Event Notification Report for December 09, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/08/2017 - 12/09/2017
Agreement State
Event Number: 53114
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: STERIS ISOMEDIX SERVICES
Region: 1
City: SPARTANBURG State: SC
County:
License #: 267
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LELAND CAVE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: STERIS ISOMEDIX SERVICES
Region: 1
City: SPARTANBURG State: SC
County:
License #: 267
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LELAND CAVE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/11/2017
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2017
Event Time: 03:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2017
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2017
Event Time: 03:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRRADIATOR DISABLED SOURCE RACK
The following information was received from the State of South Carolina by email:
"On Monday, December 11, 2017 at [1100 CST], the Department [South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control] was notified by [the] Corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of STERIS Isomedix Services that one of the source racks had been stuck in the 'up' position. The incident happened at [0328 CST] on Saturday, December 8, 2017. The worker saw that there was an unload fault on the system indicating that the rack was stuck so he called maintenance to try to correct the problem. At [0340 CST] the Radiation Safety Officer [and then the corporate RSO were notified] about the event. [The RSO] called and left a message on an employee voicemail rather than calling the 24 hour emergency phone number.
"The workers were able to go into the penthouse to correct the problem and lower the source rack back into the pool. The workers found that a carrier had a cracked hinge. They checked all of their other carriers and replaced a total of two carrier doors. The RSO informed the CRSO [Corporate Radiation Safety Officer] that the situation was resolved at [0724 CST]. The licensee stated that a written report will be sent within 30 days of the event."
The following information was received from the State of South Carolina by email:
"On Monday, December 11, 2017 at [1100 CST], the Department [South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control] was notified by [the] Corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of STERIS Isomedix Services that one of the source racks had been stuck in the 'up' position. The incident happened at [0328 CST] on Saturday, December 8, 2017. The worker saw that there was an unload fault on the system indicating that the rack was stuck so he called maintenance to try to correct the problem. At [0340 CST] the Radiation Safety Officer [and then the corporate RSO were notified] about the event. [The RSO] called and left a message on an employee voicemail rather than calling the 24 hour emergency phone number.
"The workers were able to go into the penthouse to correct the problem and lower the source rack back into the pool. The workers found that a carrier had a cracked hinge. They checked all of their other carriers and replaced a total of two carrier doors. The RSO informed the CRSO [Corporate Radiation Safety Officer] that the situation was resolved at [0724 CST]. The licensee stated that a written report will be sent within 30 days of the event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53110
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DALE SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DALE SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/09/2017
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2017
Event Time: 13:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2017
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2017
Event Time: 13:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF DIVISION 1 AC POWER TO NUMEROUS COMPONENTS
"At approximately 1347 [CST] on 12/09/17, the Main Control Room received annunciators that indicated a trip of the 4160 V 1A1 breaker 1AP07EJ, 480V XFMR 1A and A1 breaker. Numerous Division 1 components lost power (powered from unit subs 1A and A1). The Division 1 containment Instrument Air isolation valves had failed closed by design due to the loss of power. Due to the loss of containment instrument air, several control rods began to drift into the core as expected and, by procedure, the reactor mode switch was placed in the shutdown position at 1353 [CST]. All control rods fully inserted.
"Also due to the loss of power, the Fuel Building ventilation dampers failed closed by design. With the normal ventilation system secured, secondary containment differential pressure rose to slightly greater than 0 inches water gauge which exceeded the Technical Specification requirement of greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge at 1348 [CST]. The Control Room entered EOP-8, Secondary Containment Control. Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored within Technical Specification requirements at 1351 [CST] by starting the Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment system.
"This event is being reported as a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and as a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.
"The cause is currently under investigation. The NRC Resident has been notified."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DALE SHELTON TO VINCE KLCO AT 1658 EST ON 12/10/2017 * * *
"During a review of plant logs it was identified that the primary to secondary containment differential pressure was identified to be outside of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 limits of 0 plus or minus 0.25 psid at 2009 on 12/9/17 due to the primary containment ventilation system dampers closing as a result of the loss of power. This parameter is an initial safety analysis assumption to ensure that primary containment pressures remain within the design values during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). As a result, this condition is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Stone).
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ANTONELLI TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/11/17 AT 1805 EST * * *
"During the post transient review of the trip of the 4160 V 1A1 breaker 1AP07EJ, 480V XFMR 1A and A1, it was identified that the unplanned INOPERABILITY of the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system due to the loss of power to the injection valve constitutes an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for Accident Mitigation. The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) remained available to perform the core spray function, if necessary, during a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), however HPCS and LPCS are each considered single train safety systems.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Stone).
"At approximately 1347 [CST] on 12/09/17, the Main Control Room received annunciators that indicated a trip of the 4160 V 1A1 breaker 1AP07EJ, 480V XFMR 1A and A1 breaker. Numerous Division 1 components lost power (powered from unit subs 1A and A1). The Division 1 containment Instrument Air isolation valves had failed closed by design due to the loss of power. Due to the loss of containment instrument air, several control rods began to drift into the core as expected and, by procedure, the reactor mode switch was placed in the shutdown position at 1353 [CST]. All control rods fully inserted.
"Also due to the loss of power, the Fuel Building ventilation dampers failed closed by design. With the normal ventilation system secured, secondary containment differential pressure rose to slightly greater than 0 inches water gauge which exceeded the Technical Specification requirement of greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge at 1348 [CST]. The Control Room entered EOP-8, Secondary Containment Control. Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored within Technical Specification requirements at 1351 [CST] by starting the Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment system.
"This event is being reported as a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and as a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.
"The cause is currently under investigation. The NRC Resident has been notified."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DALE SHELTON TO VINCE KLCO AT 1658 EST ON 12/10/2017 * * *
"During a review of plant logs it was identified that the primary to secondary containment differential pressure was identified to be outside of Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 limits of 0 plus or minus 0.25 psid at 2009 on 12/9/17 due to the primary containment ventilation system dampers closing as a result of the loss of power. This parameter is an initial safety analysis assumption to ensure that primary containment pressures remain within the design values during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). As a result, this condition is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Stone).
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ANTONELLI TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/11/17 AT 1805 EST * * *
"During the post transient review of the trip of the 4160 V 1A1 breaker 1AP07EJ, 480V XFMR 1A and A1, it was identified that the unplanned INOPERABILITY of the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system due to the loss of power to the injection valve constitutes an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for Accident Mitigation. The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) remained available to perform the core spray function, if necessary, during a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), however HPCS and LPCS are each considered single train safety systems.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Stone).