Event Notification Report for February 07, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/06/2022 - 02/07/2022
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55735
Facility: Vogtle
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Steven Leighty
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Steven Leighty
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Notification Date: 02/07/2022
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/07/2022
Event Time: 09:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2022
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/07/2022
Event Time: 09:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/7/2022
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
The following information was provided by the licensee via telefone:
A non-licensed contractor superintendent had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
The following information was provided by the licensee via telefone:
A non-licensed contractor superintendent had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Part 21
Event Number: 55827
Rep Org: Curtiss Wright Flow Control Co.
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
Region: 3
City: Cincinnati State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Margie Hover
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
Region: 3
City: Cincinnati State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Margie Hover
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 04/07/2022
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/07/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2022
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/07/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
McCraw, Aaron (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
McCraw, Aaron (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/15/2022
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - CURTISS-WRIGHT ACTUATOR BRAKE WIRING DEFICENCY REPORT
The following information was provided by Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division via fax:
"The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Browns Ferry Plant notified us (QualTech NP, Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division) of two separate RCS/Dresser actuator failures which we had provided as safety related components. According to TVA, the first failure occurred on February 7, 2022, after being installed for approximately 167 days. The 2nd failure occurred on February 9, 2022, and was in service for approximately 24 hours when it failed.
"According to TVA in both cases the actuator's brake assembly wire harness shorted out to the frame, causing the on-board fuse to blow, disabling the actuator. The electrical short was caused by the wire harness laying against a sharp edge of the metal frame, which over time led to fraying of the wire insulation and subsequent bare wire to frame contact.
"Both units were returned to QualTech NP for evaluation and our findings confirmed TVA's assessment.
"The root cause of the issue is friction between the wires and the sharp metallic edge that over time cut through the insulation via vibration, which in turn shorted the power leads to the frame. This shorting effect was due to poor positioning and restraint of the wire harness/bundle by the manufacturer during assembly. It is not considered a design flaw, but a workmanship issue caused by the factory assembler.
"The corrective action taken with the two units was to install new brake assemblies and reposition the wire harness to prevent contact with the sharp edge. In addition, wire ties were added to restrain the wire's movement and keep it away from the sharp edge. As a follow up action, the associated dedication plan will be revised to inspect for this workmanship issue and correct as needed.
"Additional details are provided in the failure evaluation. QualTech NP has only sold this part to TVA (Browns Ferry) and could not find any additional failures of this type reported by the industry. Identification of the customer's orders and hardware involved are provided in the evaluation.
"Please phone (513) 528-7900 if you should have any questions."
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - CURTISS-WRIGHT ACTUATOR BRAKE WIRING DEFICENCY REPORT
The following information was provided by Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division via fax:
"The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Browns Ferry Plant notified us (QualTech NP, Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division) of two separate RCS/Dresser actuator failures which we had provided as safety related components. According to TVA, the first failure occurred on February 7, 2022, after being installed for approximately 167 days. The 2nd failure occurred on February 9, 2022, and was in service for approximately 24 hours when it failed.
"According to TVA in both cases the actuator's brake assembly wire harness shorted out to the frame, causing the on-board fuse to blow, disabling the actuator. The electrical short was caused by the wire harness laying against a sharp edge of the metal frame, which over time led to fraying of the wire insulation and subsequent bare wire to frame contact.
"Both units were returned to QualTech NP for evaluation and our findings confirmed TVA's assessment.
"The root cause of the issue is friction between the wires and the sharp metallic edge that over time cut through the insulation via vibration, which in turn shorted the power leads to the frame. This shorting effect was due to poor positioning and restraint of the wire harness/bundle by the manufacturer during assembly. It is not considered a design flaw, but a workmanship issue caused by the factory assembler.
"The corrective action taken with the two units was to install new brake assemblies and reposition the wire harness to prevent contact with the sharp edge. In addition, wire ties were added to restrain the wire's movement and keep it away from the sharp edge. As a follow up action, the associated dedication plan will be revised to inspect for this workmanship issue and correct as needed.
"Additional details are provided in the failure evaluation. QualTech NP has only sold this part to TVA (Browns Ferry) and could not find any additional failures of this type reported by the industry. Identification of the customer's orders and hardware involved are provided in the evaluation.
"Please phone (513) 528-7900 if you should have any questions."