| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/05/2016 - 12/06/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52239 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/13/2016
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2016
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING STATION SERVICE WATER TRAINS
"Based on a walk down in the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) with the NRC Resident [Inspector], it was observed that a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe that provides a normally pressurized source of fire water supply to the overhead sprinkler system in the SWIS is not Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielded similar to the horizontal segment of the same line near the ceiling. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB has a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. Only one train at a time would be affected during the event. This is due to the physical characteristics of the postulated MELB and the configuration/separation relative to the source line and target pumps and/or associated Motor Control Centers (MCCs) that support pump operation.
"Since the Service Water trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then two Service Water trains could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, all four Service Water trains were operable, therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"Currently, Service Water Train B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8.
"Currently, Emergency Diesel Generator B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/6/2016 AT 2009 EDT FROM DAMON SCHROEDER TO DONG PARK * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT, Comanche Peak reported an unanalyzed condition involving station service water trains per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the reported condition involved a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe in the SWIS that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps.
"On October 6, 2016 at 1410 hours CDT, a section of eyewash station pipe in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building was identified as a result of extent of condition walkdowns that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB2-1. This MCC provides power to Unit 2 Train B Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment. The affected eyewash station pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since 480V MCC 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then 2EB1-1, 2EB2-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment was operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT DANIELS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2233 EDT ON 10/10/2016 * * *
"This is an additional update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT and again on October 6, 2016 at 2009 EDT, Comanche Peak reported unanalyzed conditions involving Station Service Water System trains and a 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The reported conditions involved sections of piping that were not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded piping, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of safety-related equipment in the Service Water Intake Structure and the Unit 2 Safeguards Building.
"On October 10, 2016 at 1708 CDT, as a result of ongoing extent of condition walkdowns, a section of fire protection pipe in the Unit 1 Safeguards Building was identified that was not adequately shielded for a MELB. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B Switchgear 1EA2, Unit 1 Train B 480V MCC 1EB4-2, and Unit 1 Train B Distribution Panel 1ED2-2. Only one of these power supplies at a time would be affected. 1EA2 provides 6.9KV electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, panels, sequencer, and transformers. 1EB4-2 provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, panels, and transformers. 1ED2-2 provides 125VDC electrical power to EDG 1-02 channel 1 starting circuit. The affected fire protection pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since Unit 1 Train A Switchgear 1EA1, Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-2, and Unit 1 Train A Distribution Panel 1ED1-2 have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then both trains of Unit 1 6.9KV power (1EA2 and 1EA1), both trains of Unit 1 480V power (1EB4-2 and 1EB3-2), and both trains of Unit 1 125VDC power (1ED2-2 and 1ED1-2) along with the safety-related equipment they supply could potentially have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, none of the affected Train A equipment was inoperable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM HUNTER SCHILL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1457 EST ON 11/7/2016 * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On November 17, 2016 at 0730 CST, during ongoing extent of condition walkdowns in the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Area of the Auxiliary Building, two pressurized fire protection pipe segments were identified that did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the unshielded portion of these pipes, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 1 EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers.
"At 0743 CST, Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1021 CST, MCC 1 EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection lines.
"Since Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 1 EB4-1, 1 EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 1 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Azua).
* * * UPDATE ON 12/05/2016 AT 1730 EST FROM HUNTER SCHILL TO STEVEN VITTO * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On December 5, 2016 during ongoing extent of condition walk downs in the Auxiliary Building, pressurized fire protection pipe segments (a flange and a pipe elbow) were identified which did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the un-shielded portion of the pipes, a MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 2 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers.
"At approximately 1355 CST Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1459 CST, MCC 2EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection line locations.
"Since Unit 2 Train A 480V MCC 2EB3-1 and the associated Unit 2 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 2EB4-1 , 2EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an un-analyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB3-1 and the associated Unit 2 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Gaddy). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52334 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE BOWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/31/2016
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2016
Event Time: 02:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE
"On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours [CDT], a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available [but not operable]. The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping.
"HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/05/2016 AT 1505 EST FROM MARK BRIDGES TO STEVEN VITTO * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours CDT (ENS Report #52334).
"Upon further investigation, a pinhole through-wall leak was discovered in the body of the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve). The defect was characterized as a 1/32-inch rounded hole due to a manufacturing defect in the casting located on the downstream side of the valve near the piping connection.
"A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization, confirmed the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report 52334 is being retracted.
"Note: On November 1, 2016, at 1624 hours CDT, the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Stone). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 52407 | Rep Org: VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Licensee: VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRAN LUCANO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 12/05/2016
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - NON-CONFORMING COVER MACHINING ON SOLENOID VALVE
The following is a synopsis of the Part 21 report that was received via fax:
"Cover Machining is installed on upper section of Solenoid Valve and it allows for the electrical connection to the valve solenoid and protects inside wiring of the solenoid from environmental condition. Cover machining part number V52636-567 has 0.190 radius (Drawing V52620-50 Zone D3) which was machined too deep removing material from surface needed for proper O-ring seal. The lack of material exposes part of the sealing O-ring which could diminish the O-ring sealing capability. With O-ring sealing capability diminished, Valcor cannot ensure that valves with Cover Machining Installed on Solenoid Assembly will perform its safety function during all postulated events.
"This item has historically been manufactured by machining a casting. For the lot involved, castings were not available. Authorization was given to manufacture the Cover directly from suitable bar stock. To accomplish this, Valcor's vendor used the casting drawing and casting machining drawing to manufacture the finished machined part. The combination of these two drawings had insufficient control on the corner radius, resulting in this nonconformance.
"All defective covers in stock have been quarantined and a nonconformance report has been generated. Lack of location controlling dimension on the Cover Machining drawing for 0.190 radius was discovered to be the root cause of the defect. Valcor has created and released a new engineering drawing that properly controls the location of 0.190 radius. This action has been completed as of 11/22/2016. Engineering Manager-Nuclear was responsible to this action.
"Valcor is in a process of notifying all affected customers.
"Customers:
Ameren, Valve Part Number V526-6000-16 (Stock# 7731643), S/N 9, QTY 1, Location Ameren Missouri - Callaway
Bruce Power (BPC), Valve Part Number V526-6000-20 (Cat ID 142129), S/N 28-36, QTY 9, Bruce NGS
"Note: All 9 valves supplied to BPC have been returned to Valcor for nameplate correction and are accounted for.
"If you have any questions or addition information is needed regarding this matter, please contact Fran Lucano at 973-467-8400." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52409 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JESSE MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/05/2016
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2016
Event Time: 06:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 23 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY
"A non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for a prohibited substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been denied.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |