Event Notification Report for July 24, 2024

LOST AND RECOVERED SOURCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A Class 7 package (approximately 10 Ci of Ir-192 for use in a high dose rate remote afterloader for radiation oncology) was delivered to Saint Francis Hospital, [in] Hartford, CT. The package was delivered to hospital shipping/receiving and signed for at 1030 [EDT]. The package was then routed to [the] oncology department. When reaching oncology, it appears the package was mistaken for a 'chemotherapy' package instead of a 'radiation oncology' package and placed in storage in the chemotherapy department. Later, a medical physicist anticipating delivery of the package today inquired about the package with the delivery service and was informed that the package had been delivered. The physicist then began searching for the package and was able to locate it in the chemotherapy department. The physicist retrieved the package and began the check-in process at about 1500 per standard operating procedures. The physicist stated that the package was unopened, undamaged, and still sealed.

"The RSO received notification from radiation oncology that the package was missing prior to when the package was eventually found. The package was stored in a secured area, but its location was unknown to trained staff for the interim period, so the decision was made to make notification of the incident.

"This is an initial assessment. The radiation safety staff along with management will be conducting an investigation to determine more precise timelines, details, and evaluating corrective action options to prevent recurrence."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/30/2024

EN Revision Text: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

A Notification of Unusual Event was declared by South Texas Project Unit 1 at 0718 CDT for emergency action level (EAL) SU.1, loss of all offsite power for greater than 15 minutes, following a fire in the switchyard. Unit 1 tripped following the loss of power and is stable in Mode 3. Unit 2 reduced power to 90 percent but was otherwise unaffected by this event. Offsite services responded to the switchyard fire. The fire was extinguished at 0925 CDT.

There is no radioactive release and no threat to public safety.

The licensee notified state and local authorities and the NRC senior resident inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/24/2024 AT 1154 EDT FROM CHRIS VAN FLEET TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0702 CDT on 7/24/2024, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped due to loss of offsite power. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the scram.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator power operated relief valves (PORV). Unit 2 was reduced in power to approximately 90 percent power due to conditions in the switchyard.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

Notified R4DO (Azua)

* * * UPDATE ON 7/24/2024 AT 1259 EDT FROM CHRIS MCRARY TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone:

At 1146 CDT, South Texas Project Unit 1 terminated the previously declared Notification of Unusual Event due to restoration of an offsite source of electrical power.

Notified R4DO (Azua), NRR EO (McKenna), IR MOC (Crouch), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/24/2024 AT 1555 EDT FROM CHRIS VAN FLEET TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

For the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) reporting requirements:

"At 0702 CDT on 7/24/2024, with both Unit 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) north and south switchyard electrical buses were de-energized.

"In Unit 1, all emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 11, 12, and 13 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on train `A', `B', and `C' engineered safety feature (ESF) buses.

"Also in Unit 1, trains `A', `B', and `C' of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system automatically started.

"In Unit 2, EDG 22 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on the train `B' ESF bus.

"Also in Unit 2, train `B' of the AFW system automatically started.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of a pressurized water reactor auxiliary feedwater system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6)) and emergency alternating current (AC) electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

For the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) reporting requirement:

"A news release was completed at 1140 CDT on 7/24/2024, by South Texas Project on the declaration of the Unusual Event. This media release is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi): Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made."

Notified R4DO (Azua)

* * * UPDATE ON 7/29/2024 AT 1558 EDT FROM MATT DUGGER TO IAN HOWARD * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"After a review of station logs, it was determined that there was not a loss of all offsite AC power to Unit 1 related to the event that occurred on July 24, 2024. An offsite AC power source was available through the 138 kV transmission line.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

At this time the licensee is not retracting the declaration of emergency action level 'SU.1'.

Notified R4DO (Werner)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1046 EDT on 7/24/2024, fourteen Ashtabula County emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated during system maintenance. Ashtabula County Emergency Management Agency was contacted and made aware of the situation. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified of the issue."

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Minimum staffing [was] not met under Missouri University of Science and Technology Reactor (MSTR) Technical Specification (TS) 6.1.3.1(a) [for approximately one hour].

"At 1400 CDT, on July 24, 2024, the MSTR conducted a planned shutdown from 40 kW in support of a thermal power calibration. At approximately 1410, the control room operator left the control room for the reactor bay to perform additional power calibration data collection. At approximately 1510, the radiation safety officer (RSO) passed by the control room and observed that the magnet key remained in the console. The operator was promptly notified and secured the key. The operator notified the reactor manager and senior reactor operator on duty (shift supervisor) by approximately 1530, who discussed the issue with the facility director.

"During the time period of 1410 to 1510, the MSTR did not meet the TS definition for reactor secured, as the magnet key remained in the console. As such, without an operator in the control room, the minimum staffing requirements of TS 6.1.3.1(a) were not met, as this specification states: `1. The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be: a) A certified reactor operator in the control room.' It is noted that the reactor was shut down and the control rods remained inserted for the duration of the event.

"The event has been entered into the facility corrective action program as CAP-2024-001, and the NRC project manager will be notified."

POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On July 24, 2024, a licensed operator violated the station's fitness for duty (FFD) policy. The employee's unescorted access to South Texas Project has been terminated. The event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii).

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."