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Event Notification Report for January 12, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/11/2018 - 01/12/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53089 53144 53145 53146 53165

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53089
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CHAS ZACHER
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 11/23/2017
Notification Time: 02:54 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2017
Event Time: 20:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LPCI INOPERABILITY DUE TO OVERVOLTAGE RELAY ACTUATION

"On November 22, 2017, at 2043 [CST], Unit I MCC [Motor Control Center] 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target was found actuated and would not reset. MCC 18/19-5 was powered from the normal feed, Bus 19. Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. The overvoltage relay actuation would result in MCC 18/19-5 being de-energized in the event of a DBA LOCA [Design Basis Accident Loss of Coolant Accident] in which the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to energize Bus 18, therefore rendering both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was entered, requiring restoration of LPCI in 72 hours.

"The overvoltage target was subsequently able to be reset at 2114 [CST], restoring the LPCI function of RHR. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was exited at that time.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD SNOOK TO STEVEN VITTO ON 01/11/18 AT 1913 EST * * *

"The purpose of this notification today (01/11/18) is to retract the ENS Report made on November 23, 2017 at 0248 hours EST (ENS Report #53089).

"Upon further review, it was determined that the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target that was found actuated and would initially not reset was caused only by intermittent degraded DC control power. During this event, MCC 18/19-5 remained powered from the normal feed Bus 19, and Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal.

"It was further determined from plant drawings that under this condition the degraded DC control power to the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay has no impact to the Technical Specification 3.5.1 required capability to auto transfer power from the normal Bus 19 to the alternate Bus 18 should Bus 19 lose power such as during a DBA LOCA. This overvoltage relay was installed in the early 1990's only to support enhanced reliability of the power supply to the LPCI injection valves, and its actuation due to degraded DC control power would not impact the ability to auto transfer to alternate Bus 18. Therefore, both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system would have remained fully operable under the as-found relay condition, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was not required to be entered.

"On December 6, 2017, it was determined that a loose fuse clip terminal had caused the DC control power to the overvoltage relay to become degraded which in turn caused the relay target and its reset to become erratic. This fuse clip terminal was repaired on December 6, 2017. Based on the subsequent reviews of this event, the LPCI system was not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.5.1 during the period of the MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay actuation (i.e., 31 minutes on 11/22/17), and hence was not required to be reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"Therefore, based on this information, ENS Report #53089 is being retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

R3DO(Jeffers) has been notified.

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Agreement State Event Number: 53144
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: THERAGENICS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: Buford State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MONICA JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 01/03/2018
Notification Time: 09:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2017
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
GRETCHEN RIVERA-CAPE (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE EVENT

The following was excerpted from an email received from the state of Georgia:

"On Tuesday, January 2, 2018 it was reported to the Department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] by Theragenics Corporation in Buford, GA that an employee's dosimetry report indicated that he had exceeded the annual shallow dose limit of 50 rem. An investigation has been conducted by the employer and it was determined that two abnormal occurrences happened during this wear period:

"1. For approximately 2 hours the technician worked a non-routine job to clean and rebuild the central region of a cyclotron in order to return the cyclotron to operation. This was designated as a high radiation area and exposures of others that worked the same job had high exposures also but no one else exceeded the annual limits.

"2. On November 13, 2017 the cyclotron technician was having difficulty operating the manipulator arms and pneumatic screwdriver within a hot cell so without contacting HP [health physics] or cyclotron management he decided to remove 10 screws in the target rail of the hot cell by hand. He held target rails with his left hand and removed the screws with a screwdriver with his right hand. The projected activity on that day was 62.61 Ci and the job took 1 to 5 minutes.

"Theragenics was notified of the event on December 1, 2017. The report was sent to the department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] on December 28, 2017 and was received on January 2, 2018

"The skin exposure to the left extremity was reported as 71.865 rem for the biweekly monitoring period of November 6, 2017 to November 19, 2017."

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Agreement State Event Number: 53145
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: ATLANTIC ENGINEERING LABS. INC.
Region: 1
City: AVENEL State: NJ
County:
License #: 506950
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK TWAY
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 01/03/2018
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2018
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO PORTABLE NUCLEAR GAUGES STOLEN

The following was excerpted from an email received from the State of New Jersey:

"RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] reported that 2 portable nuclear gauges were stolen from the lab. A police report has been filed with the Woodbridge, NJ police department."

"The gauges each contain: Cs-137 (10 mCi or under each) and Am/Be-241 (44 mCi or under each)."


* * * UPDATE FROM JACK TWAY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1527 EDT ON 1/3/2018 * * *

The following was excerpted from an email received from the State of New Jersey and provides specific information about the gauges that were stolen:

1. Troxler Model 3411B, s/n 16739 containing Cs-137, not to exceed 9 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. CDCW556 or IPL Model No. HEG-137, and Am-241/Be, not to exceed 44 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. AMNV.997 or IPL Model No. AM1.NO2, 3021 or 3027.

2. Troxler Model 3411B, s/n 18556 containing Cs-137, not to exceed 9 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. CDCW556 or IPL Model No. HEG-137, and Am-241/Be, not to exceed 44 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. AMNV.997 or IPL Model No. AM1.NO2, 3021 or 3027.

Notified NRC R1DO (Werkheiser), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53146
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 07-316
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/03/2018
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2018
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE DAMAGED IN TRANSIT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"This First Notice constitutes early notice of events of possible safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Department [Arizona Department of Health Services] staff at this time.

"On January 2, 2018 at approximately 1745 MST, the Department received notification from the licensee of a damaged package containing ten densometers, with each densometer having an activity of 10 milliCuries of Americium-241. The licensee performed a survey of the package and obtained a reading of 25 mrem/hr on contact at the bottom of the package. The Agency continues to investigate the event."

Arizona First Notice: 18-001

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53165
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 01/11/2018
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2018
Event Time: 10:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT MOMENTARY LOW PRESSURE

"On January 11, 2018, at 1041 EST, a planned train swap of the Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (RBHVAC) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for less than one minute. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.117 inches of vacuum water gauge.

"Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge per TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) in addition to the RBHVAC system already in operation. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 1045 EST. There were no radiological releases associated with this event.

"Declaring secondary containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, January 12, 2018
Friday, January 12, 2018