| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
6/19/2018 - 6/20/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53391 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: E I DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY
Region: 4
City: ORANGE State: TX
County:
License #: L00005
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT | Notification Date: 05/07/2018
Notification Time: 22:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM GAUGE'S OPERATING ROD
"On May 7, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer [RSO] that on the night of May 5, 2018, they discovered the 100 milliCurie (original activity) source had disconnected from the operating rod of a Berthold model P2608.100 gauge. The RSO stated a set of tongs were used to remove the source from the vessel and place it in a lead pig designed for the source. The RSO stated the manufacturer has been contacted for assistance in repairing the gauge. The individuals who removed the source from the vessel were wearing dosimetry and the RSO stated they were sending the dosimeters in for processing. The RSO stated they had no reason to believe any individual exceeded any limit. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # 9570
* * * UPDATE ON 6/20/2018 AT 1117 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK * * *
The following was received via e-mail:
"During the licensee's investigation of this event, the radiation safety officer (RSO) found that the source on a second, almost identical, gauge had also separated from the operating rod. The second gauge, model HPS-1, contains a 500 milliCurie cobalt - 60 source. The failure does not create an exposure risk to any individual. The RSO stated they had received the results for the dosimetry sent for processing from the first reported failure and all readings were 0.0 millirem. The highest lifetime dose for any individual in the report was 105 millirem. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Hay), and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53438 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW D. MOG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 06/01/2018
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TORNADO MISSILE VULNERABILITIES
"During the period of evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to technical specification (TS) plant equipment, it was determined that the power cables to a safety related motor control center (MCC) in the service water (SW) intake structure are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. During walk downs, it was identified that the installed SW pipe tunnel barrier is not adequate. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the power cables and rendering a SW MCC inoperable.
"These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1, and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado- Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/18/2018 AT 1604 EDT FROM JUSTIN HARGRAVE TO RICHARD SMITH * * *
"During subsequent walk downs, PSEG [Public Service Enterprise Group] identified that both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are also not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. The steam exhaust pipe could be potentially impacted and cause crimping that could reduce steam exhaust flow and pump capacity. EN 53438 is updated to include both Salem units and these additional components.
"This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1, and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Notified R1DO (Burritt). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53451 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: APPLIED GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT1800298
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHIL GOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/11/2018
Notification Time: 10:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2018
Event Time: 10:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Utah via email.
"The morning of June 10, 2018, the licensee discovered that a portable nuclear density gauge had been stolen from one of their work trucks. The truck had been parked in the driveway of the AGEC's [Applied Geotechnical Engineering Consultants, Inc.] employee's house. The license claims that the gauge was properly stored in storage container that was bolted to the bed of the truck and the tailgate was locked. The licensee explained that the perpetrator broke through the locked tailgate, cut the barriers around the Troxler box, cut the locks on the Troxler box and removed the portable gauge. The Salt Lake City Police Department was also contacted. The licensee will continue to investigate the incident and will submit a written report to the DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control]."
Event Report ID No.: UT180002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53452 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: BEYOND ENGINEERING AND TESTING LLC
Region: 4
City: ROUND ROCK State: TX
County:
License #: L-06924
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/11/2018
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Texas via email.
"On June 11, 2018, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of their Troxler 3440 moisture/density gauges (SN: 67091), containing a 40 milliCurie americium 241 source and an 8 milliCurie cesium-137 source, could not be accounted for. The gauge was last used at a temporary job site on May 25, 2018. The technician that used the gauge stated to the RSO that he had returned the gauge to the storage area at their facility in Midland, Texas, that afternoon. He further stated the insertion rod was locked. The gauge, along with another, were to have been picked up by, and transferred to, another licensee (a company associated with the licensee) the week of May 28th. On June 4, 2018, the RSO discovered the gauge had not been picked up/transferred nor was it in the storage area. He began an investigation. The RSO interviewed the technician and facility supervisor and reviewed documentation. The gauge had not been used by the licensee since May 25th. The associated licensee conducted a physical inventory of all of its gauges. The associated licensee's RSO was on vacation and could not be reached until June 11th. After it was confirmed with him that the associated company did not have possession or any further knowledge of the gauge, the RSO made the notification. The RSO is continuing his investigation. More information will be provided as it is
obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: 9583
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53453 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TOLUNAY-WONG ENGINEERS INCORPORATED
Region: 4
City: BEAUMONT State: TX
County:
License #: L 04848
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/11/2018
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/11/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Texas via email.
"On June 11, 2018, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its Humboldt 5001-EZ moisture/density gauges (serial number 4097) containing a 40 milliCurie americium-241/Beryllium source (NJ04418) and a 8 milliCurie cesium-137 source (7146GQ) had been run over by a dump truck at a temporary job site. The upper casing on the gauge was damaged and the guide bar broke off as the rod was taking a reading. The rod was in the ground when hit by the truck. The technician was taking readings when he noticed a dump truck backing up close to his location. He moved to the side and tried to wave the person driving to stop. The truck didn't stop and hit the gauge. The incident was reported by the RSO and stated the area has been restricted access until the device can be recovered. The RSO traveled to the site and accessed the device. The source was successfully pulled/retrieved into the shielded position, surveyed and being transported to a servicing company for possible repair or disposal. The company will provide full details of the incident within the next few days. Investigation ongoing."
Texas Incident #: 9584 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53462 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 06/20/2018
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/20/2018
Event Time: 10:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2018 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
JEFF GRANT (IRD) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE
On June 20, 2018 at 1003 CDT, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 6.5.U, toxic gas release on site.
The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1025 CDT.
The toxic gas release occurred when site personnel were filling a fire suppression carbon dioxide (CO2) tank outside the diesel generator building. The relief valve in the common diesel generator room for Unit 1 and 2 diesel generators inadvertently lifted causing a toxic gas environment by releasing CO2 into the room. The licensee terminated the tank fill stopping the release of CO2, and with the door to the room being opened, the gas cleared in about 20 minutes.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53463 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 06/20/2018
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/20/2018
Event Time: 11:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE
"On June 20, 2018, at 1145 hours (CDT), during panel walkdown, it was identified that High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) injection valve 1E22F004 was in the open position. Valve 1E22F004 is normally closed for containment integrity purposes. Operations personnel verified that the valve was open locally and that the plant computer indicated the valve is in the 'not closed' position. No alarms or status lamps indicated why the valve would be open and there was no valid demand signal. Reactor power, pressure, level, and feedwater parameters remain steady and unchanged, with no indication of HPCS injection having occurred or in progress.
"A low-water level signal, or a high drywell pressure signal, or manual operation initiates HPCS. When a high-water level in the reactor vessel is detected, HPCS injection is automatically stopped by a signal to close injection valve 1E22F004. With valve 1E22F004 in the open position without a demand signal, closure on a high reactor water level condition was not assured. Therefore, HPCS was declared inoperable. The following Technical Specifications were entered: 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) - Operating and 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).
"Subsequently, HPCS injection valve 1E22F004 was observed to be cycling without operator action. The valve was deactivated in the closed position to assure the containment isolation function.
"The cause of valve 1E22F004 cycling without operator action is under investigation.
"HPCS is a single train safety system that consists of a single motor-driven pump, a spray sparger in the reactor vessel, and associated piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. HPCS is part of the ECCS network, which also includes Low-Pressure Core Spray, Low-Pressure Coolant Injection, and the Automatic Depressurization system.
"This event is being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 53464 | Rep Org: AAF FLANDERS
Licensee: AAF FLANDERS
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHAWN WINDLEY
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 06/20/2018
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS () | Event Text PART 21 - INTERIM REPORT NOTIFICATION
The following was received via phone call and email:
This report provides notification and interim information concerning an evaluation being performed by AAF Flanders for an unapproved design change in a High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter.
"An evaluation is underway for filters that underwent a non-approved design change. AAF Flanders has determined that an evaluation cannot be completed within the 60 day period. Discovery of the potential deviation was May 2, 2018.
"The information required for the 60-Day Interim Report Notification 21.21(a)(2) was provided. We anticipate that the evaluation will be completed by Sept 15, 2018.
"AAF Flanders is evaluating a potential nonconforming condition associated with filters (model number 0-007-C-42-03-NU-11-13-GG FU5) supplied to Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) / Xcel Energy."
AAF Flanders notified Prairie Island Nuclear Plant of this potential defect.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/14/2108 AT 1129 EDT FROM SHAWN WINDLEY TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *
The following information was received via email:
"A notification was submitted to the Commission with the subject matter of, 'Unapproved Design Change in a High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter.' At this time, the evaluation is pending third party qualification testing of the product. Information obtained from the qualification will be used in the determination of a defect. AAF Flanders had anticipated this process to have been completed by Sept 15, 2018 but because it is still on-going, we request an extension until October 31, 2018 to submit a final report to the Commission.
"The subject filters (model number 0-007-C-42-03-NU-11-13-GG FU5) supplied to Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP)/ Xcel Energy had not been installed. AAF Flanders has recalled the subject filters and currently have them segregated and stored at our facility. They pose no threat public safety."
Notified R3DO (Hanna) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 10/31/18 AT 1545 EDT FROM SHAWN WINDLEY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
The following information was excerpted from information received via email:
"AAF Flanders had anticipated the qualification process for said filters to have been completed by Sept 15, 2018. AAF requested a second extension by October 31, 2018 to submit a final report to the Commission, however; at this time our qualification is still pending third party approval. AAF Flanders is requesting another extension on the basis of an incomplete qualification of these filters. We anticipate qualification and a completed report on or before 12/15/2018."
Notified R3DO (Stoedter) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (email). | |