Event Notification Report for October 28, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/27/2018 - 10/28/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53698
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID LIVINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID LIVINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/28/2018
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2018
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING A REACTOR SHUTDOWN
"At 0445 [CDT], with reactor power less than 1% rated thermal power on Instrument Range Monitor (IRM) ranges 6 and 7, Clinton Power Station received an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The Reactor Scram Off Normal procedure was entered and all control rods were verified to be fully inserted. The apparent cause of the scram is cold water injection causing an upscale trip of the IRMs due to Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (MDRFP) Feedwater Regulating valve 1FW004 valve coming off the full shut seat momentarily. All systems responded appropriately following the scram and the plant is currently stable. Clinton Power Station will be proceeding to Mode 4 to support the planned Maintenance Outage.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0445 [CDT], with reactor power less than 1% rated thermal power on Instrument Range Monitor (IRM) ranges 6 and 7, Clinton Power Station received an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The Reactor Scram Off Normal procedure was entered and all control rods were verified to be fully inserted. The apparent cause of the scram is cold water injection causing an upscale trip of the IRMs due to Motor Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump (MDRFP) Feedwater Regulating valve 1FW004 valve coming off the full shut seat momentarily. All systems responded appropriately following the scram and the plant is currently stable. Clinton Power Station will be proceeding to Mode 4 to support the planned Maintenance Outage.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53699
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEEDEN
HQ OPS Officer: KAREN COTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEEDEN
HQ OPS Officer: KAREN COTTON
Notification Date: 10/28/2018
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2018
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER INOPERABLE
"During the performance of Service Water Essential header swap, SWN-6 (Supply to Turbine Building Oil Coolers) valve stem became disconnected from its gear box at 85% open and could not be operated. Therefore, the non-essential service water system was inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 0930 [EDT] with required actions to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours, Mode 4 in 13 hours and Mode 5 in 37 hours. Repair efforts were successful at shutting SWN-6, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1305 [EDT] before adding any negative reactivity in support of shutdown. ('TS Required S/D' box not checked.)
"This condition constituted a loss of safety function which requires an 8 hour report [in accordance with] IAW 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B): Without the ability to close SWN-6, the non-seismic portion of the conventional Service Water System could not be isolated as required in the event of either a seismic event or as required in the EOPs. The nonessential service water system is required to support the recirculation phase post [Design Basis Accident] DBA for accident mitigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
"During the performance of Service Water Essential header swap, SWN-6 (Supply to Turbine Building Oil Coolers) valve stem became disconnected from its gear box at 85% open and could not be operated. Therefore, the non-essential service water system was inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 0930 [EDT] with required actions to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours, Mode 4 in 13 hours and Mode 5 in 37 hours. Repair efforts were successful at shutting SWN-6, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1305 [EDT] before adding any negative reactivity in support of shutdown. ('TS Required S/D' box not checked.)
"This condition constituted a loss of safety function which requires an 8 hour report [in accordance with] IAW 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B): Without the ability to close SWN-6, the non-seismic portion of the conventional Service Water System could not be isolated as required in the event of either a seismic event or as required in the EOPs. The nonessential service water system is required to support the recirculation phase post [Design Basis Accident] DBA for accident mitigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53700
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF HUMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF HUMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/28/2018
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2018
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 29 | Power Operation | 29 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SEISMIC MONITORING PANEL SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
"At 1435 CDT on October 28, 2018, troubleshooting of the Seismic Monitoring Panel resulting from the receipt of Control Room annunciator 47023-0603 (Seismic Monitor Panel) determined that the '[Operational Basis Earthquake] OBE Exceedance' alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel will not alarm and determined the panel is non-functional.
"The Seismic Monitoring Panel system functions to provide indication that the OBE threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2.1.
"Station personnel are monitoring the seismic recorders for event alarms on a 15 minute frequency due to alarm function failure. The station is developing repair plans for restoration of the alarm function.
"This event does not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
"At 1435 CDT on October 28, 2018, troubleshooting of the Seismic Monitoring Panel resulting from the receipt of Control Room annunciator 47023-0603 (Seismic Monitor Panel) determined that the '[Operational Basis Earthquake] OBE Exceedance' alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel will not alarm and determined the panel is non-functional.
"The Seismic Monitoring Panel system functions to provide indication that the OBE threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2.1.
"Station personnel are monitoring the seismic recorders for event alarms on a 15 minute frequency due to alarm function failure. The station is developing repair plans for restoration of the alarm function.
"This event does not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Agreement State
Event Number: 53701
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: S.W. COLE ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: TAUNTON State: MA
County:
License #: 48-0689
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Licensee: S.W. COLE ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: TAUNTON State: MA
County:
License #: 48-0689
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 10/29/2018
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2018
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received via email from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
"Massachusetts Radiation Control Program was notified this morning by S.W. Cole Engineering (MA Radioactive Materials License 48-0689) of Taunton, MA, that InstroTek Model 3500 Xplorer Series portable moisture density gauge, containing 11 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241, was stolen yesterday (Sunday, 28 October 2018) from a temporary job site in Fall River, MA.
"Local Police, State Police and FBI have been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM JACK PRIEST TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2248 EDT ON 11/1/18 * * *
Notified by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that at 2130 EDT on 11/1/18, the Commonwealth was notified by the FBI that the subject gauge was recovered during the course of a criminal investigation. The gauge is currently in the possession of the Swansea, MA Police Department. The Commonwealth will coordinate with the licensee to take possession of the gauge on 11/2/18.
The gauge appears to be undamaged and there is no evidence of tampering. The licensee will be conducting a leak check and inspection of the gauge once they regain possession.
Notified R1DO (Schroeder), ILTAB (Davis), and NMSS Events Notification (email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following was received via email from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
"Massachusetts Radiation Control Program was notified this morning by S.W. Cole Engineering (MA Radioactive Materials License 48-0689) of Taunton, MA, that InstroTek Model 3500 Xplorer Series portable moisture density gauge, containing 11 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241, was stolen yesterday (Sunday, 28 October 2018) from a temporary job site in Fall River, MA.
"Local Police, State Police and FBI have been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM JACK PRIEST TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2248 EDT ON 11/1/18 * * *
Notified by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that at 2130 EDT on 11/1/18, the Commonwealth was notified by the FBI that the subject gauge was recovered during the course of a criminal investigation. The gauge is currently in the possession of the Swansea, MA Police Department. The Commonwealth will coordinate with the licensee to take possession of the gauge on 11/2/18.
The gauge appears to be undamaged and there is no evidence of tampering. The licensee will be conducting a leak check and inspection of the gauge once they regain possession.
Notified R1DO (Schroeder), ILTAB (Davis), and NMSS Events Notification (email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf