| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/03/2017 - 02/06/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 50900 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: EAST FARMINGDALE State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeBONIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/17/2015
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL TEST INDUCED DEFECT IN A 0867F MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVES
The following report was received from Curtiss - Wright via email:
"This letter provides interim notification of a potential test induced defect in a 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) manufactured and supplied by Target Rock (TR). The information required for this notification is provided below:
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
William Brunet
Director of Quality Assurance
James White
General Manager
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.
Target Rock 0867F Series of Main Steam-Safety Relief Valves Manufactured by Target Rock. This is a 3-stage piloted valve consisting of a main valve (the 'Main') with an actuator mounted to it (the 'Topworks'). The 0867F is the latest generation of the 67F line of MS-SRVs, including the original 3-Stage and 2-Stage designs, and this product line has over 40 years of plant operational experience. Only the 0867F is under investigation. This is due to the differences between the 0867F design and the other designs.
"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation
1966E Broadhollow Road
East Farmingdale, NY 11735
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
As we understand it, the Pilgrim Station recently manually opened the Target Rock Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) as part of cooling down the reactor following a loss of offsite power. One of the four installed MS-SRVs may not have fully opened. As-found steam testing of the affected MS-SRV did not duplicate this failure; the valve opened on demand. However, the valve did not re-close as expected. Internal inspections found damaged parts in the main stage subassembly that could potentially affect the ability of the MS-SRV to operate as designed.
We are investigating potential root causes for this damage. However, we are still unable to determine if a specific defect exists. GE SIL-196, Supplement 17 determined Main Spring relaxation was caused by 'extreme dynamics encountered during limited flow testing . Valve dynamics under full flow conditions (i.e. discharge not gagged) are much less severe than those under limited flow conditions.' These extreme dynamics, under limited flow test conditions, are the focus of our investigation. Specific areas of investigation include;
a) Testing of materials to verify they are consistent with our material specifications,
b) evaluation of differences between the 0867F and earlier designs, and
c) evaluation of the differences between different limited flow test loop configurations and test procedures
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
The Pilgrim event occurred on January 27, 2015. As-found testing occurred on February 2, 2015.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
- Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
- Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12
The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
- Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The root cause of the potential test induced defect has not yet been confirmed as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Problem Report 080 will document the corrective actions when they are determined and complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation of the potential test induced defect. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
We are working with all three (4) sites to identify appropriate precautions.
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
Not applicable.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1355 EDT ON 5/1/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state that their root cause analysis is still in progress and they anticipate completion within 60 days.
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Gray), and R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN DeBONIS (VIA EMAIL) TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1256 EDT ON 6/30/15 * * *
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state their root cause analysis findings and corrective actions. Corrective actions are estimated to be completed within 12 months.
"The following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8
FitzPatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8
Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped = 24, Quantity on order= 12
"The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs:
Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7
"Valves Currently Installed
"Target Rock recommends valves currently installed be inspected to ensure the main piston shoulder has contact with the main disc stem shoulder. These inspections should be scheduled based on plant-specific indications of the potential for fretting. These inspections can be performed by removing the base assembly from the main body and physically measuring for shoulder-to-shoulder contact.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800."
Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Dimitriadis), and R2DO (Suggs).
* * * UPDATE AT 0803 EST ON 02/03/17 FROM JOHN DEBONIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"Target Rock, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation (TR), previously submitted NID# 15428 (Ref. 1) regarding 0867F Series of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSSRV). The purpose of this letter is to provide a final update on the status of the actions identified in NID# 15428 (Ref. 1 ).
"TR has developed a design change that we have verified, though analysis and qualification testing, ensures testing on the available limited flow test facilities will not impart damage to our product. Qualification included both limited and full flow testing. Target Rock confirms this design change has no effect on either National Board certification or the performance required by the applicable Specification to support the plant safety analysis.TR will offer this design change as our recommended long term solution to all utilities who currently have installed or plan to install the 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valve model in their respective plants. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me [Alex DiMeo] at (631) 293-3800."
Notified R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Walker) and Part 21 Group. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 52499 | Rep Org: GEO ENGINEERING & TESTING INC
Licensee: GEO ENGINEERING & TESTING INC
Region: 4
City: TAMUNING State: GU
County:
License #: 56-18173-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: UKRIT SIRIPRUSANAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/20/2017
Notification Time: 03:52 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/1988
Event Time: [GST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST/MISPLACED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
A Troxler moisture density gauge was last leak checked in 1988. The gauge handle was damaged by construction equipment and put aside sometime between 1988 and 1990. The current location of the gauge is unknown.
Troxler Model 3411B
Serial Number 8117
Sources: Cs-137 10 mCi and Am-241 60 mCi
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52510 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFFERY KUETHER-ULBERG
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 01/26/2017
Notification Time: 03:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2017
Event Time: 18:36 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JESSE ROLLINS (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM DIESEL ROOM FAN MOTOR FAILURE
"On January 25, 2017, at 1836 PST, smoke was detected in the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) diesel room with no indication of a fire. Investigation found the motor starter coil for DMA-FN-32 (Diesel Mixed Air Fan 32), HPCS diesel generator room normal cooling fan, failed. This fan is required for operability of the switchgear that powers the HPCS pump. The HPCS pump is currently inoperable due to maintenance being performed on other support systems.
"This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTED ON 0036 EST ON 2/3/17 FROM QUOC VO TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"At the time of discovery HPCS was out of service in accordance with plant technical specifications, therefore the failure of the supporting equipment, DMA-FN-32, is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Miller). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 52512 | Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GREER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 01/26/2017
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2017
Event Time: 17:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
BRANNEN ADKINS (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY VIOLATION
A contract employee had a prohibited item in the Protected Area. The employee's access to the site has been restricted.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52514 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF CHICAGO - MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01165-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 01/27/2017
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2017
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/27/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION AT HOSPITAL
The following was received from the State of Illinois via email:
"On January 25, the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) contacted the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report an issue with an administration of a capsule containing I-131 which had occurred the previous afternoon. A nominal dose of 30 milliCi in capsule form was given to a child within the nuclear medicine department of the licensee's facility. Although the patient was being treated on an outpatient basis, the licensee was keeping the patient for a short time to ensure there would be no complications before being sent home. During this period, staff checked in on the patient several times and during one of the visits, discovered that rather than swallowing the capsule as instructed, the patient had spit the capsule out into their hand and was hiding the capsule. This resulted in extensive contamination of the patient's hand, clothing and the chair they were sitting in as well as the immediate surrounding area. During the process to evaluate and decontaminate the patient, additional contamination was discovered in adjacent camera rooms and corridors where the staff had traversed. Staff moved to close the department and restrict passage into/out of the nearby areas to prevent additional spread of contamination. Initial estimates suggest that the patient ingested little if any of the activity and that excessive levels were throughout the area of the nuclear medicine department. Based on this finding, barriers were erected and the department was closed for over 48 hours while assessment and decontamination efforts were ongoing.
"Agency inspectors were at the site on January 26 to perform assessments of exposure, contamination levels, potential uptake by staff and corrective action being taken by the licensee. This matter will remain open while those assessments are on going. Initial bioassay results suggest only negligible uptakes have occurred with staff. Potential exposures/uptakes continue to be evaluated by the licensee throughout the decontamination process. The licensee is exploring the potential for having additional outside resources complete the necessary decontamination and remediation steps so that the department can reopen and provide at least limited services."
Illinois Item Number: IL17002 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52515 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY
Region: 1
City: ROCHESTER State: NY
County:
License #: C1347
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DANIEL J. SAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 01/27/2017
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2016
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/27/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED SEALED SOURCE LEAK TEST
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On November 1, 2016, Eastman Kodak Company informed the Department [New York State Department of Health] that an NRD Model A-2003 static eliminator sealed source leak test result indicated a measurable contamination of 0.00661 microCuries. The device was taken out of service and another leak test was performed on the unit. The second leak test results showed only 0.0003 microCuries."
New York Event Report ID No: NYDOH - NY-16-09 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52531 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JASON WIGGINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 02/03/2017
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2017
Event Time: 14:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 88 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION - APPENDIX R FIRE ANALYSIS
"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10CFR50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), a weak-link and operator manual action (OMA) analysis for Information Notice (IN) 92-18 type hot shorts on motor-operated valves (MOVs) was performed to support the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. As a result of the analysis, it was identified that cable impacts can bypass valve limit and torque switches, resulting in physical damage to valves required for Safe Shutdown. This would prevent the valves from being operated locally or being operated from the remote shutdown panel. These cable failures could also cause the valve motors to fail. This updated analysis has identified circuit configuration deficiencies in Fire Areas 0024 A & C (Main Control Room & Cable Spread Room), 1203F (U1 Reactor Building SE), 1205F (U1 Reactor Building NE), and 2203F (U2 Reactor Building NE). Therefore, due to the identified deficient conditions, it was determined that in the event of a postulated fire in the affected fire areas, the paths of safe shutdown on the affected unit(s) could be compromised and impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions.
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be repaired.
"CRs 10326399, 10326401, 10326402, 10326404 and 10326405"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The unanalyzed condition is applicable to 10CFR50.48(b) Appendix R and not to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52534 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/03/2017
Notification Time: 18:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2017
Event Time: 15:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNIT 1 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOOP 1 MSIV STARTING TO FAIL CLOSED
"At 1545 EST on 2/3/17, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power when loop 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) started to fail closed. Non-Safety Related 4160V bus 1NA01 failed to transfer to alternate incoming power supply automatically and was successfully manually energized.
"All control rods fully inserted and AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater] and FWI [Feedwater Isolation] actuated as expected.
"Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by AFW."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |