Event Notification Report for August 20, 2017
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/19/2017 - 08/20/2017
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52918
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK KERRONE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK KERRONE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/20/2017
Notification Time: 22:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2017
Event Time: 16:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2017
Notification Time: 22:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2017
Event Time: 16:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A RISE IN MAIN CONDENSER BACK PRESSURE
"On August 20, 2017 at 1605 PDT, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100 percent power due to a rise of Main Condenser back pressure. Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon a loss of Main Condenser back pressure. Preliminary investigations indicate that the Main Condenser air removal suction valve (AR-V-1) closed, resulting in the Condenser back pressure rising to within 1.0 inch Hg of the setpoint with reactor power greater than 25 percent. Further investigations continue. All control rods fully inserted.
"In addition to the closure of the air removal suction valve, one of two Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valves did not adequately operate to control Reactor vessel level and resulted in a high-level (Level-8) actuation tripping the Reactor Feedwater System. All other systems operated as expected. Reactor water level is currently being controlled manually with the start-up level control isolation valve. AR-V-1 has been manually opened with a jumper and temporary air supply. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser.
"This event is being reported under the following: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), which requires a four-hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee plans to issue a press release.
* * * UPDATE ON 8/24/17 AT 1937 EDT FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK * * *
"The licensee is updating the notification to include an 8 hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation due to a Level 3 isolation signal which occurred approximately 20 minutes after the scram. The licensee is currently in cold shutdown to repair the Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valve.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
"On August 20, 2017 at 1605 PDT, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100 percent power due to a rise of Main Condenser back pressure. Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon a loss of Main Condenser back pressure. Preliminary investigations indicate that the Main Condenser air removal suction valve (AR-V-1) closed, resulting in the Condenser back pressure rising to within 1.0 inch Hg of the setpoint with reactor power greater than 25 percent. Further investigations continue. All control rods fully inserted.
"In addition to the closure of the air removal suction valve, one of two Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valves did not adequately operate to control Reactor vessel level and resulted in a high-level (Level-8) actuation tripping the Reactor Feedwater System. All other systems operated as expected. Reactor water level is currently being controlled manually with the start-up level control isolation valve. AR-V-1 has been manually opened with a jumper and temporary air supply. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser.
"This event is being reported under the following: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), which requires a four-hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee plans to issue a press release.
* * * UPDATE ON 8/24/17 AT 1937 EDT FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK * * *
"The licensee is updating the notification to include an 8 hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation due to a Level 3 isolation signal which occurred approximately 20 minutes after the scram. The licensee is currently in cold shutdown to repair the Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valve.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52919
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 08/21/2017
Notification Time: 05:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2017
Event Time: 21:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2017
Notification Time: 05:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2017
Event Time: 21:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO NON-FUNCTIONAL TSC VENTILATION
"On August 20, 2017 at 2108 hours CDT, Byron Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system supply fan (0VV23C) was identified as non-functional. This failure affects the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. Currently troubleshooting/investigation is being performed. This condition is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC becomes uninhabitable, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility because of the unavailability of the ventilation system. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CONROY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1504 EDT ON 8/23/17 * * *
TSC ventilation was returned to service at 1150 CDT on 8/23/17.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Dickson).
"On August 20, 2017 at 2108 hours CDT, Byron Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system supply fan (0VV23C) was identified as non-functional. This failure affects the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. Currently troubleshooting/investigation is being performed. This condition is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC becomes uninhabitable, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility because of the unavailability of the ventilation system. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CONROY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1504 EDT ON 8/23/17 * * *
TSC ventilation was returned to service at 1150 CDT on 8/23/17.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Dickson).