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Event Notification Report for October 03, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/2/2019 - 10/3/2019

** EVENT NUMBERS **


54294 54306 54307

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Agreement State Event Number: 54294
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: GEO-TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC
Region: 1
City: REISTERSTOWN   State: MD
County:
License #: MD-25-038-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN GOLDEY
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 09/25/2019
Notification Time: 16:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2019
Event Time: 15:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PORTABLE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the Maryland Radiological Health Program via phone and email:

"On September 23, 2019 at 1520 EDT, the Maryland Department of the Environment Radiological Health Program (MDE/RHP) was contacted via telephone by the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) of Geo-Technology Associates, Inc. that a portable density gauge was missing. The gauge was identified as a CPN model MC-1DR, serial number MD50707960 with nominal activities of 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241:Be. The last leak test was performed on April 11, 2019.

"On September 23, 2019 at approximately 1300 EDT, the density gauge was placed in the bed of a pick-up truck by the gauge operator after making measurements starting earlier in the morning for a residential development project known as Fields at Worthington. The area is located near the intersection of Baublitz Road and Worthington Ridge Road, Reisterstown, MD. Work was suspended due to equipment failure on the job site not related to the density gauge. The gauge operator proceeded to drive back to the licensee's office. After driving approximately 1.5 miles from the jobsite, the gauge operator realized that the gauge was not placed in its transportation case and pulled over near Knox Avenue. The gauge was missing from the bed of the pick-up truck. The tailgate was in the down position. The gauge operator called the ARSO at approximately 1330 EDT to report the missing gauge.

"The ARSO and the construction site manager looked for the gauge in the surrounding neighborhood with no success. The event has been reported to Baltimore County Police. The Case Number is: 192661514.

"MDE/RHP will conduct a reactive investigation."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Part 21 Event Number: 54306
Rep Org: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Licensee: CURTIS WRIGHT
Region: 4
City: LONDON   State: AR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000313
NRC Notified By: DONNA BOYD
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 10/02/2019
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2019
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - ITE/GOULD J20M COIL BLOCK RELAY

"On October 1, 2019, the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Site Vice President was notified of a defect on an ITE/Gould J20M Coil Block Relays which met the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 21.21.

"ANO is making this non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(I) concerning a defect on an ITE/Gould J20M Coil Block Relay which resulted in one of four safety related containment cooling fans failure to start at ANO Unit 2. On June 1, 2019, a failure occurred when the containment cooler fan hand switch was taken to 'start' during the recent Unit 2 forced outage. Troubleshooting identified the control power relay coil was found to have an open winding condition.

"The Unit 2 reactor was in shutdown (Mode 5) and no impacts to nuclear or radiological safety occurred because of this event. The failure of the containment cooling fan to start would have prevented the Containment Cooling System from performing its function of providing essential cooling/environmental controls for safety related equipment inside containment.

"On August 15, 2019, ANO approved a causal evaluation which determined the failure of the relay occurred due to a manufacturing defect associated with uneven varnish application on the coil windings. This defect lead to premature turn-to-turn shorting of the coils. This failure was determined to be limited to ITE/Gould relays that were part of a 1991 batch purchased by ANO. The 1991 relay batch had a manufacturing date code of 9132.

"As part of the ANO evaluation, an industry operating experience review identified INPO ICES OE 242045. This OE identified another utility had purchased three relays from ANO in 2007 and subsequently experienced coil failures on two of the three relays. The utility did not issue a 10 CFR Part 21 notification.

"During the ANO evaluation, NRC IN 92-27 Supplement 1 was reviewed. The IN noted the same component failure mode. However, the failure mechanism was different. The IN discussed failures associated with thermal degradation of the relay armature carriers in ganged mounting configurations. The failure mechanism at ANO is due to uneven varnish application to the coil windings.

"Entergy ANO performed a Part 21 Evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(1) which was completed on September 25, 2019. This evaluation determined this defect could create a substantial safety hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21.3.

"The licensee has two relays left that could be affected. One relay is installed and currently in use by the other containment cooling fan and the other relay is on parts hold in an ANO onsite warehouse. A Condition Report has been initiated to document the potential for failure of the installed control power relay. This ITE/Gould J20 is obsolete and other options are being evaluated to replace the ITE/Gould J20M Coil Block Relay. ANO has notified the utility to whom it sold the relays in 2007. ANO has also notified the vendor."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 54307
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILL FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 10/02/2019
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2019
Event Time: 04:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

"On October 2, 2019, at 0415 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 2 containment spray system occurred during valve strokes of the 2A train containment spray header isolations while the 2B train containment spray pump was in recirculation. The reason for the containment spray actuation was due to a conflicting procedural alignment with the 2B containment spray recirculation procedure. The containment spray system does not have an automatic function, and only receives manual actuation. The Unit 2 containment spray actuation was secured at 0416.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the containment spray system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, October 03, 2019
Thursday, October 03, 2019