Event Notification Report for November 18, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CRIMPED SOURCE GUIDE TUBE

The following is a summary of information received from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via email:

On November 7, 2024 at 1930 CST, a source guide tube became crimped which prevented source retraction to the shielded condition. The industrial radiography camera being used was a QSA 880 Delta (serial number D12667) containing a 106 Curie Ir-192 source (serial number 10791P).

The licensee was able to retrieve the source. One authorized user received 500 mR radiation exposure.

Louisiana Event Report ID Number: LA20240011

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS

The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

Two tritium exit signs were determined to be lost by the licensee.

Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation
Model Number: 880
Activity: 12 Ci H-3

Manufacturer: Shield Source Inc.
Model Number: 101
Activity: 13 Ci H-3

* * * UPDATE ON 11/12/2024 AT 1720 EST FROM KATHRYN KIRK TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *

The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

The event date is 10/1/2023, which occurred during a renovation period of October 2023 through November 2023.

Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS Events Notification (email), and ILTAB (email).

Colorado event number: CO0026

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 11/15/2024

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE FROM RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

"Radiography was being performed in a tank at the refinery. [A radiation protection boundary was set up around a tank], and the source was secured in the exposure device. One radiographer was outside the boundary and the other radiographer was inside the boundary with another individual (contractor) outside of the tank. The contractor was in a lift moving upwards next to the tank. Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between the radiographers and the contractor, the two individuals outside the tank and within the radiation boundaries were exposed to the source for 2 minutes.

"The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) estimates 1.8 R radiation exposure for the 2 minutes duration right outside the tank as a worst-case scenario. The RSO is currently performing a dose investigation of the affected contract personnel and radiographer. The RSO recommended the contactor to receive medical monitoring (blood draw) as a precaution. The Department set expectations for the licensee to send a full detailed report on findings for this incident. More information to follow for this incident report."

Device information:
Isotope: 87 Ci of Ir-192
Manufacturer: QSA Global
Device Model: 880D

Incident number: WA-24-022

* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/2024 AT 1958 EDT FROM JOHN MARTELL TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *

The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

"On 11/14/2024, inspectors from the Department will be conducting a reactive onsite visit of the overexposure event which occurred on 11/12/2024. The inspectors will be meeting at the refinery site where the overexposure occurred with the licensee representatives including the RSO to gather information on the event related to what and how the event occurred and to review related records.

"The Department staff will continue to gather information on the event to determine the extent of the exposures, the potential root cause of this incident, any correlation to previous incidents with this licensee, and appropriate corrective actions. This may include potential enforcement actions in addition to the corrective actions. Updates will be provided as additional information is received."

Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS MSST Deputy Division Director (Silberfeld), and NMSS (email)

PART 21 - CONTROL RELAY DEFECT
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"NextEra Energy Seabrook LLC. makes the following notification under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) of a defect found in a GE - Hitachi Relay, CR120B (Model #DD945E118P0060) during pre-installation bench testing. During bench testing, the relay failed to energize and transfer all associated contacts. The relay was purchased from GE - Hitachi (GEH) as safety-related, GE CR-120B relays. All GE CR-120B relays that were purchased in the same batch as the failed relay were located and quarantined in order to be returned to GEH for forensic testing. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC has concluded that this defect constitutes a substantial safety hazard (SSH). A SSH exists because the nature of the defect was such that, if installed in certain safety-related applications and failed, it would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. On November 12, 2024, the Seabrook site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii).

"Because the defect was discovered prior to installation, there was no impact to safety-related equipment.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1001 EST, on November 15, 2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to three control element assemblies fully inserting into the core. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the steam bypass control system and main feedwater. Unit 2 was not affected.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The insertion of the three control rods is suspected to be caused by an electrical failure; however, the cause is still being investigated.

UNANALYZED CONDITION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1305 CST, on November 15, 2024, it was determined that division 2 cables for the '12' emergency diesel generator start circuitry are routed through a division 1 area without adequate fire barrier separation. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. A fire impairment and hourly fire watch have been established for the affected fire zones. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."