U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/30/2016 - 10/03/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | Part 21 | Event Number: 52204 | Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC. Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC. Region: 3 City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: BURT ANDERSON HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 08/26/2016 Notification Time: 18:00 [ET] Event Date: 08/03/2016 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/30/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE | Person (Organization): ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO) ERIC MICHEL (R2DO) JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO) RAY KELLAR (R4DO) PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI) | Event Text PART 21 - SAFETY RELATED COMPONENT WELDING BY AN UNQUALIFIED WELDER The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.: "Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) with F-5 filler metal was welded on safety related components by an unqualified welder. "Crane Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, 12th Edition Rev. 2, dated 8/8/16 requires that welder performance qualification shall conform to the requirements of ASME Section IX for processing ASME B&PV Section Ill and safety related valve and valve part orders. During processing of a safety related order, it was identified that one welder was missing the required qualification documentation to perform weld repairs with F-5 filler metals (as defined in ASME Section IX) using the shielded metal arc welding process (SMAW). The safety hazard which could be created by such a defect could be a potential weld failure. "Crane Nuclear has completed a review of all applicable welding records based on the welder hire date of September, 2011. We identified a total of 10 orders that were supplied with welding performed by an unqualified welder. Notification has been made to the purchasers of the affected safety related orders on the same date as this notification. "Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Jason Klein, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953." The following facilities received these safety related orders: Duke-McGuire, Exelon-Byron, Duke-Brunswick, Entergy-ANO, Exelon-TMI, Exelon-Quad Cities, Exelon-Dresden. * * * UPDATE AT 2004 EDT ON 9/30/2016 FROM ROSALIE NAVA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * * The following information was received via fax: "This letter is intended to inform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of actions taken to complete the Part 21 evaluation on the above referenced item. All of the following actions have been completed: 1) The welder has been qualified on the SMAW process utilizing F-5 filler metal and documented in accordance with ASME Section IX requirements. 2) The affected purchasers were provided with an initial 10CFR21 notification on August 26, 2016. 3) The affected purchasers were provided with the documentation detailing the scope of the welding performed on the affected components. 4) The affected purchasers were provided an investigation summary closure letter. 5) Crane Nuclear, Inc. Corrective Action Report 16-35 generated to determine root cause and implement appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence was completed and closed on September 30, 2016. "Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact, Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940, or Burt Anderson, Site Leader. at (630) 226-4990." Notified R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Groom), and the Part 21 Group (via e-mail). | Agreement State | Event Number: 52256 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: CIVIL & ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS INC. Region: 1 City: PITTSBURGH State: PA County: License #: PA-1147 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JOE MELNIC HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 09/22/2016 Notification Time: 11:21 [ET] Event Date: 09/21/2016 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/22/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): PAUL KROHN (R1DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax: "A Troxler nuclear gauge was hit by an asphalt road compactor while on a temporary job site. Impact rendered the gauge unusable. The area was secured and the licensee Radiation Safety Officer determined that the gauge was not leaking. The gauge was then secured for shipment back to Troxler for possible repair or replacement. There was no exposure to workers or the public. "The gauge has been secured for transport to Troxler. The Department [PA Department Bureau of Radiation Protection] was also onsite to verify radiation measurements and perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided when available. "Radionuclides: Cs-137 / Am-241:Be Manufacturer: Troxler Model: 3430 Serial Number: 21864 Activity: 9 mCi (Cs-137) / 44 mCi (Am-241) "Event Report ID No: PA 160026" | Agreement State | Event Number: 52257 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: CHEMOURS Region: 1 City: FAYETTEVILLE State: NC County: License #: 026-0109-7 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: TRAVIS CARTOSKI HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 09/22/2016 Notification Time: 17:56 [ET] Event Date: 04/20/2016 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/22/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): PAUL KROHN (R1DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER The following report was received from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email: "The Agency [North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services] was notified of service contract reciprocity 0003-R Ronan to arrive at NC [North Carolina] Licensee Chemours in Fayetteville on 9/21/16. Ronan to work on a Ronan SA-1, Gauge SN:M1713, Cs-137, 20 mCi (decayed to approx 10 mCi) with a stuck shutter. "[The North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch Health Physicist] went to Chemours 0109-7 to conduct a reciprocity inspection, and conducted an investigation regarding [Chemours] failing to notify the Agency [North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services] of a stuck shutter on a radioactive gauge. The stuck shutter was identified during scheduled leak test and shutter testing by Chemours workers in June, 2016. This was confirmed with the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer]. "Shutter was in the open position. No members of the public or workers were at risk of exposure (due to facility design). "Source: Cs-137 Activity: 0.020 Ci Manufacturer: Ronan Engineering Model Number: sa-1 Serial Number: m1713 "NC Item Number: NC160030" | Agreement State | Event Number: 52258 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICALS, LP Region: 3 City: MORRIS State: IL County: License #: IL-01737-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/23/2016 Notification Time: 12:29 [ET] Event Date: 09/21/2016 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): MARK JEFFERS (R3DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER The following was received by the State of Illinois via email: "The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Equistar Chemical notified the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] via email that while performing routine shutter tests of fixed gauges at their Morris, IL location, it became known that for one of the gauges, a shutter was stuck in the 'open' position. The affected Ohmart Vega model SH-F2 gauge contains 300 milliCi of Cs-137 and is mounted on a reactor vessel within a secure area at the plant. The associated process line for the vessel does not have any maintenance scheduled to occur until next year, therefore, no entry into the vessel should be necessary and the gauge is expected to remain in the 'on' position due to operational need. The gauge manufacturer has been contacted and advised of the situation. Equistar and Vega Americans are currently attempting to schedule a field service engineer to come on site to investigate the matter and make necessary repairs/replacement. The licensee has previous experience with events of this type due to the large number of devices in use and the stressful environment that exists at this site. The licensee is prepared to respond to any further deterioration that, although not likely, may occur. Plant personnel have been advised of the matter and the process line supervisors have been instructed to contact the RSO should any abnormal events associated with the reactor processes becomes known. No on-site investigation is planned by the Agency at this time." Illinois Item Number: IL16008 | Agreement State | Event Number: 52259 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM Licensee: REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES Region: 4 City: LOS ANGELES State: CA County: License #: 1335-19 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ANDREW TAYLOR HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 09/23/2016 Notification Time: 17:57 [ET] Event Date: 09/22/2016 Event Time: [PDT] Last Update Date: 09/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): RICK DEESE (R4DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT UNDERDOSAGE OF YTTRIUM-90 The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health via email: "On September 23, 2016, the Radiation Safety Officer of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), contacted the Brea office of the Radiologic Health Branch to report a medical event. "A patient was treated with Nordion TheraSpheres containing yttrium-90 (Y-90) on September 22, 2016. The prescribed dose was 100 gray (Gy) to the left lobe of the liver. Upon completing the dose assessment after the treatment, it was discovered that only approximately 50 percent of the intended dosage of Y-90 was delivered to the patient (left lobe of the liver). The remainder of the Y-90 dosage appears to have remained in the delivery system, primarily in the system waste container. The licensee performed surveys to confirm that the areas surrounding the delivery system and patient were not contaminated. "The patient has been notified, and the licensee is investigating to determine the cause of the event." CA 5010 Number: 092316 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52270 | Facility: LIMERICK Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: BRIAN DEVINE HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/30/2016 Notification Time: 02:11 [ET] Event Date: 09/29/2016 Event Time: 17:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 09/30/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE | Person (Organization): WILLIAM COOK (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TSC VENTILATION INDICATION ISSUE IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE TESTING "On 9/29/2016 at 1700 [EDT] the MCR [Main Control Room] was notified of a potential Technical Support Center [TSC] emergency ventilation indication issue following surveillance testing. At 2350 troubleshooting revealed a blown control power fuse which affected functionality of TSC HVAC emergency mode. The system was restored to operable as of 0043 on 9/30/16. "If an emergency had been declared and TSC activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. The Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with station procedures. If TSC relocation becomes necessary, then personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC emergency ventilation system was returned to service." The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52271 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR Region: 4 State: AR Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE NRC Notified By: MARK GOHMAN HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/30/2016 Notification Time: 04:01 [ET] Event Date: 09/29/2016 Event Time: 21:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 09/30/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP | Person (Organization): WILLIAM COOK (R1DO) CHRIS MILLER (NRR) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text UNISOLABLE LEAK ON DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PIPING DUE TO WELD FAILURE ON A 1" COMMON PIPE "At 2100 CDT on 09/29/16, while in Mode 6, both trains of Decay Heat (Residual Heat Removal) were declared inoperable due to a cracked weld on a 1" common pipe. The leak developed in a USAS B31.7, Class1 pipe at a weld upstream of pressure indication isolation valve DH-1037. The leak is not isolable from the common 8-inch Decay Heat piping and encompasses approximately 1/3 [one third] of the pipe circumference. "At the time of discovery, the unit was in Lowered Inventory with both Loops of Decay Heat in service. Subsequently, one train of Decay Heat has been secured to reduce the likelihood of crack propagation. One Train of Decay Heat remains in service providing the function of removing Decay Heat and the other train is readily available. The leakage impacts redundant equipment required to fulfill a safety function. In the current condition, both trains are required to be operable to meet Technical Specification LCO 3.9.5, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low water Level. "This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for any event or condition that results in a loss of Safety Function associated with the Decay Heat System (Residual Heat Removal System). "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." The leak is approximately 0.25 gallons per minute and pipe pressure is 140 psi. Compensatory measures are in place and include an individual posted to watch the pipe in case plugging is necessary. Repairs to the pipe will be completed once pipe is able to be drained. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52273 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [2] [3] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/30/2016 Notification Time: 16:19 [ET] Event Date: 09/29/2016 Event Time: 19:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY | Person (Organization): BINOY DESAI (R2DO) FITNESS FOR DUTY GRO (EMAI) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 81 | Power Operation | 81 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED OPERATOR CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol on a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52274 | Facility: FARLEY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS HOBSON HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/01/2016 Notification Time: 09:42 [ET] Event Date: 10/01/2016 Event Time: 05:12 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/01/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): BINOY DESAI (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | A/R | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INADVERTENT CLOSURE OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE "At 0512 [CDT] on October 1, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 automatically tripped from 99 percent reactor power due to the inadvertent closure of a main steam isolation valve (MSIV). The closure of the MSIV caused a turbine trip resulting in an automatic reactor trip. Concurrent with the reactor trip, a safety injection (SI) occurred. The plant is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) autostarted as expected. The cause of MSIV closure and SI actuation is under investigation. "Cooldown will continue to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) as planned for entry into a scheduled refueling outage. Restart is not planned until the completion of the refueling outage. Unit 2 was not affected. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The MSIVs are open with the steam generators discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. SI was from high head injection which has been secured. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52275 | Facility: BRAIDWOOD Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: RON BRUCK HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/03/2016 Notification Time: 00:02 [ET] Event Date: 10/02/2016 Event Time: 16:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 10/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION | Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LIQUID PENETRATION EXAMINATION RESULTS IN INDICATIONS ON REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION "On October 2, 2016 during the Braidwood Station Unit Refueling outage (A1R19), an in-service Liquid Penetration examination was performed on the previously repaired control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69. During the examination on the weld build up for CRDM penetration 69, two indications were discovered. A 7/32 inch rounded indication was discovered located at 359 degrees on the reactor head portion of the weld buildup, and it is 4 inches from the transition of the head to penetration. A 1/4 inch rounded indication was also discovered located at 200 degrees at the transition of the head to penetration. 0 degrees is located at the outermost portion of the penetration on the flange side. The transition is the point where the vertical portion of the penetration meets the horizontal area of the reactor head. "Rounded indications that exceed 3/16 inch are rejectable per ASME Code Case N-729-1. "This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded' since the as found indication did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." | |