Event Notification Report for April 07, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/06/2018 - 04/07/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53319
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL LONG
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL LONG
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/07/2018
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2018
Event Time: 08:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2018
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2018
Event Time: 08:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AND PCIS ACTUATION DURING STATOR COOLING SYSTEM TESTING
"On April 7, 2018, at 0836 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during testing of the stator cooling system. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally. No safety-related equipment was inoperable at the time of the event. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Reactor water level being maintained via normal feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed through the bypass valves.
"Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) as a result of the reactor trip. The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the PCIS.
"Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of this event is minimal. The automatic reactor trip was not complicated and all safety-related systems operated as designed.
"Investigation of the cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On April 7, 2018, at 0836 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during testing of the stator cooling system. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally. No safety-related equipment was inoperable at the time of the event. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Reactor water level being maintained via normal feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed through the bypass valves.
"Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) as a result of the reactor trip. The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the PCIS.
"Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of this event is minimal. The automatic reactor trip was not complicated and all safety-related systems operated as designed.
"Investigation of the cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53318
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TASHA STEPHENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TASHA STEPHENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 04/07/2018
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2018
Event Time: 04:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2018
Notification Time: 11:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2018
Event Time: 04:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)
"On April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage. Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs.
"The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage. Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs.
"The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."