Event Notification Report for October 14, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/11/2019 - 10/14/2019

** EVENT NUMBERS **


532045410254310543145432554328


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53204
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: SARAH KISH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/12/2018
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2018
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text



EN Revision Imported Date : 10/14/2019

EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR TORNADO GENERATED MISSILES

"On February 12, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, Dresden Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the Unit 2, Unit 2/3, and Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator main fuel oil tank vents. This could result in crimping of the vents, which would affect the ability of the main fuel oil tanks to perform their function if a tornado would occur.

"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion' per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

* * * RETRACTION ON 10/11/19 AT 1031 EDT FROM SAMANTHA COSENZA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract event notification 53204 made on February 12, 2018, for Dresden Station. Additional review determined that the current design of all three Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Main Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Vents is consistent with the licensing basis for Dresden Station. There was no non-conformance of Dresden's tornado missile protection design, and the EDGs were operable at the time the event notification was made.

"Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The ENS 53204 report is being retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

Notified R3DO (Hills).


Part 21 Event Number: 54102
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: DRESSER-RAND
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/05/2019
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text



EN Revision Imported Date : 10/14/2019

EN Revision Text: PART 21 INTERIM NOTIFICATION - FAILURE OF A SIGNAL CONVERTER SUPPLIED TO COOPER NUCLEAR PLANT

The following is a summary of the information received from Engine Systems, Inc. via facsimile:

ESI was notified on April 6, 2019 that a signal converter (also called a signal conditioner) that sends the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling turbine speed to the turbine controller had failed. The converter is at the manufacturer's facility undergoing testing at this time and they have been unable to complete their evaluation within 60-days. The evaluation is expected to be completed by July 31, 2019.

The converter was only supplied to Cooper Nuclear Plant.


* * * UPDATE FROM DAN ROBERTS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1710 EDT ON 7/19/2019 * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

On June 5, 2019, Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) issued an interim report regarding an identified deviation for which ESI was unable to complete an evaluation within the 60-day requirement. Per the interim report, ESI committed to complete the evaluation by July 31, 2019. The evaluation is now complete and the deviation is determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.

ESI supplied the component which failed to comply or contained a defect. That part was a Signal Converter Transmitter, P/N SCT/4-20MA/4-20MA/24DC/-LIM-TA[DCM]. This component was only supplied to Cooper Nuclear Station.

The nature of the defect was that a power inverter transformer, internal to the signal converter transmitter, failed shorted. The transformer failure adversely affected other circuit board mounted components which prevented the device from functioning properly. The signal converter transmitter is a component of a turbine control panel. Within the panel, the transmitter is used to sense the customer's remote speed setpoint input signal and convert the signal which is transmitted to the turbine control. Since the signal converter transmits the customer's remote speed setpoint input to the turbine control, operability of the device is critical to operation of the RCIC turbine control system. Therefore, a failure of the signal converter would adversely affect the RCIC turbine control system and thus may affect the safe shutdown of the reactor.

At Cooper Nuclear Station, the failed component has been removed and replaced with a spare transmitter from a different batch. No further action is necessary.

For ESI, the previous design transformer (used in the failed transformer) was discontinued by the transformer manufacturer in 2016 which required the signal converter transmitter manufacturer to source a new transformer. The new transformer has the same functionality with a slightly different form factor which minimizes the potential for common cause failure with the original style transformer. Therefore, no additional actions are required since a different transformer is in current use. ESI has included a verification of the current transformer design in the commercial grade dedication package.

The names and addresses of the individuals reporting this information are:

John Kriesel
Engineering Manager
Engine Systems, Inc.;
175 Freight Rd.
Rocky Mount, NC 27804

Dan Roberts
Quality Manager
Engine Systems, Inc.;
175 Freight Rd.
Rocky Mount, NC 27804

Notified R4DO (Proulx) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.


* * * UPDATE FROM DAN ROBERTS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1643 EDT ON 10/11/2019 * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

Subsequent to the issue of the report on July 19, 2019, ESI became aware of another potential defect with the same device. As a result, ESI has amended the report to expand the extent of condition.

ESI supplied the component which failed to comply or contained a defect. That part was a Signal Converter Transmitter, P/N SCT/4-20MA/4-20MA/24DC/-LIM-TA[DCM]. This component was only supplied to Cooper Nuclear Station.

The nature of the defect was that four circuit board mounted components (two transistors, a capacitor, and a diode) failed, causing the device to go to zero output. These prevented the device from functioning properly.

Corrective actions for Cooper Nuclear: As stated above, no further action is necessary.

Corrective actions for ESI for the subsequent failure: ESI has been unable to positively determine the root cause; however, correspondence with the signal converter manufacturer indicates this may be related to the previous style transformer. While no anomalies were detected with the transformer, the failed components are electrically connected to the transformer. Verification of the current style transformer is performed in the commercial grade dedication package.

The names and addresses of the individuals reporting this information are:

John Kriesel
Engineering Manager
Engine Systems, Inc.;
175 Freight Rd.
Rocky Mount, NC 27804

Dan Roberts
Quality Manager
Engine Systems, Inc.;
175 Freight Rd.
Rocky Mount, NC 27804

Notified R4DO (Kellar) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.


Non-Agreement State Event Number: 54310
Rep Org: ALT & WITZIG ENGINEERING
Licensee: ALT & WITZIG ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: CARMEL   State: IN
County:
License #: 13-18685-1
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK HERBER
HQ OPS Officer: CATY NOLAN
Notification Date: 10/04/2019
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2019
Event Time: 19:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN AND RECOVERED NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE

The following is a synopsis of information received via phone:

On October 3, 2019, at approximately 1900 EDT, a CPN nuclear density gauge containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241 was discovered to be stolen when the person in possession of the gauge found the storage box on his truck open and the gauge not inside. Local law enforcement was notified and subsequently recovered the gauge on October 4, 2019 at 0800 EDT. The gauge did not appear to be damaged and the lock was still intact. The gauge is now in the possession of the licensee.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf


Non-Agreement State Event Number: 54314
Rep Org: PAVEMENT INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES
Licensee: PAVEMENT INSPECTION TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: BRIDGEPORT   State: CT
County:
License #: 06-35542-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER GENDUSO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/06/2019
Notification Time: 19:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE FROM TRUCK

The following report is a summary of the information received via phone call:

On 10/6/19, the radiation safety officer (RSO) noticed that one of the company vehicles appeared to have been broken into and the windows were smashed. The RSO conducted an inventory of the density gauges and determined that one of them was missing. The RSO then contacted local law enforcement (LLEA) and reported the incident. LLEA arrived on site at approximately 1640 EDT to obtain the incident information. The incident is still under investigation.

The gauge information is as follows:
Manufacturer: Humboldt
Model: 5001
Serial Number: 2529
Source Quantity/Activity:
Am-241/Be - 50 milliCuries
Cs-137 - 10 milliCuries.

* * * UPDATED ON 10/7/19 AT 1404 EDT FROM CHRIS GENDUSO TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The Pavement Inspection Technologies RSO reported that the gauge was recovered intact.

Notified R1DO (Dentel), ILTAB and NMSS Events (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf


Power Reactor Event Number: 54325
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1     State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SAUL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/11/2019
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2019
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 96 Power Operation 30 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN INITIATED

"At 1300 EDT, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1. Technical Specification Action 3.1.4.C (Restore Control Element Assembly [CEA] alignment) was entered on 10/11/2019 at 1100 EDT, with a Required Action to reduce thermal power to less than 70 percent Rated Thermal Power and restore CEA alignment within 2 hours. This Required Action was not completed within the Completion Time; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

"At 1345 EDT, CEA alignment was restored and Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Control Element Assembly Alignment) was met. Reactor Power is being stabilized.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


Power Reactor Event Number: 54328
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PATRICK EGAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/12/2019
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2019
Event Time: 08:55 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT - UNOPENED CAN OF BEER FOUND INSIDE PROTECTED AREA

One unopened can of beer was discovered in a break room refrigerator within the plant's Protected Area. The individual that brought in the can of beer was identified. That individual is a Pacific Gas and Electric employee but does not normally work at Diablo Canyon. That individual was brought in to support work during the Unit 2 refueling outage. When questioned, the individual stated that the can of beer had been brought in to give to another person to see if that person liked that brand of beer (the beer was apparently from a small specialty brewery). A behavioral observation was performed on the individual who brought in the can of beer. There was no indication of alcohol use by the individual. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended pending further investigation.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021