Event Notification Report for September 13, 2021
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/12/2021 - 09/13/2021
Agreement State
Event Number: 55466
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: CEC Corporation
Region: 4
City: Oklahoma City State: OK
County:
License #: OK-31047-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kevin Sampson
HQ OPS Officer: Howie Crouch
Licensee: CEC Corporation
Region: 4
City: Oklahoma City State: OK
County:
License #: OK-31047-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kevin Sampson
HQ OPS Officer: Howie Crouch
Notification Date: 09/13/2021
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2021
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
AZUA, RAY (R4)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
AZUA, RAY (R4)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/15/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the state of Oklahoma via email:
"We [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] have been informed that earlier today a Troxler Model 3440 gauge was struck by a truck in Oklahoma City. The gauge belonged to CEC Corp. (OK-31047-01). Surveys of the gauge indicated that the shielding was intact. [The State] will provide more information as it becomes available."
Troxler Model 3440 gauges contain 40 mCi Am241:Be and 8 mCi Cs-137 sources.
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the state of Oklahoma via email:
"We [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] have been informed that earlier today a Troxler Model 3440 gauge was struck by a truck in Oklahoma City. The gauge belonged to CEC Corp. (OK-31047-01). Surveys of the gauge indicated that the shielding was intact. [The State] will provide more information as it becomes available."
Troxler Model 3440 gauges contain 40 mCi Am241:Be and 8 mCi Cs-137 sources.
Agreement State
Event Number: 55468
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: Mistras Group
Region: 4
City: Richmond State: CA
County:
License #: 4886-48
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. Arunika Hewadikaram
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Licensee: Mistras Group
Region: 4
City: Richmond State: CA
County:
License #: 4886-48
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. Arunika Hewadikaram
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 09/16/2021
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2021
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
AZUA, RAY (R4)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
AZUA, RAY (R4)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/15/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY DEVICE MALFUNCTION
The following information was received from the state of California via email:
"On 9/14/2021, the licensee contacted the Radiation Health Branch (RHB) to report an incident that occurred on 9/13/2021 in which a radiography exposure device failed to retract to the fully shielded position. The licensee reported that after completing their second exposure shot, the radiography crew cranked the source to the fully shielded position which actuated the fully shielded source position indicator. The crew reverse cranked the source to confirm that the source was locked into the fully shielded position and discovered that the source was still exposed. The radiographers were able to lock the source into the final position after manipulating the locking mechanism manually. The licensee reported an exposure maximum of 33 millirem to one of the radiographers due to this incident. At this time, the licensee does not expect an overexposure to either radiographers nor members of the public. RHB will be investigating this incident further."
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY DEVICE MALFUNCTION
The following information was received from the state of California via email:
"On 9/14/2021, the licensee contacted the Radiation Health Branch (RHB) to report an incident that occurred on 9/13/2021 in which a radiography exposure device failed to retract to the fully shielded position. The licensee reported that after completing their second exposure shot, the radiography crew cranked the source to the fully shielded position which actuated the fully shielded source position indicator. The crew reverse cranked the source to confirm that the source was locked into the fully shielded position and discovered that the source was still exposed. The radiographers were able to lock the source into the final position after manipulating the locking mechanism manually. The licensee reported an exposure maximum of 33 millirem to one of the radiographers due to this incident. At this time, the licensee does not expect an overexposure to either radiographers nor members of the public. RHB will be investigating this incident further."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55458
Facility: McGuire
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Travis Rollins
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Travis Rollins
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 09/13/2021
Notification Time: 05:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 00:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2021
Notification Time: 05:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 00:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
MILLER, MARK (R2)
MILLER, MARK (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/13/2021
EN Revision Text: SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"At 0011 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), actuations of the 2B Diesel Generator (DG) and the 2B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump occurred during Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Testing while resetting the 2B DG Load Sequencer. The 2B DG was running unloaded following test actuation, and during realignment from the test, a blackout condition was experienced when the breaker opened supplying the 4160 Volt Essential Power System 2ETB from the Standby Auxiliary Power Transformer SATB. Sequencer actuation closed the emergency breaker to 2ETB and loaded the 2B Motor Driven AFW Pump onto the bus. Steam supply valves to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump were open from the previous test configuration.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 2B DG and the 2B Motor Driven AFW Pump.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"At 0011 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), actuations of the 2B Diesel Generator (DG) and the 2B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump occurred during Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Testing while resetting the 2B DG Load Sequencer. The 2B DG was running unloaded following test actuation, and during realignment from the test, a blackout condition was experienced when the breaker opened supplying the 4160 Volt Essential Power System 2ETB from the Standby Auxiliary Power Transformer SATB. Sequencer actuation closed the emergency breaker to 2ETB and loaded the 2B Motor Driven AFW Pump onto the bus. Steam supply valves to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump were open from the previous test configuration.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 2B DG and the 2B Motor Driven AFW Pump.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55459
Facility: Surry
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Ken Wagar
HQ OPS Officer: Howie Crouch
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Ken Wagar
HQ OPS Officer: Howie Crouch
Notification Date: 09/13/2021
Notification Time: 23:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 18:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2021
Notification Time: 23:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 18:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
Person (Organization):
MILLER, MARK (R2)
MILLER, MARK (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/13/2021
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION OF FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"On September 13, 2021, at 1822 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. Specifically, it was determined that some Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cables may be susceptible to a hot short/spurious operation to the close circuit. A spurious closure of the emergency bus normal supply breakers after the EDG is powering the bus could result in non-synchronous paralleling, EDG overloading, or EDG output breaker tripping due to faulted power cable from normal supply breaker. The spurious closure of the normal supply breakers is not currently addressed in the Appendix R Report or previous Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) analysis.
"This condition is associated with the Appendix R safe-shutdown function of the Emergency Power System. The Emergency Power System is considered operable but not fully qualified for its safety-related design function.
"The following fire areas are impacted:
1) Fire Area 13, Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room
2) Fire Area 46, Unit 1 Cable Tray Room
3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room
4) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel
"Until this condition is analyzed, Surry has implemented mitigating actions in the above fire areas.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR [condition report] 1180502.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Mitigating actions include posting fire watches in the affected areas.
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION OF FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"On September 13, 2021, at 1822 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. Specifically, it was determined that some Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cables may be susceptible to a hot short/spurious operation to the close circuit. A spurious closure of the emergency bus normal supply breakers after the EDG is powering the bus could result in non-synchronous paralleling, EDG overloading, or EDG output breaker tripping due to faulted power cable from normal supply breaker. The spurious closure of the normal supply breakers is not currently addressed in the Appendix R Report or previous Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) analysis.
"This condition is associated with the Appendix R safe-shutdown function of the Emergency Power System. The Emergency Power System is considered operable but not fully qualified for its safety-related design function.
"The following fire areas are impacted:
1) Fire Area 13, Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room
2) Fire Area 46, Unit 1 Cable Tray Room
3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room
4) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel
"Until this condition is analyzed, Surry has implemented mitigating actions in the above fire areas.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR [condition report] 1180502.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Mitigating actions include posting fire watches in the affected areas.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 55488
Rep Org: West Physics
Licensee: West Physics
Region: 3
City: Rensselaer State: IN
County:
License #: 22-29403-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: David Howard
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Licensee: West Physics
Region: 3
City: Rensselaer State: IN
County:
License #: 22-29403-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: David Howard
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 09/24/2021
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2021
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2021
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Lost/Stolen LNM>10x
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Lost/Stolen LNM>10x
Person (Organization):
FELIZ-ADORNO, NESTOR (R3)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
FELIZ-ADORNO, NESTOR (R3)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/22/2021
EN Revision Text: MISSING SEALED SOURCES
The following is a summary of a phone call with the physicist at the licensee:
The licensee reported that two small sealed sources (Ge-68, roughly 0.7 mCi each) were discovered to be missing from a mobile PET-CT coach that was parked at a location in Rensselaer, IN. This coach was being refurbished at this site. The sources were discovered missing by a service engineer working on the PET-CT unit on 9/13/2021. The entire facility was thoroughly searched with a GM survey meter and the sources could not be located.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: MISSING SEALED SOURCES
The following is a summary of a phone call with the physicist at the licensee:
The licensee reported that two small sealed sources (Ge-68, roughly 0.7 mCi each) were discovered to be missing from a mobile PET-CT coach that was parked at a location in Rensselaer, IN. This coach was being refurbished at this site. The sources were discovered missing by a service engineer working on the PET-CT unit on 9/13/2021. The entire facility was thoroughly searched with a GM survey meter and the sources could not be located.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf