Event Notification Report for December 18, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/17/2016 - 12/18/2016
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52443
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVID PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVID PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 12/19/2016
Notification Time: 07:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2016
Event Time: 23:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2017
Notification Time: 07:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2016
Event Time: 23:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNISOLABLE LEAK ON HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY
"On December 18, 2016 at 2320 [PST], a leak was discovered on the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system minimum flow line. The leak is located at a bolted flange downstream of the manual isolation valve HPCS-V-53. The location of the leak is not isolable from the suppression pool. This provides a direct path from inside the Primary Containment to the Reactor Building.
"High Pressure Core Spray system is a single train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) system, therefore inoperability is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Based on the location of the leak, Primary Containment integrity is compromised. Primary Containment was declared inoperable and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The cause of the leak is under investigation. Actions are underway to cool down and enter MODE 4."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MATT HUMMER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2245 EDT ON 5/24/17 * * *
"Engineering evaluations indicate that there was neither a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperability nor a condition that resulted in a significantly degraded principal safety barrier (Primary Containment). Therefore, this event does not meet the reporting criteria in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), and Event Notification# 52443 is being retracted.
"Bases for the retraction are: (1) Extent or accumulation of water flooding the HPCS room would not have prevented the system from fulfilling any of its designated safety functions, if the system had received a starting signal due to an emergency; and (2) the consequences of the HPCS Minimum Flow Line leak into the Reactor Building were within the dose limits and did not have a significant effect on Primary Containment integrity; therefore, the Primary Containment was degraded but operable.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Groom).
"On December 18, 2016 at 2320 [PST], a leak was discovered on the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system minimum flow line. The leak is located at a bolted flange downstream of the manual isolation valve HPCS-V-53. The location of the leak is not isolable from the suppression pool. This provides a direct path from inside the Primary Containment to the Reactor Building.
"High Pressure Core Spray system is a single train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) system, therefore inoperability is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Based on the location of the leak, Primary Containment integrity is compromised. Primary Containment was declared inoperable and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The cause of the leak is under investigation. Actions are underway to cool down and enter MODE 4."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MATT HUMMER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2245 EDT ON 5/24/17 * * *
"Engineering evaluations indicate that there was neither a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperability nor a condition that resulted in a significantly degraded principal safety barrier (Primary Containment). Therefore, this event does not meet the reporting criteria in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), and Event Notification# 52443 is being retracted.
"Bases for the retraction are: (1) Extent or accumulation of water flooding the HPCS room would not have prevented the system from fulfilling any of its designated safety functions, if the system had received a starting signal due to an emergency; and (2) the consequences of the HPCS Minimum Flow Line leak into the Reactor Building were within the dose limits and did not have a significant effect on Primary Containment integrity; therefore, the Primary Containment was degraded but operable.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Groom).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52442
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFFERY KUETHER-ULBERG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFFERY KUETHER-ULBERG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 12/18/2016
Notification Time: 18:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2016
Event Time: 11:24 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2016
Notification Time: 18:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2016
Event Time: 11:24 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
MIKE KING (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
MIKE KING (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO LOAD REJECT FROM SUBSTATION
"On December 18, 2016 at time 1124 PST the plant experienced a full reactor scram. Preliminary investigations indicate that the scram was caused by a load reject from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Ashe substation. Further investigations continue. The following conditions have occurred:
"Turbine Governor valve closure
Reactor high pressure trip
+13 inches reactor water level activations
E-TR-B (backup transformer) supplying E-SM-7/SM-8 (vital power electrical busses)
Complete loss of Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC)
E-TR-S (Startup transformer) supplying SM-1/2/3 (non-vital power electrical busses)
E-DG-1/2/3 (emergency diesel generators) auto start
Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A/B/C initiation signals
Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) are closed
"Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) RCIC and High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) were manually activated and utilized to inject and maintain reactor water level. Pressure control is with Safety Relief Valves (SRV) in, manual. Level control is with RCIC and Control Rod Drive (CRD). RCIC has experienced an over speed trip that was reset so that level control could be maintained by RCIC.
"This event is being reported under the following:
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) which requires a 4 hour notification for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system.
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) which requires a 4 hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) which requires an 8 hours notification for actuation of ECCS systems.
"All control rods fully inserted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
The licensee indicated that no increase in radiation levels were detected.
"On December 18, 2016 at time 1124 PST the plant experienced a full reactor scram. Preliminary investigations indicate that the scram was caused by a load reject from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Ashe substation. Further investigations continue. The following conditions have occurred:
"Turbine Governor valve closure
Reactor high pressure trip
+13 inches reactor water level activations
E-TR-B (backup transformer) supplying E-SM-7/SM-8 (vital power electrical busses)
Complete loss of Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC)
E-TR-S (Startup transformer) supplying SM-1/2/3 (non-vital power electrical busses)
E-DG-1/2/3 (emergency diesel generators) auto start
Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A/B/C initiation signals
Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) are closed
"Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) RCIC and High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) were manually activated and utilized to inject and maintain reactor water level. Pressure control is with Safety Relief Valves (SRV) in, manual. Level control is with RCIC and Control Rod Drive (CRD). RCIC has experienced an over speed trip that was reset so that level control could be maintained by RCIC.
"This event is being reported under the following:
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) which requires a 4 hour notification for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system.
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) which requires a 4 hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) which requires an 8 hours notification for actuation of ECCS systems.
"All control rods fully inserted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
The licensee indicated that no increase in radiation levels were detected.