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Event Notification Report for October 23, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/22/2019 - 10/23/2019

** EVENT NUMBERS **


54301 54345

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Part 21 Event Number: 54301
Rep Org: FLOWSERVE US INC.
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN STRONG
HQ OPS Officer: KERBY SCALES
Notification Date: 09/30/2019
Notification Time: 15:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text

PART 21 - VALVE MANUFACTURE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

The following information was received from Flowserve US Inc. via facsimile:

"Description: Contrary to the requirements of ASME Section Ill - NC-4000, Flowserve Raleigh identified that they were utilizing as standard practice, the base material acceptance criteria in lieu of welding acceptance criteria for valves with temporary attachments (i.e. - Lug removal areas). This utilization of criteria has been ongoing as far back as Flowserve's Review could determine. No specific orders or customers are identified as this is systemic to the overall process of valve manufacturing at Flowserve Raleigh.

"Evaluation: A review was completed of the ASME Code requirements by Flowserve Raleigh's Engineering and Metallurgical Process Control Departments with the following results:

"The examination of Temporary Attachment Removal Areas, to the NB/NC-2540 Examination and Repair of Forgings and Bars, and NB/NC-2570 Examination and Repair of Statically and Centrifugally Cast Products is contrary to NB/NC-5340 and 5350 acceptance criteria. However, it can be determined that Temporary Attachment Removal Areas examined to NB/NC-2500 acceptance criteria is consistent with the acceptable surface condition resulting from a welded repair performed on the same material product form. No greater risk to pressure integrity is created by the examination of Temporary Attachment Removal Areas to NB/NC-2500 acceptance criteria. The examination of Temporary Attachment Removal Areas examined to NB/NC-2500 acceptance criteria does not result in a Risk to safety relating to pressure integrity.

"Paragraph NB/NC-4435 of Article NB/NC-4000 FABRICATION AND INSTALLATION contains mandatory requirements for the examination of Components. Contrary to the requirement of NB/NC-4435 (b) (3) to examine the Nonstructural Temporary Attachment Removal Area in accordance with the Acceptance Criteria of NB/NC-5340 or NB/NC-5350 Flowserve performed these examinations in accordance with Article NB/NC-2000 in accordance with the Acceptance Standards of NB/NC-2500 for the applicable Material Product Form. NB/NC-2540 Examination and Repair of Forgings and Bars, NB/NC-2570 Examination and Repair of Statically and Centrifugally Cast Products.

"ND-4435 contains no mandatory requirements for the examination of Nonstructural Temporary Attachment Removal Area.

"Extent of Condition: This utilization of criteria has been ongoing as far back as Flowserve's Review could determine. No specific orders or customers are identified as this is systemic to the overall process of valve manufacturing at Flowserve Raleigh.

"Corrective Actions: Flowserve Raleigh Corrective Action, (CAR-393758) has been issued, and is currently in process of determining root cause and preventive action measures.

"Summation: After review by Flowserve Raleigh's Engineering and Metallurgical Process Control Departments. It is the position of Flowserve Raleigh, that in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21, this condition, while reportable to the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), is not a significant/substantial safety hazard."

Megan Strong
Quality Manager
office: 919-831-3220
mstrong@flowserve.com

* * * UPDATE ON 10/22/19 AT 1404 EDT FROM FLOWSERVE TO OSSY FONT * * *

In addition to the information previously provided, Flowserve provided the following via fax:

"Scope/ Extent of Condition:
This utilization of criteria has been ongoing as far back as Flowserve's Review could determine. After further review, the scope of impact was determined as cast steel valves, Class 1 and Class 2 only. Anything outside of this criterion would not have been impacted.

"Corrective Actions:
Flowserve Raleigh issued Corrective Action, (CAR-393758), and is continuing their process of completing the root cause and corrective actions needed to prevent recurrence. Actions that have already taken place and/or are in progress are:
1. ASME Code Training is to be developed, with application toward the criteria as outlined in this Part 21. This training is to be developed to enhance the code knowledge of Flowserve Raleigh Personnel generating Quality Assurance Plans.
2. Quality Assurance Personnel are to be trained in accordance with the applicable code requirements, to ensure adequate knowledge of the above condition.
3. Non-Destructive Examination Personnel are to be trained in accordance with the applicable code requirements, to ensure adequate knowledge of the above condition.
4. Flowserve's Quality Assurance Plans are to have their applicable NOE matrix's revised to incorporate the applicable criteria needed for the removal of temporary attachments.

"Summation:
After review by Flowserve Raleigh, the following is to be a summation of the above listed 10 CFR Part 21.
1. The review has determined a programmatic condition that had been existent for many years. Raleigh can only assure that any customers for whom were supplied Class 1 or Class 2 cast steel valves, prior to the issuance of this Part 21 may have this condition.
2. To date, there have not been any reported failures or technical issues as a result of this condition.
3. While the above condition is a reportable condition to the NRC, with regards to the violation of the ASME B&PVC Code, it is Flowserve Raleigh's position that it does not pose a compromised condition to safety."

Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Lopez), R3DO (Stoedter), R4DO (Young) and the Part 21 group via email.

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Part 21 Event Number: 54345
Rep Org: CURTISS-WRIGHT
Licensee: CURTISS-WRIGHT
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE   State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS COVAN
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 10/22/2019
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text

PART 21 - INCORRECTLY WIRED SOCKET SIDE QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTORS

The following information was received via fax:

"To maintain compliance with 10 CFR 21, this initial notification is to document the failure to comply of basic components which were found to have a defect and were supplied to a licensed operating nuclear power plant.

"On September 4, 2019 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was notified by Duke Energy - Catawba Nuclear Station of a possible deviation of a supplied EGS Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC), P/N 880701-102 (S/N: 47801 and 47802) where two socket side connectors were wired incorrectly. Condition Report (H19-4603) was generated to internally document all actions and investigations on this matter.

"On October 17, 2019, the basic components with the possible deviation were returned to Curtiss-Wright and evaluated. The evaluation found that the socket sides were wired incorrectly by color code but the wire markers were correctly labeled. If installed using the wire marker delineation, the wiring would be correct, but if the basic components were installed using the color code, there could be the possibility of incorrect wiring. Since Curtiss-Wright is not privy to how the operating plant installs these connector(s), if installed using the color code it may cause a possible safety hazard and therefore considered defective.

"The condition was caused by human error and was isolated to the two subject socket side QDCs.

"The defected QDCs were returned and replacement connectors were built and supplied to Duke Energy - Catawba Nuclear Station.

"Even though this is considered an isolated event, corrective actions to help prevent recurrence are in the process of being implemented. These include, but are not limited to, adding an additional specific peer check during manufacturing and adding a specific final inspection check to confirm actual wire insulation color code, if applicable.

"Based on our evaluation these two connectors were the only ones affected by this defect. They have been removed from service and replacements have been provided. Once all corrective actions to prevent recurrence are completed, an official close out letter will be generated."

If you would like to discuss this further please contact the following:
Chris Covan, Quality Assurance Manager, at (256) 924-7414 or ccovan@curtisswright.com, or
Tim Franchuk, Director of Quality Assurance, at (513) 201-2176 or tfranchuk@curtisswright.com.


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, October 23, 2019
Wednesday, October 23, 2019