Event Notification Report for February 02, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/3/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was received from the state of Minnesota via email:

"The Minnesota Department of Health was notified by email on 02/02/2022 at 1652 CST of a shutter stuck in the open position on a generally licensed gauge. The gauge is an Endress+Hauser model FQG61, serial number S700290113F containing 2 milliCi of Cesium-137. The licensee isolated the area and has service for the gauge scheduled for Monday, 02/07/2022."

MN report no.: MN220001

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/3/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SHUTTER ON NUCLEAR GAUGE

The following was received from the state of Texas (the Agency) via email:

"On February 3, 2022, the Agency was contacted by the licensee's service company and notified that while removing a Vega SH-F1B nuclear gauge from its mounted position it was dropped about 2 feet and the operating arm for the shutter was bent. The shutter was locked in the closed position and remained closed. The gauge contains a 20 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 source. Dose rates taken on the gauge housing after the gauge was dropped were normal. A leak test was performed on the source and the results were satisfactory. The gauge was placed in storage. The manufacturer is being contacted to repair the gauge. No overexposures occurred due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident # I-9909

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/1/2022

EN Revision Text: LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE INSTRUMENT

The following information is a summary of information provided by the licensee ("the Company") via email:

An x-ray fluorescence instrument (XRF) went missing while in the possession of a licensed Atlas ATC employee. The employee used the XRF in the course and scope of their duties on January 31, 2022. Following completion of their last assignment of the day, which was a lead inspection in New Haven, CT, the employee left the jobsite and went home where they kept the XRF overnight, secured in its case inside of their residence. The following morning on February 1, 2022, the employee packed the secured XRF with other equipment and materials they used for work into the trunk of their car. While traveling to the East Hartford, CT office, the employee had a flat tire. The employee's direct supervisor came to provide assistance and gave him shelter alongside the highway for approximately 60 minutes until a tow truck arrived. The employee accompanied the tow truck for tire repair. The XRF remained in the trunk of the vehicle. After arriving at the service station, the employee took the XRF out of the trunk and secured it in the back seat of the vehicle, where it remained the entire time that the vehicle was being serviced. The employee left the service center at approximately 1100 EST and drove to the East Hartford, CT office where the vehicle was parked for approximately 45 to 50 minutes. At approximately 1200 EST, the employee left the office to complete a job in Springfield, MA. That job did not require the use of the XRF. The employee arrived at the Springfield, MA project site around 1255 EST and parked approximately 1,000 feet from the actual work site address, which was in a residential neighborhood. The employee completed that job at approximately 1500 EST. After leaving the project site, the employee stopped at a gas station before arriving at the Company's West Springfield, MA office at 1400 EST. After leaving the office, the employee stopped at two restaurants (one in Springfield, MA and then one in East Windsor, CT). The employee then traveled back to the East Hartford, CT office. When they went to unload their equipment, they then noticed that the XRF was not in the back seat of the vehicle. The employee checked the entire vehicle for the XRF, but it could not be located.

The Company's internal investigation has determined that the XRF was stolen out of the vehicle. There is video surveillance that confirms that the secured XRF was in the back seat of the vehicle when the employee left the service station, and the employee did not remove the XRF from the vehicle thereafter. There is no evidence that the employee willfully failed to maintain control of licensed material that was not in storage, either. Based on the investigation, the XRF was stolen somewhere between the employee's stop at the East Hartford, CT office and the time they left the restaurant in East Windsor, CT, which was around 1945 EST.

The employee notified the East Hartford, CT office's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), Branch Manager and Building Sciences Supervisor via text around 2120 EST. Extensive efforts on the part of the employee and licensee to locate the instrument were futile. The East Hartford, CT and Springfield, MA Police Departments were notified of the lost/stolen XRF.

In furtherance of recovery efforts, the Company quickly put the appropriate regulatory authorities on notice that the XRF was missing. Immediately after the loss became known the next morning (February 2nd), the RSO contacted the CT Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Radiation Group to report that the licensed device was lost or stolen; they subsequently called the Massachusetts Department of Public Health Radiation Group as the XRF may have traveled to, but was not used in, Massachusetts.

The RSO also called Protec (the company from where the XRF was originally purchased) as Protec's phone number is printed inside of the XRF case in the case of an emergency. The RSO felt that this notification was a necessary step to take, and in the event that the XRF is found and Protec is called, the Company will be notified immediately.

After investigative efforts were unsuccessful in recovering the XRF, formal police reports were filed on February 4, 2022 with the Police Departments in East Hartford, CT (Case #2200003902) and Springfield, MA (Incident #22-1419-OF) regarding the theft. These cases are still open and the investigations are ongoing.

The instrument is a Protec LPA-1 x-ray fluorescence instrument, serial number: 1331, 12 mCi Co-57 source s/n NA515.

This event was also reported by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as EN 55724.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 REPORT- FAILURE OF FLOWSERVE SOLENOID COIL

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

A Model 38878-8 solenoid valve failed a routine coil resistance test at Catawba Nuclear Station while installed on a feed water isolation valve actuator. The solenoid valve was returned to Flowserve where the low resistance was confirmed. The solenoid coil was then sent to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for further evaluation.
The OEM (Ohmega) completed their analysis and found the reason for failure to be associated with the magnet wire, but the exact point of failure could not be located due to the construction of the coil.
Additionally, Flowserve compiled shipment data for the subject coil and found there to be at least 273 instances where the part was shipped to customers. Of those 273+, this case is the only known instance of a failure associated with the coil.

Sites that Flowserve shipped the Model 38878-8 Solenoid Valve to: Comanche Peak, Catawba, Braidwood, Byron, Beaver Valley, Seabrook

Due to the rigorous functional testing and the historical reliability of the coil in the field, Flowserve does not believe this incident is indicative of an issue with the manufacturing or testing of the coil and concludes that this issue does not affect other coils currently in service.
Ohmega suggests a possible manufacturing improvement of winding the coil with a varnish to provide extra insulation of the magnet wire.
Flowserve suggests that plant operators using these solenoid coils measure the resistance of the coil periodically, especially after the coil has been energized for testing or service.