Event Notification Report for April 07, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/06/2025 - 04/07/2025
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57652
Facility: Seabrook
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Jack Connolly
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Jack Connolly
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Notification Date: 04/08/2025
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2025
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2025
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2025
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - Pot RHR Inop
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - Pot RHR Inop
Person (Organization):
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/10/2025
EN Revision Text: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On April 7, 2025, at 2000 EDT, it was discovered that all pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the `D' steam generator. The redundant `A' Train EFW flow control valve for the `D' steam generator remains functional, as well as the capability of the auxiliary feedwater system to supply all steam generators.
"The `A' and `B' EFW flow control valves are arranged in a series configuration for each steam generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW flow control valves to meet its surveillance requirements will render all EFW pumps inoperable per technical specifications (TS).
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Troubleshooting is ongoing for the cause of the loss of control power. The licensee is currently in technical specification limiting condition for operation 3.7.1.2 action statement 'D' to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to operable status as soon possible.
* * * RETRACTION ON 04/09/2025 AT 1049 EDT FROM BOB MURRELL TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 04/08/2025 at 1344 EDT, EN 57652. Notification of the event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commision was initially made because of declaring all pumps in the emergency feedwater system inoperable in response to discovering the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve, which supplies the `D' steam generator. The redundant `A' train EFW flow control valve for the `D' steam generator remained functional, as well as the capability of the EFW system to supply all steam generators.
"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra has concluded that the loss of control power to the `B' train EFW flow control valve did not prevent EFW from fulfilling its safety function. Specifically, the `A' train of EFW was fully capable of fulfilling all EFW safety functions.
"Therefore, this event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Schussler)
EN Revision Text: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On April 7, 2025, at 2000 EDT, it was discovered that all pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the `D' steam generator. The redundant `A' Train EFW flow control valve for the `D' steam generator remains functional, as well as the capability of the auxiliary feedwater system to supply all steam generators.
"The `A' and `B' EFW flow control valves are arranged in a series configuration for each steam generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW flow control valves to meet its surveillance requirements will render all EFW pumps inoperable per technical specifications (TS).
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Troubleshooting is ongoing for the cause of the loss of control power. The licensee is currently in technical specification limiting condition for operation 3.7.1.2 action statement 'D' to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to operable status as soon possible.
* * * RETRACTION ON 04/09/2025 AT 1049 EDT FROM BOB MURRELL TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 04/08/2025 at 1344 EDT, EN 57652. Notification of the event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commision was initially made because of declaring all pumps in the emergency feedwater system inoperable in response to discovering the loss of control power to the `B' train emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control valve, which supplies the `D' steam generator. The redundant `A' train EFW flow control valve for the `D' steam generator remained functional, as well as the capability of the EFW system to supply all steam generators.
"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra has concluded that the loss of control power to the `B' train EFW flow control valve did not prevent EFW from fulfilling its safety function. Specifically, the `A' train of EFW was fully capable of fulfilling all EFW safety functions.
"Therefore, this event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Schussler)
Part 21
Event Number: 57654
Rep Org: Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co.
Licensee: Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co.
Region: 3
City: Cincinnati State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark Papke
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co.
Region: 3
City: Cincinnati State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark Papke
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 04/08/2025
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2025
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
Franke, Mark (R2DO)
Hills, David (R3DO)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Schussler, Jason (R1DO)
Franke, Mark (R2DO)
Hills, David (R3DO)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/10/2025
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - GENERAL ELECTRIC TIME DELAY RELAY FAILURE
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via email:
This is a report made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21 on a failure of a Curtiss Wright (CW) supplied General Electric (GE) time delay relay.
On 12/10/24, Constellation notified CW about the failure of the relay. Constellation stated the relay failed a planned maintenance test. The induction disc was unable to complete the full travel towards the under-voltage trip due to obstruction from the stationary contact, which slipped down along the shaft upon which it was mounted, and made contact with the induction disc.
On 2/13/25, CW received the failed CW supplied GE time delay relay from Constellation.
Further research discovered that LaSalle had a similar failure in 2002, but there have not been any other reported failures in the nuclear industry until this one.
On 4/07/25, Revision 2 of the failure analysis written by Constellation Power Labs stated similar results as those of 12/10/24. The bracket, even when fully tightened, could not hold its position on the shaft. The root cause of the failure could not be determined.
Because CW cannot establish a root cause, the following checks are recommended:
1) CW has modified the dedication plan to apply mild vertical force to assure that the clamp is secure as part of the dedication process.
2) End users should provide a similar mechanical test to be sure that the clamp remains secure during periodic surveillance and maintenance activities.
These actions should preclude a possible recurrence of this failure mechanism.
Relay information:
Part number: 12IAV69A1A
Manufacturer's serial number: AIAV111700032
CW tag number: CJ678001
CW serial number: 03
Affected facilities: Unknown
Responsible Curtis-Wright representative:
Mark Papke
QA Manager
Curtiss-Wright
4600 East Tech Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45245
* * * UPDATE ON 04/09/25 AT 0818 EDT FROM MARK PAPKE TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
Curtiss Wright (CW) provided a copy of the undervoltage relay failure analysis Revision 2 written by Constellation Power Labs to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The report included conclusions, observations, and a test plan.
In addition, CW sent out a test procedure to the customer. CW has indicated that customers should perform a routine maintenance check on the contact/clamp.
Affected facilities: Constellation Fleet
Notified R1DO (Schussler), R2DO (Franke), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 group (Email).
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - GENERAL ELECTRIC TIME DELAY RELAY FAILURE
The following is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via email:
This is a report made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21 on a failure of a Curtiss Wright (CW) supplied General Electric (GE) time delay relay.
On 12/10/24, Constellation notified CW about the failure of the relay. Constellation stated the relay failed a planned maintenance test. The induction disc was unable to complete the full travel towards the under-voltage trip due to obstruction from the stationary contact, which slipped down along the shaft upon which it was mounted, and made contact with the induction disc.
On 2/13/25, CW received the failed CW supplied GE time delay relay from Constellation.
Further research discovered that LaSalle had a similar failure in 2002, but there have not been any other reported failures in the nuclear industry until this one.
On 4/07/25, Revision 2 of the failure analysis written by Constellation Power Labs stated similar results as those of 12/10/24. The bracket, even when fully tightened, could not hold its position on the shaft. The root cause of the failure could not be determined.
Because CW cannot establish a root cause, the following checks are recommended:
1) CW has modified the dedication plan to apply mild vertical force to assure that the clamp is secure as part of the dedication process.
2) End users should provide a similar mechanical test to be sure that the clamp remains secure during periodic surveillance and maintenance activities.
These actions should preclude a possible recurrence of this failure mechanism.
Relay information:
Part number: 12IAV69A1A
Manufacturer's serial number: AIAV111700032
CW tag number: CJ678001
CW serial number: 03
Affected facilities: Unknown
Responsible Curtis-Wright representative:
Mark Papke
QA Manager
Curtiss-Wright
4600 East Tech Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45245
* * * UPDATE ON 04/09/25 AT 0818 EDT FROM MARK PAPKE TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
Curtiss Wright (CW) provided a copy of the undervoltage relay failure analysis Revision 2 written by Constellation Power Labs to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The report included conclusions, observations, and a test plan.
In addition, CW sent out a test procedure to the customer. CW has indicated that customers should perform a routine maintenance check on the contact/clamp.
Affected facilities: Constellation Fleet
Notified R1DO (Schussler), R2DO (Franke), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 group (Email).