Event Notification Report for December 06, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/05/2024 - 12/06/2024
Agreement State
Event Number: 57468
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: University of Texas at El Paso
Region: 4
City: El Paso State: TX
County:
License #: L0000159
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Bruce Hammond
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Licensee: University of Texas at El Paso
Region: 4
City: El Paso State: TX
County:
License #: L0000159
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Bruce Hammond
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 12/12/2024
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2024
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - AUTOCLAVE CONTAMINATION
The following report was received by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency):
"On December 11, 2024, the Agency received an email from the licensee requesting information on reporting a contamination incident that occurred in their biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory involving 200 microcuries of C-14. The incident occurred on Friday, December 6, 2024, and was discovered on December 7, 2024, when the sample had cooled and access could occur.
"The licensee's researcher had labeled a sample of the material they were using with the C-14. After the use was concluded, the researcher doused the material with a fluid to kill the bacteria.
"The sample was placed in a `red bag' for disposal, but [the sample] was inadvertently placed on a tray that was moved to the autoclave. The sample was put through the autoclaving process where the plastic container it was in ruptured due to the heat and pressure. Some material spilled onto the tray, and some material was in the drain of the autoclave. It was not until December 7, 2024, when the material cooled, that any assessment could confirm the presence of radioactive material and any evaluation for contamination could be made. The drain [exposure rate] was four times background, and the tray contained most of the contamination and material. The BSL-3 laboratory and vivarium have been closed until such time as decontamination can be completed.
"There was no contamination of personnel, no contamination outside of the autoclave, and no contamination in the actual BSL-3 laboratory. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-10150
Texas NMED Number: TX240048
The following report was received by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency):
"On December 11, 2024, the Agency received an email from the licensee requesting information on reporting a contamination incident that occurred in their biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory involving 200 microcuries of C-14. The incident occurred on Friday, December 6, 2024, and was discovered on December 7, 2024, when the sample had cooled and access could occur.
"The licensee's researcher had labeled a sample of the material they were using with the C-14. After the use was concluded, the researcher doused the material with a fluid to kill the bacteria.
"The sample was placed in a `red bag' for disposal, but [the sample] was inadvertently placed on a tray that was moved to the autoclave. The sample was put through the autoclaving process where the plastic container it was in ruptured due to the heat and pressure. Some material spilled onto the tray, and some material was in the drain of the autoclave. It was not until December 7, 2024, when the material cooled, that any assessment could confirm the presence of radioactive material and any evaluation for contamination could be made. The drain [exposure rate] was four times background, and the tray contained most of the contamination and material. The BSL-3 laboratory and vivarium have been closed until such time as decontamination can be completed.
"There was no contamination of personnel, no contamination outside of the autoclave, and no contamination in the actual BSL-3 laboratory. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-10150
Texas NMED Number: TX240048
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57491
Facility: Farley
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Roosevelt Scott
HQ OPS Officer: Eric Simpson
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Roosevelt Scott
HQ OPS Officer: Eric Simpson
Notification Date: 01/13/2025
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 21:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2025
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 21:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Franke, Mark (R2DO)
Franke, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 2104 CST, on December 6, 2024, while at 100 percent power, an invalid actuation of the B2G load sequencer (B Train) occurred due to a human performance error during maintenance. The B2G load sequencer initiated a complete actuation of the 'B' Train which included auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and closing the 2B diesel generator (DG) output breaker as designed. All systems started successfully. The 2B DG was not running at the time nor was it required to be. The DG breaker protective relay actuated and the 2B DG was declared inoperable.
"Operators immediately recognized the invalid signal and immediately secured the AFW system at 2106 CST. The auto start of the AFW system had negligible effects on plant systems and reactor power.
"Following event investigation and equipment inspections, the 2B DG was returned to operable status in approximately 24 hours.
"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Resident Inspector was immediately notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 2104 CST, on December 6, 2024, while at 100 percent power, an invalid actuation of the B2G load sequencer (B Train) occurred due to a human performance error during maintenance. The B2G load sequencer initiated a complete actuation of the 'B' Train which included auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and closing the 2B diesel generator (DG) output breaker as designed. All systems started successfully. The 2B DG was not running at the time nor was it required to be. The DG breaker protective relay actuated and the 2B DG was declared inoperable.
"Operators immediately recognized the invalid signal and immediately secured the AFW system at 2106 CST. The auto start of the AFW system had negligible effects on plant systems and reactor power.
"Following event investigation and equipment inspections, the 2B DG was returned to operable status in approximately 24 hours.
"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Resident Inspector was immediately notified."