Event Notification Report for December 05, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/04/2024 - 12/05/2024
Agreement State
Event Number: 57468
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: University of Texas at El Paso
Region: 4
City: El Paso State: TX
County:
License #: L0000159
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Bruce Hammond
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Licensee: University of Texas at El Paso
Region: 4
City: El Paso State: TX
County:
License #: L0000159
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Bruce Hammond
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 12/12/2024
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2024
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - AUTOCLAVE CONTAMINATION
The following report was received by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency):
"On December 11, 2024, the Agency received an email from the licensee requesting information on reporting a contamination incident that occurred in their biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory involving 200 microcuries of C-14. The incident occurred on Friday, December 6, 2024, and was discovered on December 7, 2024, when the sample had cooled and access could occur.
"The licensee's researcher had labeled a sample of the material they were using with the C-14. After the use was concluded, the researcher doused the material with a fluid to kill the bacteria.
"The sample was placed in a `red bag' for disposal, but [the sample] was inadvertently placed on a tray that was moved to the autoclave. The sample was put through the autoclaving process where the plastic container it was in ruptured due to the heat and pressure. Some material spilled onto the tray, and some material was in the drain of the autoclave. It was not until December 7, 2024, when the material cooled, that any assessment could confirm the presence of radioactive material and any evaluation for contamination could be made. The drain [exposure rate] was four times background, and the tray contained most of the contamination and material. The BSL-3 laboratory and vivarium have been closed until such time as decontamination can be completed.
"There was no contamination of personnel, no contamination outside of the autoclave, and no contamination in the actual BSL-3 laboratory. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-10150
Texas NMED Number: TX240048
The following report was received by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency):
"On December 11, 2024, the Agency received an email from the licensee requesting information on reporting a contamination incident that occurred in their biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory involving 200 microcuries of C-14. The incident occurred on Friday, December 6, 2024, and was discovered on December 7, 2024, when the sample had cooled and access could occur.
"The licensee's researcher had labeled a sample of the material they were using with the C-14. After the use was concluded, the researcher doused the material with a fluid to kill the bacteria.
"The sample was placed in a `red bag' for disposal, but [the sample] was inadvertently placed on a tray that was moved to the autoclave. The sample was put through the autoclaving process where the plastic container it was in ruptured due to the heat and pressure. Some material spilled onto the tray, and some material was in the drain of the autoclave. It was not until December 7, 2024, when the material cooled, that any assessment could confirm the presence of radioactive material and any evaluation for contamination could be made. The drain [exposure rate] was four times background, and the tray contained most of the contamination and material. The BSL-3 laboratory and vivarium have been closed until such time as decontamination can be completed.
"There was no contamination of personnel, no contamination outside of the autoclave, and no contamination in the actual BSL-3 laboratory. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-10150
Texas NMED Number: TX240048
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57491
Facility: Farley
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Roosevelt Scott
HQ OPS Officer: Eric Simpson
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Roosevelt Scott
HQ OPS Officer: Eric Simpson
Notification Date: 01/13/2025
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 21:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2025
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2024
Event Time: 21:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Franke, Mark (R2DO)
Franke, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 2104 CST, on December 6, 2024, while at 100 percent power, an invalid actuation of the B2G load sequencer (B Train) occurred due to a human performance error during maintenance. The B2G load sequencer initiated a complete actuation of the 'B' Train which included auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and closing the 2B diesel generator (DG) output breaker as designed. All systems started successfully. The 2B DG was not running at the time nor was it required to be. The DG breaker protective relay actuated and the 2B DG was declared inoperable.
"Operators immediately recognized the invalid signal and immediately secured the AFW system at 2106 CST. The auto start of the AFW system had negligible effects on plant systems and reactor power.
"Following event investigation and equipment inspections, the 2B DG was returned to operable status in approximately 24 hours.
"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Resident Inspector was immediately notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report (LER) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 2104 CST, on December 6, 2024, while at 100 percent power, an invalid actuation of the B2G load sequencer (B Train) occurred due to a human performance error during maintenance. The B2G load sequencer initiated a complete actuation of the 'B' Train which included auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and closing the 2B diesel generator (DG) output breaker as designed. All systems started successfully. The 2B DG was not running at the time nor was it required to be. The DG breaker protective relay actuated and the 2B DG was declared inoperable.
"Operators immediately recognized the invalid signal and immediately secured the AFW system at 2106 CST. The auto start of the AFW system had negligible effects on plant systems and reactor power.
"Following event investigation and equipment inspections, the 2B DG was returned to operable status in approximately 24 hours.
"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Resident Inspector was immediately notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57506
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Quintin Holley
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Quintin Holley
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Notification Date: 01/23/2025
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 17:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2025
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 17:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Suggs, LaDonna (R2DO)
Suggs, LaDonna (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
60-DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 1705 EST on December 5, 2024, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) '2' occurred. It was determined that the run timing relay failed causing energization of the starting air solenoid valves ultimately resulting in EDG '2' spuriously starting and running with no demand and no auto-start signals.
"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"During this event, the actuation of EDG '2' was complete. Initiation of attendant instrumentation/controls and supporting auxiliary equipment was as expected for the actuation being outside normal EDG start logic. Emergency bus 'E2' remained energized from offsite power and EDG '2' did not tie to bus 'E2'.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 1705 EST on December 5, 2024, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) '2' occurred. It was determined that the run timing relay failed causing energization of the starting air solenoid valves ultimately resulting in EDG '2' spuriously starting and running with no demand and no auto-start signals.
"The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"During this event, the actuation of EDG '2' was complete. Initiation of attendant instrumentation/controls and supporting auxiliary equipment was as expected for the actuation being outside normal EDG start logic. Emergency bus 'E2' remained energized from offsite power and EDG '2' did not tie to bus 'E2'.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57459
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jason Wiley
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jason Wiley
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 12/06/2024
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 23:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2024
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 23:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Suber, Gregory (R2DO)
Suber, Gregory (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/13/2024
EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 2358 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on December 5, 2024, emergency diesel generator (EDG) '1' was declared inoperable due to a failure in the standby lube oil temperature control circuit. At this time, EDG '2' was already inoperable due to failure of a relay in the starting air circuity. As a result, both EDGs were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"Offsite power, EDG '3', and EDG '4' were operable during the entire time period that EDGs '1' and '2' were inoperable. The effective safety function was restored at time 0148 on December 6, 2024, when lube oil temperature was restored and EDG '1' was declared operable. EDG '1' was inoperable concurrently with EDG '2' for approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The inoperability of two EDGs placed the plant in LCO 3.8.1.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/12/2024 AT 1738 EST FROM SABRINA SALAZAR TO ERNEST WEST * * *
"The purpose of this Notification is to retract EN 57459 which was made on December 6, 2024, at 1700 EST.
"At 2358 EST on December 5, 2024, emergency diesel generator (EDG) '1' was declared inoperable due to low lube oil temperature. At this time, EDG '2' was already inoperable. The condition of EDG `1' and EDG `2' being inoperable at the same time was reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Subsequent to this, it was determined that the identified EDG `1' low lube oil temperature reading was not representative of the temperature of the lube oil in the crankcase and sump, and therefore had no impact on EDG `1' operability. A component failure in the standby lube oil flow control circuit resulted in lube oil flow bypassing the lube oil circuit leg where temperature is sensed, allowing this uncirculated oil in the temperature sensing leg to stagnate and cool. Lube oil flow continued to recirculate through the heater circuit leg to the EDG and remained above the operability limit.
"The operability determination for EDG `1' has been updated indicating that EDG `1' operability was never lost for this event. As a result, there was not a condition that could have prevented the system from fulfilling the safety function. Offsite power, EDG `1', EDG '3', and EDG '4' were operable during this time.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Franke)
EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 2358 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on December 5, 2024, emergency diesel generator (EDG) '1' was declared inoperable due to a failure in the standby lube oil temperature control circuit. At this time, EDG '2' was already inoperable due to failure of a relay in the starting air circuity. As a result, both EDGs were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"Offsite power, EDG '3', and EDG '4' were operable during the entire time period that EDGs '1' and '2' were inoperable. The effective safety function was restored at time 0148 on December 6, 2024, when lube oil temperature was restored and EDG '1' was declared operable. EDG '1' was inoperable concurrently with EDG '2' for approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The inoperability of two EDGs placed the plant in LCO 3.8.1.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/12/2024 AT 1738 EST FROM SABRINA SALAZAR TO ERNEST WEST * * *
"The purpose of this Notification is to retract EN 57459 which was made on December 6, 2024, at 1700 EST.
"At 2358 EST on December 5, 2024, emergency diesel generator (EDG) '1' was declared inoperable due to low lube oil temperature. At this time, EDG '2' was already inoperable. The condition of EDG `1' and EDG `2' being inoperable at the same time was reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Subsequent to this, it was determined that the identified EDG `1' low lube oil temperature reading was not representative of the temperature of the lube oil in the crankcase and sump, and therefore had no impact on EDG `1' operability. A component failure in the standby lube oil flow control circuit resulted in lube oil flow bypassing the lube oil circuit leg where temperature is sensed, allowing this uncirculated oil in the temperature sensing leg to stagnate and cool. Lube oil flow continued to recirculate through the heater circuit leg to the EDG and remained above the operability limit.
"The operability determination for EDG `1' has been updated indicating that EDG `1' operability was never lost for this event. As a result, there was not a condition that could have prevented the system from fulfilling the safety function. Offsite power, EDG `1', EDG '3', and EDG '4' were operable during this time.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Franke)
Agreement State
Event Number: 57456
Rep Org: NJ Rad Prot And Rel Prevention Pgm
Licensee: Phillips 66
Region: 1
City: Linden State: NJ
County:
License #: 506897-RAD240003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Jack Tway
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Licensee: Phillips 66
Region: 1
City: Linden State: NJ
County:
License #: 506897-RAD240003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Jack Tway
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Notification Date: 12/06/2024
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2025
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/21/2025
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On December 5, 2024, the licensee became aware of a shutter that could not fully close but was able to return to the fully open, operative position. The shutter failure was identified while performing a routine six-month fixed gauge shutter check. The fixed gauge is located eight feet above a walking platform which is only accessible to licensee staff via ladder, scaffolding or other means. No members of the public have access to this location.
"The shutter is currently in its normal, open position. No maintenance activities are scheduled which would require closure of the shutter.
"The licensee has a contract with the manufacturer and has scheduled them to assess this situation and make any necessary repairs.
"The shutter holder contains a Cs-137 sealed source (model A-2102) with maximum activity of 300 mCi.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) [NJAC 7:28-51.1]"
Equipment information:
Model number: SH-F2
Serial number: 0362CG
Manufacturer: Vega Americas, Inc.
New Jersey Event Report ID number: To be determined
* * * UPDATE ON 1/19/2025 AT 1321 EDT FROM JACK TWAY TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On January 8, 2025, the Phillips 66 contractor, Vega Americas Inc, removed the device with the stuck shutter and placed it into storage at the facility awaiting disposal. A new device was installed by the manufacturer in its place.
"The device serial number was originally reported as 0362CG. This serial number is incorrect. The serial number of the source is 37053G (50 mCi), which was installed in device model SHF1B, manufactured by Vega. The licensee is contacting Vega to obtain the correct device serial number.
"This incident is now considered closed by the state."
NMED Number: 240437
Notified R1DO (Carfang), and NMSS Events Notification (email).
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER
The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On December 5, 2024, the licensee became aware of a shutter that could not fully close but was able to return to the fully open, operative position. The shutter failure was identified while performing a routine six-month fixed gauge shutter check. The fixed gauge is located eight feet above a walking platform which is only accessible to licensee staff via ladder, scaffolding or other means. No members of the public have access to this location.
"The shutter is currently in its normal, open position. No maintenance activities are scheduled which would require closure of the shutter.
"The licensee has a contract with the manufacturer and has scheduled them to assess this situation and make any necessary repairs.
"The shutter holder contains a Cs-137 sealed source (model A-2102) with maximum activity of 300 mCi.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) [NJAC 7:28-51.1]"
Equipment information:
Model number: SH-F2
Serial number: 0362CG
Manufacturer: Vega Americas, Inc.
New Jersey Event Report ID number: To be determined
* * * UPDATE ON 1/19/2025 AT 1321 EDT FROM JACK TWAY TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email:
"On January 8, 2025, the Phillips 66 contractor, Vega Americas Inc, removed the device with the stuck shutter and placed it into storage at the facility awaiting disposal. A new device was installed by the manufacturer in its place.
"The device serial number was originally reported as 0362CG. This serial number is incorrect. The serial number of the source is 37053G (50 mCi), which was installed in device model SHF1B, manufactured by Vega. The licensee is contacting Vega to obtain the correct device serial number.
"This incident is now considered closed by the state."
NMED Number: 240437
Notified R1DO (Carfang), and NMSS Events Notification (email).
Agreement State
Event Number: 57457
Rep Org: Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency
Licensee: Alton Steel
Region: 3
City: Alton State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01738-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Licensee: Alton Steel
Region: 3
City: Alton State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01738-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Notification Date: 12/06/2024
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2024
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Learn, Matthew (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Learn, Matthew (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCES
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email:
"On December 5, 2024, two 1.53 mCi Co-60 sources were removed from their casting molds for an outage and placed into shielded source holders. At that time, it was discovered that one source could not be fully placed into its shielded configuration. The cause was believed to be a bend or steel prohibiting the source from being fully inserted. The active portion of the source was shielded, but the inactive portion extended beyond the shutter. It was also discovered that the shutter for the second source was inoperable.
"The sources were oriented to minimize exposure rates and secured in the licensee's source storage room. Exposure rates within the source storage room were 2 mR per hour and the exterior wall (unrestricted area) was maximumly 1.6 mR/hour. These measurements were confirmed by Chase Environmental consulting staff on December 6, 2024.
"The Agency staff will respond to the facility and assess the sources and shields when being removed for use on Monday, December 9, 2024.
"There are no anticipated exposures in excess of regulatory limits as a result of this incident. The matter is reportable to the Agency under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(c)(2)."
Equipment information:
Device: Gauge shutter
Manufacturer: Berthold
Model number: LB 300 IRL ML
Illinois Item Number: IL240031
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email:
"On December 5, 2024, two 1.53 mCi Co-60 sources were removed from their casting molds for an outage and placed into shielded source holders. At that time, it was discovered that one source could not be fully placed into its shielded configuration. The cause was believed to be a bend or steel prohibiting the source from being fully inserted. The active portion of the source was shielded, but the inactive portion extended beyond the shutter. It was also discovered that the shutter for the second source was inoperable.
"The sources were oriented to minimize exposure rates and secured in the licensee's source storage room. Exposure rates within the source storage room were 2 mR per hour and the exterior wall (unrestricted area) was maximumly 1.6 mR/hour. These measurements were confirmed by Chase Environmental consulting staff on December 6, 2024.
"The Agency staff will respond to the facility and assess the sources and shields when being removed for use on Monday, December 9, 2024.
"There are no anticipated exposures in excess of regulatory limits as a result of this incident. The matter is reportable to the Agency under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(c)(2)."
Equipment information:
Device: Gauge shutter
Manufacturer: Berthold
Model number: LB 300 IRL ML
Illinois Item Number: IL240031