Event Notification Report for March 01, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/7/2025

EN Revision Text: MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0101 EST on 03/01/25, while shutting down for entry into a scheduled refueling outage, the station discovered that a single main steam isolation valve '4A MSIV' did not fully close on demand. All other equipment operated as expected.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Unit 4 will remain in mode 4 until corrected. The MSIV was closed by isolating instrument air.


* * * RETRACTION ON 03/06/2025 AT 2023 FROM BOB MURELL TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The following information was provided by Florida Power and Light (FPL) via phone and email:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 57578. Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of a single main steam isolation valve (MSIV). The `4A' MSIV failed to fully close on demand during a planned refueling outage shutdown.

"Subsequent to the initial report, FPL has concluded that the '4A' MSIV would have fully closed during an accident scenario based on steam flows that would have been present.

"Therefore, this event is not considered an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is not reportable to the NRC pursuant [to] 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Penmetsa).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was provided by the Washington State Department of Health (the Department) via email:

"In early March 2025, a mixed-waste operator at Perma-Fix Northwest (PFNW) sustained a finger sliver while processing waste. Although the wound frisked clean, split 24-hour urinalysis later that month revealed 0.07 and 0.06 pCi Pu per L, projecting a maximum committed effective dose (CEDE) of up to 6 rem. PFNW did not alert the Department until June 10, 2025, about sixty days after receiving the positive result, and still has not submitted the 30-day written report that was due on April 28, 2025. These delays violate the 24-hour telephone-notification and 30-day written-report provisions of WAC 246-221-250, both incorporated into PFNW's licenses via license condition 11. Bioassay follow-up, dose modelling, and record updates have also lagged, contravening license condition 21, while no timely radiological unusual event file was routed to the Department as required by license condition 23.

"No chelation therapy (Ca- or Zn-DTPA) was administered, and the contract certified health physicist (CHP) did not document why none was indicated. Immediate corrective actions included and include retro-logging the 24-hour call, submitting an overdue SA-300 written report within five working days, and certifying the committed dose by June 20, 2025. They are also to provide supporting records for the Department to review during the June 24, 2025 on-site inspection. Should the final dose exceed 5 rem CEDE, PFNW will breach the annual dose limit in WAC 246-221-010(1), and the dose must then be subtracted from the worker's planned-special-exposure allowance under subsection (2). In summary, PFNW's failures in notification, reporting, and bioassay execution constitute serious compliance deficiencies that require immediate, documented remediation to protect the worker and restore conformity with state and license requirements.

"As the maximum calculated CED exceeds 5 rem, this event is being reported as a possible overexposure.

"The Department is conducting a responsive investigation."

Washington Incident File: WNS-INC-25-04