Event Notification Report for August 21, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/20/2016 - 08/21/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52191
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: GREG KAUTZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: GREG KAUTZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/21/2016
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 19:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 19:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2016
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BILL DEAN (NRR)
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (R2RA)
BILL DEAN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 35 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
At 35 percent power, a main generator lockout caused the main generator to trip, resulting in a reactor trip of Unit 1. Because of the lockout, power did not transfer to the startup transformers. Both emergency diesel generators started and aligned to the emergency busses.
During the trip all control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in Mode 3 steaming through the atmospheric relief valves and feeding the steam generators using auxiliary feedwater. There is no reported primary to secondary leakage. Primary coolant is being moved using natural circulation cooling.
The trip of Unit 1 had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 2140 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM GREG KRAUTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 2125 EDT after the plant restored normal offsite power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sandal), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 2315 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On August 21, 2016 at 1926 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power due to a main generator inadvertent Energization Lockout Relay actuation. The cause of the lockout is currently under investigation. Coincident with the loss of offsite power, the four reactor coolant pumps deenergized. Both the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators started on demand and powered the safety related AC buses. All CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] fully inserted into the core. Offsite power to the switchyard remained available during the event, and at 2036, restoration of offsite power to St. Lucie Unit 1 was completed. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through natural circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 1850 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F.
"St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
"This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sandal).
* * * UPDATE AT 0048 EDT ON 08/22/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
"On August 21, 2016 at 2330 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 started two Reactor Coolant Pumps to establish Forced Circulation in order to enhance Decay Heat removal. Plant conditions remain stable with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves in service.
"This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(ii) as a follow up notification of protective measures taken."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sandal).
At 35 percent power, a main generator lockout caused the main generator to trip, resulting in a reactor trip of Unit 1. Because of the lockout, power did not transfer to the startup transformers. Both emergency diesel generators started and aligned to the emergency busses.
During the trip all control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in Mode 3 steaming through the atmospheric relief valves and feeding the steam generators using auxiliary feedwater. There is no reported primary to secondary leakage. Primary coolant is being moved using natural circulation cooling.
The trip of Unit 1 had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 2140 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM GREG KRAUTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 2125 EDT after the plant restored normal offsite power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sandal), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 2315 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On August 21, 2016 at 1926 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power due to a main generator inadvertent Energization Lockout Relay actuation. The cause of the lockout is currently under investigation. Coincident with the loss of offsite power, the four reactor coolant pumps deenergized. Both the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators started on demand and powered the safety related AC buses. All CEAs [Control Element Assemblies] fully inserted into the core. Offsite power to the switchyard remained available during the event, and at 2036, restoration of offsite power to St. Lucie Unit 1 was completed. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through natural circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 1850 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F.
"St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
"This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sandal).
* * * UPDATE AT 0048 EDT ON 08/22/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
"On August 21, 2016 at 2330 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 started two Reactor Coolant Pumps to establish Forced Circulation in order to enhance Decay Heat removal. Plant conditions remain stable with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves in service.
"This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(ii) as a follow up notification of protective measures taken."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Sandal).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52192
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK BELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK BELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/22/2016
Notification Time: 06:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 22:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 06:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2016
Event Time: 22:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM HVAC
"At 2251 EDT on 8/21/2016, the 'A' Train of Control Room ventilation was inoperable for scheduled testing and the 'B' Train of Control Room ventilation was declared inoperable due to a thermal overload of a cooling fan. This resulted in not meeting the limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6. No action statement exists for having two trains of Control Room Ventilation inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was applied. At 2255 on 8/21/2016 the 'A' Train of Control Room Ventilation was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1355 EDT ON 09/08/16 FROM CHUCK YARLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *
"Event notification 52192 is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, Harris determined that the 'A' train of Control Room Emergency Filtration was Operable at the time 'B' train became Inoperable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (Rose).
"At 2251 EDT on 8/21/2016, the 'A' Train of Control Room ventilation was inoperable for scheduled testing and the 'B' Train of Control Room ventilation was declared inoperable due to a thermal overload of a cooling fan. This resulted in not meeting the limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6. No action statement exists for having two trains of Control Room Ventilation inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was applied. At 2255 on 8/21/2016 the 'A' Train of Control Room Ventilation was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1355 EDT ON 09/08/16 FROM CHUCK YARLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *
"Event notification 52192 is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, Harris determined that the 'A' train of Control Room Emergency Filtration was Operable at the time 'B' train became Inoperable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (Rose).