Event Notification Report for July 11, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/10/2016 - 07/11/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52080
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STACEY HAMM
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STACEY HAMM
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/11/2016
Notification Time: 19:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2016
Notification Time: 19:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO NON-WORK RELATED ON-SITE CONTRACTOR FATALITY
"At approximately 1614 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Main Control Room was notified of a contracted employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue near the Discharge Weir. First Responders were immediately dispatched and present at the scene in minutes. Off-site assistance was requested and arrived on-site at approximately 1641. Dosher Memorial Hospital officials notified the plant at approximately 1745 that the patient was declared deceased at 1710. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area), and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not yet been determined.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee completed their notification to OSHA at 1835 hours.
"At approximately 1614 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Main Control Room was notified of a contracted employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue near the Discharge Weir. First Responders were immediately dispatched and present at the scene in minutes. Off-site assistance was requested and arrived on-site at approximately 1641. Dosher Memorial Hospital officials notified the plant at approximately 1745 that the patient was declared deceased at 1710. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area), and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not yet been determined.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The licensee completed their notification to OSHA at 1835 hours.
Agreement State
Event Number: 52088
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: UNKNOWN State: VA
County:
License #: GENERAL LICEN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: UNKNOWN State: VA
County:
License #: GENERAL LICEN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/14/2016
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2016
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE FOUND AT METAL RECYCLING FACULTY
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via facsimile:
"On July 11, 2016, Sims Metal Recycling, Petersburg, Virginia, reported to the Virginia Radioactive Material Program (VRMP) that a radioactive source had been found in a shipment of metal. VRMP Radiation Safety Specialists performed an onsite review. Labels indicated that the source was a general license device from EG&G Berthold, model not identified, serial number 001098 with a 100 millicurie (September 1990) cesium-137 source, serial number 3027. The shutter was locked partially open with the opening behind part of the gauge mounting. Maximum radiation levels at contact at the mounting near the shutter were 5 mR; at three feet, maximum levels were less than 0.1 mR/hr. The gauge was placed in a drum using a mechanical hoist and the drum was placed in a secured area. Dose estimates by VRMP personnel indicated no individual was likely to have received more than 1 mrem whole body or 5 mrem extremity dose. On-site tests for leakage indicated no removable contamination. The recycling facility contacted RSO, Inc., a commercial firm, to arrange for disposal. The gauge owner was not identified from review of the VRMP general license database. Berthold Technologies USA is reviewing records to identify the owner of the gauge."
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-16-008
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via facsimile:
"On July 11, 2016, Sims Metal Recycling, Petersburg, Virginia, reported to the Virginia Radioactive Material Program (VRMP) that a radioactive source had been found in a shipment of metal. VRMP Radiation Safety Specialists performed an onsite review. Labels indicated that the source was a general license device from EG&G Berthold, model not identified, serial number 001098 with a 100 millicurie (September 1990) cesium-137 source, serial number 3027. The shutter was locked partially open with the opening behind part of the gauge mounting. Maximum radiation levels at contact at the mounting near the shutter were 5 mR; at three feet, maximum levels were less than 0.1 mR/hr. The gauge was placed in a drum using a mechanical hoist and the drum was placed in a secured area. Dose estimates by VRMP personnel indicated no individual was likely to have received more than 1 mrem whole body or 5 mrem extremity dose. On-site tests for leakage indicated no removable contamination. The recycling facility contacted RSO, Inc., a commercial firm, to arrange for disposal. The gauge owner was not identified from review of the VRMP general license database. Berthold Technologies USA is reviewing records to identify the owner of the gauge."
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-16-008
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52227
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUDY CAPUTO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUDY CAPUTO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 04:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2016
Event Time: 04:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF DIVISION 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION LOGIC DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE
"On July 11, 2016, at approximately 0430 CDT, while Unit 1 was operating at 100% power, the 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (M/G) set tripped causing a loss of the A RPS bus. This caused the complete actuation of the Division 1 (outboard) primary containment isolation logic. The isolation logic actuation resulted in successful closure of the Division 1 primary containment isolation valves. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip set-point), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report.
"In response to the trip of the 1A RPS M/G Set, operators swapped the A RPS bus to the alternate power supply using the applicable response procedure. The containment isolation signal was reset and the systems were restored to their normal lineup. Reactor power was not affected by this event. All safety related equipment controlled by the affected primary containment isolation circuits operated as designed.
"The 1A RPS M/G Set trip was due to a blown power fuse for the 1A RPS M/G Set. This was the result of worn insulation on one of the generator output leads. The generator output leads were repaired and rerouted to prevent future problems on 07/15/16. Restoration of the normal power supply to the 1A RPS function was completed on 7/19/16."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On July 11, 2016, at approximately 0430 CDT, while Unit 1 was operating at 100% power, the 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (M/G) set tripped causing a loss of the A RPS bus. This caused the complete actuation of the Division 1 (outboard) primary containment isolation logic. The isolation logic actuation resulted in successful closure of the Division 1 primary containment isolation valves. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip set-point), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report.
"In response to the trip of the 1A RPS M/G Set, operators swapped the A RPS bus to the alternate power supply using the applicable response procedure. The containment isolation signal was reset and the systems were restored to their normal lineup. Reactor power was not affected by this event. All safety related equipment controlled by the affected primary containment isolation circuits operated as designed.
"The 1A RPS M/G Set trip was due to a blown power fuse for the 1A RPS M/G Set. This was the result of worn insulation on one of the generator output leads. The generator output leads were repaired and rerouted to prevent future problems on 07/15/16. Restoration of the normal power supply to the 1A RPS function was completed on 7/19/16."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.