Event Notification Report for March 07, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/24/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/FOUND GAUGE

The following information was received from the Washington State Department of Health (the Department) via email:

"On March 7, 2025, at 1613 PDT, the Department was notified that a portable gauge (Troxler 3411-B) had fallen from a vehicle. This notification initially came from the Washington State Emergency Operations Officer of the Washington Military Department. The notification stated that the licensee had submitted a police report and was actively searching for the source.

"At 1633, the Department Emergency Response Duty Officer (ERDO) forwarded the notification to the Radioactive Materials Section Manager. At 1711, the Materials Section Manager contacted the licensee by phone to determine the scope of response necessary. The licensee informed the Department that the gauge was contained in a locked box and was believed to be lost or stolen. The licensee called back at 1716, informing the Department that the gauge had been found with the box locked, intact, and no signs of damage to the source contained within the shielded gauge. The gauge was found along the side of the road, in a ditch and away from any pedestrian traffic. No exposure is believed to have occurred to the public when considering the source was in a shielded position and inside of a locked Troxler class A container.

"The source was verified to be intact and sealed. Operational verifications of the gauge were performed, and the gauge is functioning normally. The gauge is in the possession of the licensee.

"A final report will be submitted to the NRC after the licensee has responded with corrective actions."

Washington Incident Number: WA-25-005

* * * UPDATE ON 3/21/2025 AT 1947 EDT FROM DANE BLAKINGER TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *

The following information was received from the Washington State Department of Health (the Department) via email:

"The licensee corrective actions include mandatory retraining of gauge handling and locking procedures for all gauge users at Terra Associates Inc., an increased [frequency] of user audits of locking procedures from every 6 months to every 3 months, and GPS trackers installed on all gauge transportation boxes. The Department will review corrective actions during future inspections, to include a review of this report and ensure licensee is demonstrating compliance with proposed corrective actions."

Notified R4DO (Bywater) and NMSS Events Notification (email)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was received from the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) via phone and email:

"New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) received an email on the morning of 3/20/2025, from the Chief Operating Officer of NRD, LLC to report a potential overexposure of a production worker.

"On 3/7/2025, a production worker had received an acid burn on his forearm resulting in a first-degree burn where the skin was reddened but not visually broken. The chemical agent causing this burn is suspected to be nitric acid with Am-241 contamination used in routine production activities for Am-241 foils. The exact nature of the work being performed, cause of this burn/contamination, and personal protective equipment (PPE) worn by the affected individual is unknown at this time. The initial skin contamination was 8,900 disintegrations per minute (dpm) according to NRD. After 7 hours of decontamination, using water and mild soap, NRD states that they were able to successfully decontaminate some of the areas on the individual's forearm, however, 5,900 dpm remained on the skin. Nasal swabs and whole-body surveys returned as below background levels according to NRD. NRD, LLC stated that only this one worker had been contaminated from this event.

"NRD states that they believed that this contamination was localized to skin contamination with no evidence of internal uptake. However, this individual has been removed from work and a series of bioassays were performed (24-hour composite urine collection) on 3/8/2025, 3/11/2025, and 3/16/2025 and sent to GEL Laboratories for rush analysis. The 3/8/2025 result showed 22.9 picocuries per liter of Am-241, further confirmed via gamma spectroscopy. This preliminary report was provided to NRD on 3/19/2025.

"NRD states that they performed dose reconstruction from this event using the baseline bioassay, last monthly routine bioassay (collected on 3/5/2025), and the singular reactionary bioassay result available from the collection on 3/8/2025 (reported to NRD on 3/19). NRD, LLC used the integrated modules for bioassay (IMBA) using an ingestion-specific intake model, which indicates 5.47 rem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) and 128 rem committed dose equivalent (CDE) to the bone surfaces. These doses are not confirmed as official, but estimates provided the information available at this time. Given the nature of intake and the suspected pathways for intake (e.g., dermal absorption), NYSDOH is awaiting clarification for the assumptions and rationale used in estimating this intake as well as seeking additional information on the nasal samples collected/analyzed and the whole-body surveys performed pre-, during and post-decontamination.

"Prior to reporting this event to NYSDOH, NRD, LLC contacted Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) on the evening of 3/19/2025. NRD, LLC informed NYSDOH that REAC/TS was notified and did not recommend any medical intervention. NYSDOH called REAC/TS independently on March 20, 2025, and spoke to the medical team that spoke to NRD. It was noted that REAC/TS did not have enough information at the point of discussion with NRD to determine if any intervention was necessary and requested NRD, LLC to provide additional information on this event. NYSDOH shared information on this event reported by NRD with REAC/TS following this call. NYSDOH immediately recommended to NRD, LLC that they continue timely follow-up with REAC/TS to determine if medical intervention may be necessary per their clinical recommendation, particularly since two additional bioassay samples (3/11/2025 and 3/16/2025; collection dates) were being analyzed and may strengthen the confidence in performing dose reconstruction. If medical intervention is deemed clinically necessary, the timeliness of medical intervention may directly impact the amount of dose received by the affected worker. Because of this, NYSDOH strongly recommended to NRD that they prioritize resolving any information needed for REAC/TS to make this determination.

"NYSDOH has requested a significant amount of additional information and documentation on this event including, but not limited to, the modeled pathways and methods for dose reconstruction, the extent of personnel and area contamination, immediate protective actions, and causes and corrective actions from this event. NYSDOH has also identified several suspected items of noncompliance pertaining to this event and will follow up on these observations.

"It is not suspected that there is any risk to public health or the environment from this event. NYSDOH is monitoring this event and has assigned NYSDOH Incident Number 1523 to internally track this event. NYSDOH will provide an update to this notification once additional information is available."

NMED Event Report ID Number: NY-25-04

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On March 7, 2025, at approximately 1700 CST, the Department was notified by the licensee that a Troxler 3440 moisture density gauge containing an 8 mCi Cesium-137 source (original strength) and a 40 mCi (original strength) Am-241/Be source were damaged by being run over by construction equipment at a job site in Melissa, Texas. The radiation safety officer (RSO) was onsite, the sources were intact, but the gauge was damaged to an extent that the cesium source could not be retracted into a safe position. The RSO, in coordination with the Department, removed the gauge from the accident site, and made the device safe by placing it in a container filled with sand. The damaged gauge was then secured to the container, the container was secured to the licensee's vehicle, and the damaged gauge was transported to their vault which was less than 1 mile away. The manufacturer, who has a local repair facility, was already closed for the weekend so the damaged device was placed in the vault at the licensee's facility for transport to the manufacturer on Monday. The RSO performed several surveys at the accident site, with the gauge in the truck, and at the licensee's vault. All readings were well within normal limits. No overexposure occurred as the only time the source was exposed was when the RSO transferred it from the ground to the sand filled container. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-10181
Texas NMED Number: TX250018

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/16/2025

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - CIRCUIT BREAKER DEFECT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On March 7, 2025, General Electric Hitachi (GEH) issued 10 CFR Part 21 Communication SC 25-01 for a molded case circuity breaker (MCCB), in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b). Testing performed by GEH identified a deviation in two (2) breakers; specifically, GEH part number DD148C6151P004 (Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) part number: TB13030BWE05). These MCCBs failed to instantaneously trip at the designated current and time.

"James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) completed an evaluation of this deviation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1) on May 6, 2025, and concluded this condition is a defect which could create a substantial safety hazard. The instantaneous trip function of this component protects safety-related buses from tripping on an overcurrent condition.

"JAF was listed as the only affected plant. It was determined that the defect does not exist in any installed plant equipment because bench testing performed prior to installation includes overcurrent trip testing and would have identified this defect. The components affected by this defect have been restricted to prevent them from being installed pending corrective action resolution.

"This letter is submitted as a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). Additional details will be provided in a written report within 30 days, in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii).

"There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector at JAF has been notified. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mark Hawes, Regulatory Assurance, at (315) 349-6659."

Known affected power plants:
James A. FitzPatrick