Event Notification Report for March 28, 2025

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was received from the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) via phone and email:

"New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) received an email on the morning of 3/20/2025, from the Chief Operating Officer of NRD, LLC to report a potential overexposure of a production worker.

"On 3/7/2025, a production worker had received an acid burn on his forearm resulting in a first-degree burn where the skin was reddened but not visually broken. The chemical agent causing this burn is suspected to be nitric acid with Am-241 contamination used in routine production activities for Am-241 foils. The exact nature of the work being performed, cause of this burn/contamination, and personal protective equipment (PPE) worn by the affected individual is unknown at this time. The initial skin contamination was 8,900 disintegrations per minute (dpm) according to NRD. After 7 hours of decontamination, using water and mild soap, NRD states that they were able to successfully decontaminate some of the areas on the individual's forearm, however, 5,900 dpm remained on the skin. Nasal swabs and whole-body surveys returned as below background levels according to NRD. NRD, LLC stated that only this one worker had been contaminated from this event.

"NRD states that they believed that this contamination was localized to skin contamination with no evidence of internal uptake. However, this individual has been removed from work and a series of bioassays were performed (24-hour composite urine collection) on 3/8/2025, 3/11/2025, and 3/16/2025 and sent to GEL Laboratories for rush analysis. The 3/8/2025 result showed 22.9 picocuries per liter of Am-241, further confirmed via gamma spectroscopy. This preliminary report was provided to NRD on 3/19/2025.

"NRD states that they performed dose reconstruction from this event using the baseline bioassay, last monthly routine bioassay (collected on 3/5/2025), and the singular reactionary bioassay result available from the collection on 3/8/2025 (reported to NRD on 3/19). NRD, LLC used the integrated modules for bioassay (IMBA) using an ingestion-specific intake model, which indicates 5.47 rem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) and 128 rem committed dose equivalent (CDE) to the bone surfaces. These doses are not confirmed as official, but estimates provided the information available at this time. Given the nature of intake and the suspected pathways for intake (e.g., dermal absorption), NYSDOH is awaiting clarification for the assumptions and rationale used in estimating this intake as well as seeking additional information on the nasal samples collected/analyzed and the whole-body surveys performed pre-, during and post-decontamination.

"Prior to reporting this event to NYSDOH, NRD, LLC contacted Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) on the evening of 3/19/2025. NRD, LLC informed NYSDOH that REAC/TS was notified and did not recommend any medical intervention. NYSDOH called REAC/TS independently on March 20, 2025, and spoke to the medical team that spoke to NRD. It was noted that REAC/TS did not have enough information at the point of discussion with NRD to determine if any intervention was necessary and requested NRD, LLC to provide additional information on this event. NYSDOH shared information on this event reported by NRD with REAC/TS following this call. NYSDOH immediately recommended to NRD, LLC that they continue timely follow-up with REAC/TS to determine if medical intervention may be necessary per their clinical recommendation, particularly since two additional bioassay samples (3/11/2025 and 3/16/2025; collection dates) were being analyzed and may strengthen the confidence in performing dose reconstruction. If medical intervention is deemed clinically necessary, the timeliness of medical intervention may directly impact the amount of dose received by the affected worker. Because of this, NYSDOH strongly recommended to NRD that they prioritize resolving any information needed for REAC/TS to make this determination.

"NYSDOH has requested a significant amount of additional information and documentation on this event including, but not limited to, the modeled pathways and methods for dose reconstruction, the extent of personnel and area contamination, immediate protective actions, and causes and corrective actions from this event. NYSDOH has also identified several suspected items of noncompliance pertaining to this event and will follow up on these observations.

"It is not suspected that there is any risk to public health or the environment from this event. NYSDOH is monitoring this event and has assigned NYSDOH Incident Number 1523 to internally track this event. NYSDOH will provide an update to this notification once additional information is available."

NMED Event Report ID Number: NY-25-04

PART 21 - SOFTWARE ERROR IN TRANSIENT STABILITY PROGRAM

The following information was provided by Southern Nuclear Operating Company via email:

"This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days.

"Based upon the information provided by Operation Technology, Inc. (OTI) in [electrical transient analyzer program] (ETAP) error report ERCA-24-003, revision 1, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has determined that a substantial safety hazard could have been created by the error introduced in the transient stability program in the current release of ETAP software utilized at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (HNP) and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 (VEGP1-2) were it to go uncorrected. While the nature of the software error detailed by OTI in ETAP error report ERCA-24-003, revision 1 had the potential to impact bus transfers and degrade essential safety-related equipment, SNC has verified that none of the HNP or VEGP1-2 calculations that utilized the transient stability program had false favorable results.

"The NRC Senior Residents at HNP and VEGP1-2 have been notified."

Affected plants:
Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/31/2025

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLAINT INSULATED CONDUCTOR

The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:
A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to nine plants.
Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse.

Reporting company point of contact:
RSCC Wire and Cable LLC
dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure
20 Bradley Park Road
East Granby, CT 06026

Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager
Phone: 860-653-8376
Fax: 860-653-8301
Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com

* * * UPDATE ON 08/23/24 AT 1315 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The vendor provided the final report for this event listing corrective actions and the estimated completion dates.
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 09/04/24 AT 1044 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO NESTOR MAKRIS * * *

The vendor notified the NRC that they plan to send additional finding data regarding this notification via fax and/or email within the next day or two.
Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 09/06/24 AT 1327 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The vendor identified an additional non-compliant shipment of insulated conductor.
Affected plant: Calvert Cliffs
Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 9/17/24 AT 1641 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The vendor identified an additional non-compliant shipment of insulated conductor.
Affected customer: Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division.
Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), R3DO (Ziolkowski), R4DO (Azua), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 9/26/24 AT 1030 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The vendor is continuing to conduct inventory sampling which involves a 14 day aging test. Due to the length of testing, the vendor plans on submitting their final report the week of October 7, 2024.
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R3DO (Havertape), R4DO (Young), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 10/28/24 AT 1121 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The vendor has decided to expand the scope and breadth of the review to ensure they have identified and corrected for the full extent of the matter. Additional time is needed to complete this review.
Notified R1DO (Eve), R3DO (Edwards), R4DO (Warnick), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 02/13/25 AT 1125 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO IAN HOWARD * * *

The vendor has decided to expand the scope and breadth of the review to ensure they have identified and corrected for the full extent of the matter. RSCC is reviewing shipments from the past 18 months to ensure it has accounted for all non-conforming products. Additional cables related to this scope have been identified and impacted customers have been notified.

***UPDATE ON 03/28/2025 AT 1039 EDT FROM CAROL GROSSO TO RODNEY CLAGG***

The vendor has identified cable(s) that could be affected and have advised customers of the issue and requested that samples be returned to the vendor facility for further verification testing, which is a process that remains ongoing. This testing will confirm the cable's safety related function. Once the testing is complete, the vendor will notify the NRC with an updated and final Part 21 report.

Notified R1DO (Arner), R3DO (Gilliam), R4DO (Deese), and Part 21 group (Email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT

The following is a summary of information provided by the New York City Department of Health via email:

On February 26, 2025, the licensee reported a dose administered differed by more than 20 percent of the prescribed dose. During an administration of Lu-177-PSMA [lutetium-177-prostate specific membrane antigen], the administration was stopped because it was determined that the patient's creatine level was significantly elevated. The administered activity was estimated as 49 mCi, out of an intended/prescribed activity of 162 mCi.

New York Identification Number: NYC-25-0226.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone or email:

"On 3/28/2025 at 0106 MST, Palo Verde Generating Station Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 due to discovering `A' essential chiller (EC) oil temperature at 80 degrees Fahrenheit, which is below the operability limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. `A' EC inoperable rendered the `A' high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump inoperable. At the time of discovery, `B' HPSI was inoperable due to recirculating the refueling water tank for chemistry purposes (LCO 3.5.3 condition B entered on 3/27/2025 at 2127 MST). This resulted in inoperability for both trains of HPSI, leading to a loss of the HPSI safety function.

"On 3/28/2025 at 0115 MST, `B' HPSI was restored to operable condition, LCO 3.0.3 was exited, and the loss of safety function was restored.

"There were no power reductions (control rod insertions or boron concentration changes). The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any release of radioactive materials. Unit 2 and 3 remained at 100%.

"NRC resident has been notified of the event."

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone or email:

"At approximately 1409 EDT on March 28, 2025, with Unit 2 in mode 2 at approximately 1 percent power during reactor startup, an actuation of group 1 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (i.e., main steam line, main steam line drain, and reactor water sample line isolation valves) occurred during performance of the Unit 2 turbine control/stop valves tightness test procedure. The group 1 PCIV actuation resulted when the turbine stop valves were opened (with control valves remaining closed) while main condenser vacuum was below 10 inches Hg [inches of Mercury]. The PCIVs automatically closed as designed when the group 1 actuation signal was received.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0915 EDT, on March 29, 2025, with Unit 1 in mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the emergency diesel generator system occurred during Unit 2 startup transformer testing. The reason for the auto-start was the loss of an electrical bus during testing. The division 3 diesel generator automatically started as designed on low safety bus voltage.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency diesel generator system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."