Event Notification Report for February 12, 2021

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN SOIL MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via email from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC):

"On February 12, 2021, on or around 0830 [EST], a Wingerter Laboratories [employee], License 0673-1 Cat 3L(1), called the BRC to inform them of a stolen soil moisture density gauge (SMDG): Troxler Model 3411 S/N: 5500, Cs-137 and Am:Be-241. [A driver for the licensee] picked up the SMDG from the office to bring to [another employee] and stopped for coffee at the Florida City Quick Stop at 239 SW 344 Street. While inside, the gauge was stolen from the pickup truck with the use of a grinder to cut the cables and locks. Florida City Police Department was called, and [Florida City police officer] responded who filed report number 21001477. [The licensee employee] agreed to submit the most recent copy of the leak test for this gauge. [A BRC inspector will be conducting an investigation]."

Florida Report Number: FL21-021

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

* * * UPDATE ON 2/15/21 AT 0916 EST FROM MATTHEW SENISON TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following report was received via email from the Florida BRC:

"[The licensee] has submitted the most recent copy of the leak test for this gauge. The BRC Inspector responded to this incident and the SMDG has not been found. From a discussion over the phone, the lock(s) and chain(s) were really cut into using power tools. [The] Inspector took pictures and obtained some from the licensee. The address for the gas station receipt that the employee gave him does not match the address of the gas station that was reported to the IRC [(Incident Response Coordinator)]. The gas station has a camera that faces the parking lot, but did not record the theft."

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), ILTAB and NMSS Event Notifications via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DEGRADED SHIPPING PACKAGE SHIELDING

The following was received from the LA Department of Environmental Quality, (LDEQ):

"QSA Global Inc. called in a notification [to LDEQ] of receiving a transportation shipment today, Friday, February 12, 2021 at 1430 CST. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC was the shipper. The package was surveyed with a radiation reading at surface on the bottom greater than 440 mrem, with a TI [Transportation Index] of 11.1. The lateral sides were reading 75 mrem. The carrier was not an enclosed vehicle. The package consisted of ten (10) gauges.

"The manufacture of density gauges is TN Technologies.

"The package originated from San Fernando Trinidad, West Indies to 11211 FM 2920, Tomball, Texas 77375, to 1046 Alliet Road, Broussard, Louisiana 70518 to QSA Global, Baton Rouge, Louisiana."

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA 20210003

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/20/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT

The following was received by email from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:

"The licensee reported that on February 12, 2021 while using a QSA Global Model 880, Serial # D15520, containing a 128 Curie source of iridium-192, the source failed to fully retract and lock. The technicians secured the area by adjusting their 2 mR/hr boundaries to an unshielded source distance and immediately contacted their company designee. Once on scene, the designee surveyed the scene and device and found elevated readings. Working the crank handle back and forth several times he was able to return the source to the secured and locked position. The device was taken back to the licensee's storage vault in Williamsport, PA for inspection. The cause of the incident is believed to be cold temperature and freezing of the lock mechanism. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) subsequently investigated the incident and found that neither the radiographer nor the assistant radiographer had been performing proper radiation surveys during the workday which would have identified the lock failure sooner. As a result, the radiographer received a dose of 876 mR. We are still awaiting a dose on the assistant radiographer. Corrective actions include retraining all radiography employees to follow proper procedure. Also, both the radiographer and assistant radiographer are no longer employed by the licensee."

PA Event Report ID No: PA210003

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/12/2021

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF GROUP I CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC

"At 2323 EST on 02/12/2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the Group I containment isolation logic occurred during fluid flushing of turbine stop valves. The reason for the actuation was due to a maintenance activity resulting in turbine stop valve movement with no condenser vacuum which is a Group I isolation signal. Two Group I isolation valves, 2B31F019 and 2B31F020, reactor water sample valves, automatically isolated as designed when the system actuation signal was received. The other Group I valves had already been removed from service as part of the refueling outage schedule.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that results in an invalid actuation of the Group I containment isolation system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."