 10th, 2025, train `A' DG was exhibiting erratic and degraded voltage and was placed in emergency stop, which caused a loss of power to PBA-S03.
"When the `A' DG was stopped, train `A' balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system (BOP ESFAS) detected the loss of power condition on PBA-S03, and sent an emergency start signal to the train `A' DG. Train `A' DG did not respond as it was placed in emergency stop. Operators restored power to PBA-S03 at 0703 MST. At the time of the [loss of power], the reactor was defueled with the core offloaded to the spent fuel pool. Unit 2 and Unit 3 are not impacted by this event and remain in Mode 1, 100 percent power. Unit 1 is still currently in Unusual Event, CU2.1
"This [update] is in addition to the event reported at 1029 EDT EN 57659. The original EN reported an Emergency Classification definition as a loss of all but 1 AC power source to emergency buses for 45 minutes. The correct time is 15 minutes.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the update."
[This update is an 8-hour, non-emergency, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) report of a valid specified system actuation due to the BOP ESFAS attempting to start 'A' DG upon loss of the PBA-SO3 bus during the initial event.]
Notified R4DO (Vossmar).
* * * UPDATE ON 4/10/2025 AT 2245 EDT FROM NGOC NGUYEN TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:
On 4/10/2025, at 2224 EDT, Palo Verde Unit 1 terminated the Unusual Event. Restoration of 'A' DG was made by swapping to its redundant automatic voltage regulator and performance of a functional startup. This restores two sources of power to the class 1E bus: offsite power and 'A' DG in a standby configuration. The redundant automatic voltage regulator was tested in surveillance in the previous cycle and remains operable. The issues that led to the declaration of Unusual Event with 'A' DG have been entered into the corrective action program.
State and local authorities have been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Internal notifications: R4DO (Vossmar), NRR EO (Felts), IR MOC (Crouch), R4 RA (Monninger), NRR (King), R4 PAO (Dricks), and NSIR (Erlanger)
External notifications: DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 4/10/2025, Unit 1 was defueled at 0 percent power. The `A' train class bus was being powered by the `A' diesel generator (DG) and the `B' train bus was out of service for maintenance. Additionally, the `A' train offsite power transformer is currently out of service for maintenance. Abnormal indication was observed on the `A' DG with lowering voltage and the decision was made to manually trip the `A' DG.
"Power was restored to the `A' class bus by crosstieing `B' train offsite power via engineering safety feature transformer NBN-X04. This resulted in a loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer which is an Unusual Event (UE) CU2.1. It is currently not known at this time what caused the abnormal voltage indications on the `A' DG."
State and local agencies were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Palo Verde Units 2 and 3 were not affected by this event. The licensee restored spent fuel pool cooling.
* * * UPDATE ON 4/10/2025 AT 1701 EDT FROM TANNER GOODMAN TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to the event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"Train `A' emergency diesel generator (DG) was supplying power to PBA-S03 bus. At 0658 MST on April 10th, 2025, train `A' DG was exhibiting erratic and degraded voltage and was placed in emergency stop, which caused a loss of power to PBA-S03.
"When the `A' DG was stopped, train `A' balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system (BOP ESFAS) detected the loss of power condition on PBA-S03, and sent an emergency start signal to the train `A' DG. Train `A' DG did not respond as it was placed in emergency stop. Operators restored power to PBA-S03 at 0703 MST. At the time of the [loss of power], the reactor was defueled with the core offloaded to the spent fuel pool. Unit 2 and Unit 3 are not impacted by this event and remain in Mode 1, 100 percent power. Unit 1 is still currently in Unusual Event, CU2.1
"This [update] is in addition to the event reported at 1029 EDT EN 57659. The original EN reported an Emergency Classification definition as a loss of all but 1 AC power source to emergency buses for 45 minutes. The correct time is 15 minutes.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the update."
[This update is an 8-hour, non-emergency, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) report of a valid specified system actuation due to the BOP ESFAS attempting to start 'A' DG upon loss of the PBA-SO3 bus during the initial event.]
Notified R4DO (Vossmar).
* * * UPDATE ON 4/10/2025 AT 2245 EDT FROM NGOC NGUYEN TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:
On 4/10/2025, at 2224 EDT, Palo Verde Unit 1 terminated the Unusual Event. Restoration of 'A' DG was made by swapping to its redundant automatic voltage regulator and performance of a functional startup. This restores two sources of power to the class 1E bus: offsite power and 'A' DG in a standby configuration. The redundant automatic voltage regulator was tested in surveillance in the previous cycle and remains operable. The issues that led to the declaration of Unusual Event with 'A' DG have been entered into the corrective action program.
State and local authorities have been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Internal notifications: R4DO (Vossmar), NRR EO (Felts), IR MOC (Crouch), R4 RA (Monninger), NRR (King), R4 PAO (Dricks), and NSIR (Erlanger)
External notifications: DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57661
Facility: Arkansas Nuclear
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Shannon Mosby
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Shannon Mosby
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 04/10/2025
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2025
Event Time: 11:24 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2025
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2025
Event Time: 11:24 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | 100 |
FITNESS FOR DUTY
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On April 10, 2025, at 1124 CDT, a licensed operator at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during random testing per the Entergy fitness for duty (FFD) program. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On April 10, 2025, at 1124 CDT, a licensed operator at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during random testing per the Entergy fitness for duty (FFD) program. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57663
Facility: Columbia Generating Station
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Robert Rood
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Robert Rood
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 04/12/2025
Notification Time: 08:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2025
Event Time: 02:23 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2025
Notification Time: 08:17 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2025
Event Time: 02:23 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - Plant S/D Reqd By TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Degraded Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - Plant S/D Reqd By TS 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Degraded Condition
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Crouch, Howard (IR)
Mckenna, Phillip (NRR EO)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Crouch, Howard (IR)
Mckenna, Phillip (NRR EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | 0 |
SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"During a planned shutdown at Columbia Generating Station for a refueling outage, pressure boundary leakage was identified from the bonnet vent line of loop `B' discharge motor operated isolation valve during a drywell inspection. Leakage was initially identified during a drywell entry at 15 percent [reactor] power and identified as pressure boundary leakage during a subsequent entry in mode 3. The leak exceeds technical specification (TS) 3.4.5 'RCS Operational Leakage' of no pressure boundary leakage. TS action `C' was entered, requiring [the plant to be in] mode 3 in 12 hours and mode 4 in 36 hours. Columbia Generating Station was in mode 3 at time of determination for [entering TS] 3.4.5. Therefore, the event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant's TS.
"The event is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) due to an event that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Columbia Generating Station estimates the leak rate to be less than 0.2 gallons per minute. Columbia Generating Station expects to enter mode 4 within the required 36 hours.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"During a planned shutdown at Columbia Generating Station for a refueling outage, pressure boundary leakage was identified from the bonnet vent line of loop `B' discharge motor operated isolation valve during a drywell inspection. Leakage was initially identified during a drywell entry at 15 percent [reactor] power and identified as pressure boundary leakage during a subsequent entry in mode 3. The leak exceeds technical specification (TS) 3.4.5 'RCS Operational Leakage' of no pressure boundary leakage. TS action `C' was entered, requiring [the plant to be in] mode 3 in 12 hours and mode 4 in 36 hours. Columbia Generating Station was in mode 3 at time of determination for [entering TS] 3.4.5. Therefore, the event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant's TS.
"The event is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) due to an event that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Columbia Generating Station estimates the leak rate to be less than 0.2 gallons per minute. Columbia Generating Station expects to enter mode 4 within the required 36 hours.
Agreement State
Event Number: 57224
Rep Org: Washington State Dept of Health
Licensee: Adams County Public Works
Region: 4
City: Ritzville State: WA
County:
License #: WN- I0289
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark F Hernandez
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: Adams County Public Works
Region: 4
City: Ritzville State: WA
County:
License #: WN- I0289
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark F Hernandez
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 07/12/2024
Notification Time: 18:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2024
Event Time: 09:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2025
Notification Time: 18:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2024
Event Time: 09:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Gepford, Heather (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Gepford, Heather (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/15/2025
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE
The following is a summary of information provided by the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) via email:
A portable gauge (PG) was ran over by a roller around 0930 PDT. The main body was crushed and the gauge source rod broke off but appeared to be intact.
The PG user used a shovel to pick up the source and placed it in the transport box. The PG user stayed with the PG until the radiation safety officer (RSO) arrived. The RSO confirmed [an] intact source rod and gathered the remaining damaged PG parts into the transport box. It was then transported to the licensee storage location.
The RSO and local fire department did not have a survey meter for radiation and contamination surveys.
Three DOH representatives were sent for radiation and contamination survey data collection. The highest on-contact radiation level on the PG container was 1.7 mR/hr. No indication of contamination outside of the PG container was detected. A direct frisk of the RSO and PG user's hands found no indication of contamination.
DOH will take survey data including wipes and verify they are negative. Once verified, the RSO will contact the manufacturer or a waste broker for PG disposal. A leak test will be performed prior to transport. The damaged PG will remain secured in the transport box until disposal.
Washington state event number: WA-24-016
* * * UPDATE ON 04/14/2025 AT 1911 EDT FROM MARK HERNANDEZ TO IAN HOWARD * * *
The following is a summary of information provided by the Department via email:
The leak test was negative prior to shipping the PG for disposal. All corrective actions have been completed by the licensee and the investigation is closed.
Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification (email)
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE
The following is a summary of information provided by the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) via email:
A portable gauge (PG) was ran over by a roller around 0930 PDT. The main body was crushed and the gauge source rod broke off but appeared to be intact.
The PG user used a shovel to pick up the source and placed it in the transport box. The PG user stayed with the PG until the radiation safety officer (RSO) arrived. The RSO confirmed [an] intact source rod and gathered the remaining damaged PG parts into the transport box. It was then transported to the licensee storage location.
The RSO and local fire department did not have a survey meter for radiation and contamination surveys.
Three DOH representatives were sent for radiation and contamination survey data collection. The highest on-contact radiation level on the PG container was 1.7 mR/hr. No indication of contamination outside of the PG container was detected. A direct frisk of the RSO and PG user's hands found no indication of contamination.
DOH will take survey data including wipes and verify they are negative. Once verified, the RSO will contact the manufacturer or a waste broker for PG disposal. A leak test will be performed prior to transport. The damaged PG will remain secured in the transport box until disposal.
Washington state event number: WA-24-016
* * * UPDATE ON 04/14/2025 AT 1911 EDT FROM MARK HERNANDEZ TO IAN HOWARD * * *
The following is a summary of information provided by the Department via email:
The leak test was negative prior to shipping the PG for disposal. All corrective actions have been completed by the licensee and the investigation is closed.
Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification (email)
Agreement State
Event Number: 57423
Rep Org: WA Office of Radiation Protection
Licensee: Acuren
Region: 4
City: Anacortes State: WA
County:
License #: IR067
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Martell
HQ OPS Officer: Tenisha Meadows
Licensee: Acuren
Region: 4
City: Anacortes State: WA
County:
License #: IR067
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Martell
HQ OPS Officer: Tenisha Meadows
Notification Date: 11/13/2024
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2024
Event Time: 13:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2025
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2024
Event Time: 13:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Silberfeld, Dafna (NMSS)
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Silberfeld, Dafna (NMSS)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/15/2025
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE FROM RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:
"Radiography was being performed in a tank at the refinery. [A radiation protection boundary was set up around a tank], and the source was secured in the exposure device. One radiographer was outside the boundary and the other radiographer was inside the boundary with another individual (contractor) outside of the tank. The contractor was in a lift moving upwards next to the tank. Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between the radiographers and the contractor, the two individuals outside the tank and within the radiation boundaries were exposed to the source for 2 minutes.
"The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) estimates 1.8 R radiation exposure for the 2 minutes duration right outside the tank as a worst-case scenario. The RSO is currently performing a dose investigation of the affected contract personnel and radiographer. The RSO recommended the contactor to receive medical monitoring (blood draw) as a precaution. The Department set expectations for the licensee to send a full detailed report on findings for this incident. More information to follow for this incident report."
Device information:
Isotope: 87 Ci of Ir-192
Manufacturer: QSA Global
Device Model: 880D
Incident number: WA-24-022
* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/2024 AT 1958 EDT FROM JOHN MARTELL TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *
The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:
"On 11/14/2024, inspectors from the Department will be conducting a reactive onsite visit of the overexposure event which occurred on 11/12/2024. The inspectors will be meeting at the refinery site where the overexposure occurred with the licensee representatives including the RSO to gather information on the event related to what and how the event occurred and to review related records.
"The Department staff will continue to gather information on the event to determine the extent of the exposures, the potential root cause of this incident, any correlation to previous incidents with this licensee, and appropriate corrective actions. This may include potential enforcement actions in addition to the corrective actions. Updates will be provided as additional information is received."
Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS MSST Deputy Division Director (Silberfeld), and NMSS (email)
* * * UPDATE ON 04/14/2025 AT 1827 EDT FROM MARK HERNANDEZ TO IAN HOWARD * * *
The following is a summary of information provided by the Department via email:
The total dose received is 1.7 mrem for two individuals on the lift and 4 mrem for the other individual inside the tank. After the reactive inspection and interviews were performed, a violation letter was sent to the licensee for individuals not wearing proper dosimetry in a radiation area and not contacting the emergency response number after discovery of the unmonitored exposure. All corrective actions have been completed by the licensee and the investigation is closed.
Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification (email)
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE FROM RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:
"Radiography was being performed in a tank at the refinery. [A radiation protection boundary was set up around a tank], and the source was secured in the exposure device. One radiographer was outside the boundary and the other radiographer was inside the boundary with another individual (contractor) outside of the tank. The contractor was in a lift moving upwards next to the tank. Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between the radiographers and the contractor, the two individuals outside the tank and within the radiation boundaries were exposed to the source for 2 minutes.
"The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) estimates 1.8 R radiation exposure for the 2 minutes duration right outside the tank as a worst-case scenario. The RSO is currently performing a dose investigation of the affected contract personnel and radiographer. The RSO recommended the contactor to receive medical monitoring (blood draw) as a precaution. The Department set expectations for the licensee to send a full detailed report on findings for this incident. More information to follow for this incident report."
Device information:
Isotope: 87 Ci of Ir-192
Manufacturer: QSA Global
Device Model: 880D
Incident number: WA-24-022
* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/2024 AT 1958 EDT FROM JOHN MARTELL TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *
The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:
"On 11/14/2024, inspectors from the Department will be conducting a reactive onsite visit of the overexposure event which occurred on 11/12/2024. The inspectors will be meeting at the refinery site where the overexposure occurred with the licensee representatives including the RSO to gather information on the event related to what and how the event occurred and to review related records.
"The Department staff will continue to gather information on the event to determine the extent of the exposures, the potential root cause of this incident, any correlation to previous incidents with this licensee, and appropriate corrective actions. This may include potential enforcement actions in addition to the corrective actions. Updates will be provided as additional information is received."
Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS MSST Deputy Division Director (Silberfeld), and NMSS (email)
* * * UPDATE ON 04/14/2025 AT 1827 EDT FROM MARK HERNANDEZ TO IAN HOWARD * * *
The following is a summary of information provided by the Department via email:
The total dose received is 1.7 mrem for two individuals on the lift and 4 mrem for the other individual inside the tank. After the reactive inspection and interviews were performed, a violation letter was sent to the licensee for individuals not wearing proper dosimetry in a radiation area and not contacting the emergency response number after discovery of the unmonitored exposure. All corrective actions have been completed by the licensee and the investigation is closed.
Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification (email)