Event Notification Report for May 02, 2017

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEVEL DENSITY GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN

The following information was obtained from the state of Louisiana via email:

"On 05/03/2017, the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for ExxonMobil Chemical received notice that a level density gauge was having difficulty with the operation of the shutters on a gauge installed on a process. During follow-up checks, the one level gauge was found with shutters that were stuck in the open position and the manual operation handle had broken. The report was received by the RSO at approximately 1400 [CDT] on May 02, 2017.

"The gauge was an Ohmart Corporation Gauge, devices involved, Model Number SHF-2-45. The gauge/device S/N unknown is loaded with approximately 200 mCi of Cs-137 and the S/N 5828GK. The source and source holder usually have one S/N for the whole device. BBP Sales/Service Company was contacted to fix the problem by repairing the gauge or replacing the device. The gauge is installed on processes and does not pose a health and safety threat to the general public or the employees. The source survey revealed the readings were less than 2 mR/hr and proper safety precautions will be taken when personnel enters the area. This is considered an equipment failure with the manual shutter handle device breakage."

LA Event Report ID No.: LA-170007

PART 21 - C8, M8 AND H8 SWITCHES EXHIBITED CONTINUITY FROM INTERNAL CIRCUITRY TO CASE GROUND DURING INSPECTION AND TEST

The following report was received via email:

"TopWorx Information Notice: TIN 2017-01

"04 May 2017

"Subject: C8, M8 and H8 Switches

"From:

James McDill
Director of Operations
TopWorx
3300 Fern Valley Road
Louisville, KY 40213
Fax: (502) 969-7315

"Equipment Affected by this Information Notice: C8, M8 & H8 Series Products released prior to April 01, 2017.

"Purpose: The purpose on this TopWorx Information Notice (TIN) is to alert that as of 02 May 2017 TopWorx was made aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the equipment listed above. TopWorx is informing its customers of this circumstance in accordance with Section
21.21 (b) and 50.55 (e) of 10CFR21.

"Applicability: This notice applies only to the C8, M8, and H8 series of switches.

"Discussion: A potential nonconformance was discovered during product review when X-Ray analysis revealed a small piece of loose solder inside a completed C8 switch. Investigations revealed that the cause of this defect was the amount of solder used to hermetically seal the switch and enclosure together. Under the right conditions and circumstances, excessive solder on this specific switch model could potentially bridge between a circuit connection and the internal surface of the switch enclosure causing a high potential (Hipot) failure.

"Extent of Condition: No other series of switches are affected by this information notice.

"Actions Required: The recommended corrective action for installed switches is to continue monitoring for ground fault indications. If you do not currently monitor for ground fault indications, then a resistance check using an ohmmeter from each contact to the case to ensure no continuity to ground exists. Any switches exhibiting continuity to ground should be returned to TopWorx for replacement.

"10CFR21 Implications: TopWorx requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21.

Customer notifications [Quantity purchased and Customer Purchase Order numbers]:

Nuclear Logistics Inc.
[Qty 2 - PO #NLI57759, Qty 1 - PO #NLI-50192 REPL]

Control Southern Inc.
[Qty 10 - PO #X230280199, Qty 24 - PO #X230303436, Qty 1 - PO #X230315950, Qty 14 - PO #X230336922]

Ralph A. Hiller Co.
[Qty 10 - PO #NUC9868]

Weir Valves & Controls USA Inc.
[Qty 1 - PO #2022132/0, Qty 1 - PO #202321/0]

Emerson Process Mgmt (Bettis)
[Qty 4 - PO #4125106730, Qty 8 - PO #4125084349]

Fisher Controls
[Qty 4 - PO #G133492, Qty 4 - PO #4123340399, Qty 0 - PO #G132951 (ordered but not shipped), Qty 18 - PO #G132951, Qty 1 - PO #G133421]

"If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:

Mark Brozak
Manger, Quality
TopWorx
3300 Fern Valley Road
Louisville, KY 40213
Fax: (502) 969-8000
Phone: (502) 873-4689
Mark.Brozak@emerson.com"

FAILED ULTRASONIC TESTING OF WELD

"On May 2, 2017, during planned inspections, an ultrasonic examination performed on weld PCS-4-PRS-1P1-1, revealed an axial indication in the pressurizer nozzle to safe end area of the weld. This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI.

"The plant was in cold shutdown at 0% power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup.

"This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public.

"The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), since an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code, Section XI.

* * * RETRACTION ON 5/9/17 AT 1303 EDT FROM BARBARA DOTSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"Additional evaluations of the recorded indication concluded that the indication was attributed to an erroneous ultrasonic response. This was the result of a combined effect of compromised surface contact at the area of the recorded indication and associated examination scan speed. The contact issue is attributed to the specific tooling configuration required for this exam. The combination of these factors resulted in the introduction of an erroneous reflector in the area of interest that had characteristics of a relevant indication.

"The vendor repeated the entire examination for axial flaws and there were no service induced indications recorded. A review of the newly acquired data by site, vendor and EPRI personnel confirmed that no service induced flaws are present."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Hills).

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR COMBUSTION TURBINE GENERATOR CONFIGURATION

"On May 2, 2017, while performing a past operability review associated with Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1, it was determined that a past configuration of CTG 11-1 could not have assured all of the applicable Appendix R success criteria under all of the postulated scenarios described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report [UFSAR]. From November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 when Mode 4 was entered, CTG 11-1 was in a configuration where it could not be started from the dedicated shutdown panel, although it could be started locally. One of the specific scenarios for Appendix R in the UFSAR credits CTG 11-1 to support a safe shutdown based on an assumed time required to start CTG 11-1 and then provide flow to the reactor pressure vessel using the Standby Feedwater System. During the time period where CTG 11-1 could only be started locally, this assumed time would have been exceeded. Therefore, this event is being reported as an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, CTG 11-1 was fully operable and the described condition had already been corrected.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY GREG MILLER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1532 EDT ON 05/19/2017 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on May 2, 2017 (EN 52724) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The notification to the NRC involved an event where Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1 could only be started locally such that required operator actions during an Appendix R safe shutdown scenario could be delayed. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event, additional site documentation, and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) were reviewed further. lt was verified that Fermi 2 procedures contained actions to ensure Appendix R safe shutdown capability under the plant conditions during the relevant time period. A time validation study was performed [May 9, 2017] which verified that the operator actions could have been completed within the time described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for initiating Standby Feedwater flow to the reactor pressure vessel. In addition, a review of the supporting design calculation identified margin in the required time described in the UFSAR. Based on this information, the condition of CTG 11-1 during the time period from November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 would not have prevented compliance with the Appendix R safe shutdown requirements. Under these circumstances, the event does not represent an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52724 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) is required to be submitted."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Cameron).

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP POWER TRANSFER

"On May 2nd, 2017, at 1945 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear [WBN] Plant Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to a failure of the #3 Reactor Coolant Pump normal feeder breaker to close during the planned power transfer to unit power following startup. Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

"All control and shutdown rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as designed. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, with decay heat removal via auxiliary feedwater and main steam dump systems. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment.

"This reactor trip and system actuation is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no effect on WBN Unit 2.

"The NRC Senior Resident [Inspector] has been notified."