Event Notification Report for March 09, 2019
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/08/2019 - 03/09/2019
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53922
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 03/10/2019
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2019
Event Time: 23:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2019
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2019
Event Time: 23:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2019
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
HO NIEH (DNRR)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
HO NIEH (DNRR)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
At 0012 EST on 3/10/2019, Browns Ferry Unit-3 declared an Unusual Event due to a spurious trip of the generator breaker, resulting in a loss of AC power to the 4 kV shutdown boards greater than 15 minutes. All diesel generators started and loaded to supply onsite power. The reactor auto-scrammed, with all rods fully inserting. The Main Steam Isolation Valves opened and shutdown cooling was being conducted via the condenser. The licensee will exit the emergency declaration once offsite power is restored. There is no estimated restart date.
Browns Ferry Unit 1 remains in Mode-1 (100%), Unit 2 remains in Mode-5 for a refueling outage.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This event is related to EN 53923.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 3/10/19 AT 1419 EDT FROM JOHN HOLLIDAY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
At 1310 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit-3 exited the Unusual Event when 161 kV lines were made available. The licensee is executing procedures for securing the diesel generators while alternate offsite power methods are utilized. Switchyard damage evaluation is in progress.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Desai), R2RA (Haney), DNRR (Nieh), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Grant).
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
At 0012 EST on 3/10/2019, Browns Ferry Unit-3 declared an Unusual Event due to a spurious trip of the generator breaker, resulting in a loss of AC power to the 4 kV shutdown boards greater than 15 minutes. All diesel generators started and loaded to supply onsite power. The reactor auto-scrammed, with all rods fully inserting. The Main Steam Isolation Valves opened and shutdown cooling was being conducted via the condenser. The licensee will exit the emergency declaration once offsite power is restored. There is no estimated restart date.
Browns Ferry Unit 1 remains in Mode-1 (100%), Unit 2 remains in Mode-5 for a refueling outage.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This event is related to EN 53923.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 3/10/19 AT 1419 EDT FROM JOHN HOLLIDAY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
At 1310 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit-3 exited the Unusual Event when 161 kV lines were made available. The licensee is executing procedures for securing the diesel generators while alternate offsite power methods are utilized. Switchyard damage evaluation is in progress.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Desai), R2RA (Haney), DNRR (Nieh), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Grant).
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53921
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/09/2019
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2019
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2019
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2019
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SEWAGE LINE BACKUP CAUSING WASTEWATER DISCHARGE TO CHESAPEAKE BAY
"A sewage line on the south end of the plant backed up causing sanitary wastewater to flow into storm drains and out to the Chesapeake Bay. This is a required notification of the Maryland Department of the Environment under COMAR [Code of Maryland Regulations] 26.08 for discharge of a pollutant into navigable waters or the adjoining shoreline. The amount has been estimated at less than 1000 gallons and the source has been isolated and storm drains have been covered to stop any flow into them and subsequently to the Chesapeake Bay. This notification is made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of a state agency."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A sewage line on the south end of the plant backed up causing sanitary wastewater to flow into storm drains and out to the Chesapeake Bay. This is a required notification of the Maryland Department of the Environment under COMAR [Code of Maryland Regulations] 26.08 for discharge of a pollutant into navigable waters or the adjoining shoreline. The amount has been estimated at less than 1000 gallons and the source has been isolated and storm drains have been covered to stop any flow into them and subsequently to the Chesapeake Bay. This notification is made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of a state agency."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53923
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Notification Date: 03/10/2019
Notification Time: 04:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2019
Event Time: 22:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2019
Notification Time: 04:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2019
Event Time: 22:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC SCRAM RESULTING IN RPS AND ECCS ACTUATION
"At 2259 CST on 3/9/2019, Browns Ferry Unit-3 received an automatic SCRAM on Main Generator Breaker Failure and Turbine Load Reject. Unit-3 declared a Notification of Unusual Event SU1 for loss of offsite AC power to Unit-3 specific 4kV Shutdown Boards for greater than 15 minutes.
"Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS) Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals, all required components actuated as required. Main steam relief valves lifted on the initial transient. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiated on low reactor water level. HPCI remains in service for reactor level and pressure control. RCIC is not in service at this time, the station is investigating low flow from the pump. All four Unit-3 Diesel Generators started and loaded as expected. Residual Heat Removal System is in service for suppression pool cooling.
"4kV Station Unit Boards have been restored from the 161kV system. Actions are in progress to restore 4kV Shutdown Boards to offsite power.
"This event is reportable within 1 hour in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of the Licensees Emergency Plan. Complete as documented on EN 53922.
"This event requires a 4 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'
"This event also requires an 8 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), (4) ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system, (5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system; isolation condenser system; and feedwater coolant injection system, and (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: Emergency diesel generators (EDGs).'
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
As of the event report, the MSIVs were opened and decay heat was being removed via the bypass valves to the condenser.
"At 2259 CST on 3/9/2019, Browns Ferry Unit-3 received an automatic SCRAM on Main Generator Breaker Failure and Turbine Load Reject. Unit-3 declared a Notification of Unusual Event SU1 for loss of offsite AC power to Unit-3 specific 4kV Shutdown Boards for greater than 15 minutes.
"Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS) Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals, all required components actuated as required. Main steam relief valves lifted on the initial transient. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiated on low reactor water level. HPCI remains in service for reactor level and pressure control. RCIC is not in service at this time, the station is investigating low flow from the pump. All four Unit-3 Diesel Generators started and loaded as expected. Residual Heat Removal System is in service for suppression pool cooling.
"4kV Station Unit Boards have been restored from the 161kV system. Actions are in progress to restore 4kV Shutdown Boards to offsite power.
"This event is reportable within 1 hour in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of the Licensees Emergency Plan. Complete as documented on EN 53922.
"This event requires a 4 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'
"This event also requires an 8 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), (4) ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system, (5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system; isolation condenser system; and feedwater coolant injection system, and (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: Emergency diesel generators (EDGs).'
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
As of the event report, the MSIVs were opened and decay heat was being removed via the bypass valves to the condenser.