Event Notification Report for January 04, 2023

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0148 EST on January 4, 2023 it was identified that P4400F603B, Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Supply Isolation Valve, lost position indication. Division 2 EECW System was declared inoperable due to the potential that this valve may not be capable of performing its safety function to automatically isolate the safety related Division 2 EECW system from the non-safety related Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system. Because the Division 2 EECW system provides cooling to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler, HPCI was also declared inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non--emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"At 0240 EST, position indication was restored and Division 2 EECW and HPCI was returned to operable following inspection of the associated motor control center (MCC) and testing of the associated fuses. The cause of the loss of indication is under investigation.

"The Senior NRC resident inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 3/6/23 AT 1740 EST FROM GREGORY MILLER TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following retraction was received from the licensee via email:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification, EN 56295, reported on 1/4/2023.

"Following the initial EN, further analysis of the condition was performed utilizing a gothic analysis model to perform HPCI room heat-up calculations. Based on the initial conditions at the time of the indication loss, specifically HPCI room and Suppression Pool temperature, it was determined that the resulting worst case post-accident room temperature was sufficiently low enough to provide margin to HPCI operability without the room cooler in service for the required mission time.

"No other concerns were noted during the event. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56295 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Ruiz).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services via email:

"The Nebraska Radioactive Materials Program was notified on January 4, 2023, about 1700 [CST] by a representative of Olsson of a damaged InstroTek, Model 3500, portable moisture density gauge. An Authorized User (AU) from Olsson transported the nuclear density gauge to a job site near Plattsmouth, NE for compaction testing on backfill for a new grain bin. Upon arrival at the site, he assessed the work area for hazards and began gauge standardization away from the active work area. During the standard count, the AU returned to his work truck to grab testing equipment which was approximately 100 feet east of where the gauge was sitting. During that time, the AU witnessed a contractor on site that was driving a tele-handler run over the gauge and standard block, causing damage to the gauge. Emergency procedures from Olsson's Radiation Safety Program were immediately reviewed and put into action by the AU. The local and Corporate RSOs [Radiation Safety Officers] were contacted to help with the situation. All personnel were removed from the area and the area was blocked out with emergency tape. The local RSO arrived with survey equipment, took readings around the area, made phone calls with the corporate RSO and manufacturer, and determined it was safe to transport the gauge back to Olsson's permanent storage location at the field office. The AU was wearing his dosimetry badge and he does not believe that any other individual on site would have received any exposure."

Nebraska Event Number: NE-23-0001

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) via email:

"The licensee informed ODH on Wednesday, 1/4/2023, that one of the IMS Model 5321 gauges at its plant in Canton, Ohio has a shutter stuck in the open position. The gauge contains nine [Cesium] Cs-137 sources with a maximum activity of 10 Curies each and each source has its own shutter. The other eight shutters are operating normally. The licensee tried cycling the stuck shutter and activating the air cut-off/bleed-off valve, but the shutter remained open. The manufacturer has a technician scheduled to come in Saturday, 1/7/2023, at the earliest to make the repair.

"The gauge is contained inside a caged area with a keycard lock mechanism and motion sensor. Since the gauge shutter cannot be closed, licensee management has sent a communication out to all badged employees who have access to the cage informing them to not enter until the manufacturer can come onsite and make the necessary repairs. The normal operating state for this device is with the shutter open. ODH has authorized the mill to continue operations until the manufacturer arrives to make repairs and standard radiation boundaries will continue to work for protection."

Ohio Event Item Number: OH230001