Event Notification Report for March 10, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/10/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING CHECK SOURCE

The following was received from the State of Washington via email:

"Framatome notified the State of Washington of a leaking 5 microCi Cs-137 check source that was identified on 8/17/2020. A set of stack samples showed evidence of Cs-137 contamination, leading the Radiation Safety Officer for the licensee to contact the Radiological Safety Supervisor to investigate into the possibility of a leaking Cs-137 check source. A visibly damaged source was identified and a leak test of the source revealed 0.02 microCi of removable material. The source storage area was surveyed to determine if there was any additional contamination, but none above the licensee's limits for action was identified. The source was contained and placed in storage to be held for disposal."

Washington Incident No.: WA-20-017

* * * UPDATE ON AUGUST 26, 2020 AT 1250 EDT FROM ANDREW HALLORAN TO BRIAN LIN * * *

The following information was received from the State of Washington via email:

"The leak test was performed in accordance with approved procedures using an instrument that was appropriate and in calibration. The source was part of a source jig used for routine instrument checks around the site. According to the Radiation Safety Officer, the source was likely damaged from impact against a hard surface during routine use."

Notified R4DO (Kellar) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

* * * UPDATE ON MARCH 9, 2021 AT 1838 EST FROM ANDREW HALLORAN TO BRIAN LIN * * *

The following information was received from the State of Washington via email:

"The source has been removed from service to be sent for disposal with the next waste shipment. Source manufacturer - The Nucleus. Serial number - SB-D14. Activity - 5 microCi."

Notified R4DO (Josey) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

This material event contains a "Category 2" level of radioactive material.

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/8/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CATEGORY 2 PACKAGE CONTAINING SEVEN SEALED SOURCES LOST IN TRANSIT

"The licensee reported to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] at 1400 EST on March 1, 2021, that it discovered on March 1, 2021 at 1200 EST that a package (Yellow-III, T.I. 2.6, Type B, UN 2916) containing seven sealed sources (Ir-192; 59.9 Ci, 59.2 Ci, 58.1 Ci, 59.9 Ci, 59.5 Ci, 59.8 Ci, and 69.2 Ci) in a model 976C source changer was missing.

"The package was shipped by QSA Global, Inc. on February 12, 2021, for export to their customer NDT Instruments, based in Singapore. On March 1, 2021 at 1200 EST, QSA Global, Inc. discovered that the package had not been received.

"The carrier indicated that the package had been at their Memphis, TN facility on 2/13/2021, and that since then the location is unknown.

"The reporting requirement is immediate and is of 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1,000 times the quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C. The four-hour reporting requirement of 105 CMR 120.077(B), missing shipment of Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, also applies."

The Agency considers this event to be open.

Notified: DHS-SWO, FEMA-OC, USDA-OC, HHS-OC, DOE-OC, DHS CISA Central, and EPA-EOC, Notified via E-mail: FDA- EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA-NWC, and CWMD-Watch Desk.

* * * UPDATE ON 3/5/2021 AT 1534 EST FROM ROBERT LOCKE TO JOANNA BRIDGE * * *

The following was received via e-mail from the Radiation Control Officer, Massachusetts Radiation Control Program:

"Licensee reports that they were notified on [5 March, 2021] that the missing package had been located in Memphis. The package was found undamaged and will continue for export to Singapore."

Notified R1DO (BURKET), NMSS (RIVERA-CAPELLA), IR MOC (GOTT), and ILTAB (RICHARDSON) and via email NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICATION, and INES NATIONAL OFFICER (MILLIGAN). Also notified DHS-SWO, FEMA-OC, USDA-OC, HHS-OC, DOE-OC, DHS CISA Central, and EPA-EOC and via email FDA- EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA-NWC, and CWMD-Watch Desk.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND FOUND GAUGE

The following is a summary of a report received from the California Department of Public Health (the Department) via email:

The Department was notified that a Troxler model 3440, Serial Number 22188 (9 mCi. Cs-137, 44 mCi. Am:Be-241) had been lost when the operator left the worksite believing the gauge was in the bed of the truck. At approximately 1430 PST, the licensee reported the gauge had been located at the work site and returned. The licensee is investigating the event and the Department will review their findings.

California Report ID: 5010-030321

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

"At 0313 EST on March 9th, 2021, during performance of Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) valve exercising, the inboard vacuum breaker isolation valve did not stroke closed as expected, but remained mid-position. The affected penetration of primary containment was isolated by closing the outboard HPCI vacuum breaker isolation valve. This results in an unplanned inoperability of the Unit 1 HPCI system.

"This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Unit 1 is in a 14-day LCO for Tech Spec 3.5.1(d), HPCI inoperability. Tech Spec 3.6.1.3(a), Containment Penetration Valve, was completed with closing the outboard HPCI vacuum breaker isolation valve. The Units are in a normal offsite power line-up.

SUSPECTED TECH SPEC POWER LIMIT EXCEEDED

At 1027 CST on 3/8/21, while the reactor was at 900 kW at steady state, a sample was pulled before the planned down power was executed. As a result, the reactor may have exceeded the 1000 kW limit for one second by 1 kW per Tech Spec 3.1. The duration was recorded on the strip chart recorder.

The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Patrick Boyle).

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The event was an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) system.

"On January 11, 2021 at 1152 Eastern Standard Time (EST) with Unit 1 at 100% power, Train 'A' of the CVI System actuated due to an invalid high radiation signal from 1-RM-90-130, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor. The cause of the signal was determined to be a failed sample pump associated with the radiation monitor. 1-RM-90-130 was in service at the time of the invalid signal. The Train 'A' Containment Ventilation Isolation signal was a full actuation of that train and the system functioned as designed.

"Prior to and following the invalid high radiation alarms, all radiation monitors except 1-RM-90-130 were stable at their normal values; therefore, the CVI was invalid. Control room operators performed appropriate checks and confirmed that all required automatic actuations occurred as designed. The failed pump was replaced and returned to service. This event was entered into the corrective action program as CR 1663398.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."