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Event Notification Report for December 12, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/11/2019 - 12/12/2019

** EVENT NUMBERS **

 
54413 54436 54437

Agreement State Event Number: 54413
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LARSON DESIGN GROUP
Region: 1
City: MORGANTOWN   State: WV
County:
License #: 47-35062-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BENJAMIN SEIBER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 11/26/2019
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARK HENRION (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
CNSC (CANADA) (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF A NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection via email:

"On November 26, 2019 a lawyer representing the licensee reported the event via telephone. The licensee is Larson Design Group, USNRC Radioactive Material License No. 47-35062-01, PA reciprocity license PA-R0218. Details are sparse at this time. The lawyer stated an employee wrecked a vehicle carrying a nuclear gauge (with Cesium 137 and Americium 241) in a ditch late Friday night. He had a friend pick him up, leaving the vehicle and gauge unattended. At some point police found the vehicle and impounded it. The police recognized the radioactive material shipping case in the vehicle. They allowed the employee to claim the vehicle only after producing documentation indicating he was authorized to possess it. It is believed the gauge never left the vehicle and it is back in possession of the licensee. The DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] will update this event as soon as more information is provided."

PA Event Report ID No.: 190028

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CHIPPO TO KARL DIEDERICH AT 1004 EST ON 12/11/19 * * *

The following update was received from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection via fax:

"The nuclear gauge was a Troxler 3440 (S/N: 33739) containing 8.1 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be. The gauge was impounded by police and was out of the licensee's control for approximately 60 hours. The employee responsible has had his employment terminated. As part of corrective actions, the licensee will review its training practices and update as necessary."

Notified R1DO (Lally) and (via e-mail) NMSS Events group, ILTAB, and CNSC.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Non-Power Reactor Event Number: 54436
Facility: UNIV OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA
RX Type: 10000 KW TANK
Comments:
Region: 0
City: COLUMBIA   State: MO
County: BOONE
License #: R-103
Agreement: N
Docket: 05000186
NRC Notified By: JEREMY CUSTER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 12/11/2019
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2019
Event Time: 00:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WERTZ (NPR PM)
ELIZABETH REED ()

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION REQUIRING SHUTDOWN

The following information was received via phone and email.

"On December 10, 2019, at 0012 CST, the University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor (MURR) was shut down due to a failure of the regulating blade drive mechanism during reactor operation. MURR was not in compliance with all Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs), specifically S 3.2.a, which states, 'All control blades, including the regulating blade, shall be operable during reactor operation.' The regulating blade drive mechanism was removed, repaired, reinstalled, and all its functions were tested satisfactorily. Permission from the Reactor Facility Director was obtained per TS 6.6.c(4) prior to starting up the reactor later on December 10."

Notification to the NRC Operations Center is required per TS 6.6.c(1) to report that an Abnormal Occurrence, as defined by TS 1.1.b, occurred. MURR was not in compliance with all of the Limiting Conditions for Operations as established in TS Section 3.0.

"A detailed event report will follow within 14 days as required by TS 6.6.c(3)."

Power Reactor Event Number: 54437
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2     State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALAN BIALOWAS
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 12/11/2019
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/11/2019
Event Time: 13:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL TORNADO MISSILE VULNERABILITIES

"On December 11, 2019, at 1356 EST, it was concluded that certain safety-related equipment is vulnerable to design basis tornado missiles which could render the equipment inoperable and not able to perform its design function. This applies to the following Technical Specification equipment:

"1. Component cooling water piping for the 'A' spent fuel cooling water system heat exchanger. This heat exchanger is vulnerable to a horizontal missile traveling through the roll-up door, which would challenge operability of the Technical Specification required component cooling system equipment.
2. All three emergency service water pumps and their diesel fuel oil supply tank. The emergency service water pumps and diesel fuel oil tank are vulnerable to a horizontal missile penetrating the missile screens.
3. Certain component cooling water system pump discharge piping is vulnerable from a vertical missile penetrating the auxiliary building roof.
4. The Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system pumps and the pump suction and discharge piping are vulnerable to a missile traveling through the screens on the sides and roof of the main steam valve house. This vulnerability also exists for the Unit 2 AFW.
5. The Unit 2 Service Water (SW) supply valves to the river water make-up pump are vulnerable to a vertical missile traveling through the turbine building roof. A missile strike on the piping or valves could cause an unisolable leak or pipe break on this non-essential SW piping which could result in inability to maintain Technical Specification required intake canal inventory.

"These conditions are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There are no current operational challenges to either unit due to the tornado missile vulnerabilities.

"Identified SSCs [structures, systems, and components] were declared inoperable [at 1356] and NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002, Rev. 1, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' was implemented. Initial compensatory measures were implemented, per the guidance of NRC Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01 Appendix A, within the time allowed by the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and the associated systems were then declared operable, but nonconforming."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021