Event Notification Report for May 10, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following is a summary from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency via e-mail:

The Emergency Management Agency was contacted at approximately 1416 CDT on April 30, 2021, to report the loss of an industrial radiography camera containing 105 Ci of Ir-192. The device/source is believed to be in the possession of the common carrier and an active investigation is underway. There is no current indication of intentional theft or diversion.

The Licensee called to report that the common carrier had dropped off a package on April 30, 2021, at 1040 CDT which was supposed to contain a Spec 150 camera (S/N 439) with a 105 Ci Ir-192 source (s/n CD2901). The cardboard overpack was damaged and the box was empty. The device/source had been overnighted from Spec Industries in St. Rose, LA to Romeoville, Illinois. The State is reaching out to the common carrier and notifying the Tennessee program officials since it is possible the package was lost at the Memphis hub.

State Item Number: IL210012
Common Carrier Tracking Number: 166975368552

Notified: DHS SWO, DOE Operations Center, FEMA Operations Center, HHS Operations Center, CISA Central, USDA Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA Emergency Operations Center (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK GAUGE SHUTTER

The following information was received from the Alabama Department of Public Health, Office of Radiation Control via email:

"The Radiation Safety Officer for Georgia-Pacific of Pennington, Alabama notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control that while performing routine six (6) month leak testing and shutter checks, one of their gauges had a shutter stuck in the open position. The manufacturer has been notified and a repair date is pending. Further information involving the gauge is forthcoming in the written report."

Alabama Event No: 21-14

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING STATIC ELIMINATORS

The following was received via e-mail from the Texas Department of Health Services:

"On April 30, 2021, Biomerics reported the loss of eleven static eliminators (NRD model P-2042-1000) Serial Numbers: A2LD792, A2LD794, A2LD795, A2LD799, A2LD803, A2JQ929, A2KT72, A2EZ959, A2EZ960, A2EZ961 and A2EZ962. Each device contained a 185 MBq (5 mCi) Po-210 source. The devices were received from NRD Advanced Static Control from April 5, 2006 to November 21, 2017. The company was supposed to ship used devices to NRD Advanced Static Control. Biomerics searched the areas where these parts were used and during the course of moving equipment, it is apparent that these devices were thrown away. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Event Number: 75751

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received via e-mail from the California Department of Public Health, Radiological Health Branch (RHB):

"On April 30, 2021, [The] ENGEO [Radiological Safety Officer] RSO contacted RHB to report a stolen moisture density gauge, a Troxler, Model 3440, S/N 26157 containing licensed material 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241. The gauge was stolen from one of their storage locations (Extra Space Storage). The gauge was last in their physical possession on April 22, 2021, and was secured in the facility at approximate 1430 PDT. The facility is secured by a common gate with access granted with an access key code with security cameras that log entering and exiting the facility. The storage unit was secured by a keyed master lock, and the equipment was locked to the inside of the unit with a chain and secured with at least 1 master lock.

"Since April 22, 2021, [the] staff has visited the unit on a couple of occasions, however [the staff] was not concerned at the time when the equipment was not observed in the unit which is common as the equipment is used during the day on a regular basis and also due to the lock to the unit being intact (showing no signs of forced entry). On April 29, 2021, the individual who the equipment is assigned to, returned to pick up the gauge and noticed someone had removed it. It was determined that no one from their company removed the gauge from the storage unit after it was secured on April 22, 2021. [The] licensee was unable to view security footage due to privacy of other customers. [The] licensee was told by the manager that he reviewed all footage of their staff entering and leaving the facility between April 22 and April 29 and he observed the staff return the gauge to the unit on April 22, and leave without the gauge in his vehicle after he secured it in the storage unit. [The] licensee has conducted an internal investigation into the location of the gauge and determined that no one with their organization removed the gauge in question. This appears to be consistent with the reported observations of the facility manager's review of security footage.

"[The] licensee has notified Rohnert Park Police Department of the stolen gauge (police report #21-1838). A cash reward has been offered for the safe return of the gauge.

"RHB will be following up on this investigation."

California Report Number: 043021

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ELECTRICAL FAULT CAUSES STUCK RACKS

The following report was received by the California Department of Public Health, Radiological Health Branch:

"At approximately 0140 [PDT], the licensee received several alarms for the Cell B irradiator. An attempt to lower the source racks normally was unsuccessful. At approximately 0400 [PDT], the source racks were successfully lowered to the bottom of the pool following emergency operating procedures (EOP-034, Stuck Source Rack) for manually lowering the source rack. During this time, the irradiator entrance door remained secured by the safety system interlock system.

"After some review and troubleshooting, the licensee determined that there was an electrical fault in a junction box which was later determined to have been caused by a degraded wire that short circuited to ground causing the electrical malfunction. The licensee subsequently replaced this degraded wire with new components.

"Once repairs to the electrical system were completed and a functional safety system check of the irradiator was performed to determine that all safety systems were operating correctly, the licensee resumed operations."

California NMED Report Number: 050121

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

"On May 6, 2021 at 1223 [EDT], Unit 1 was manually tripped from 60 percent power due to degrading main condenser vacuum. Unit 1 was in the process of decreasing power due to increased secondary sodium levels identified earlier in the day. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps is reportable per 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF [Engineered Safeguards Features] system. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system."

The electrical system is in normal lineup for shutdown conditions. There was no effect on Unit 2 operation. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On March 10, 2021, at 0815 [CST], during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage (L2R18), while performing a test to verify functionality of an isolation relay following replacement of the relay, a Group 4 isolation signal was actuated. The Group 4 isolation logic affects both the Reactor Building Ventilation (VR) and Containment Vent and Purge (VQ) system [for both units]. All equipment responded as designed to the Group 4 isolation, including startup of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) to maintain secondary containment pressure [for both units]. Investigation determined that the cause of the isolation was an inadvertent contact of the self-retracting grip jumper between two adjacent terminals that caused a short to ground and a blown fuse during the test performance. The fuse was replaced and systems restored as needed for the plant condition.

"The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/10/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - POWER RANGE NEUTRON MONITOR SYSTEM DEFECT

The following is a summary of information received via email from Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP):

On March 9, 2021, GE Hitachi (GEH) issued Safety Communication SC 21-02 for PRC 21-02, Transfer of Information, Revision 0, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b). Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was listed as a potentially affected plant. This is a deviation from the Power Range Nuclear Monitor (PRNM) Licensing Topical Report, NEDC 32410P-A.

On May 5, 2021, MNGP completed an evaluation of this deviation and concluded this condition represents a substantial safety hazard in that the condition could result in an Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) flux reading either below or above the Technical Specification (plus/minus) 2% band. The condition is a defect that is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4).

The GEH NUMAC PRNMS was installed in 2009 with System Part No. 299X739NF.

Name and Address of the Individual or Individuals Informing the Commission:
Thomas A. Conboy,
Site Vice President
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company - Minnesota
2807 West County Road 75
Monticello, MN 55362

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.