| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/03/2016 - 06/06/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51881 | Rep Org: JEROME CHEESE COMPANY
Licensee: JEROME CHEESE COMPANY
Region: 4
City: JEROME State: ID
County:
License #: GL6149519
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PEGGY DORTCH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/25/2016
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2016
Event Time: 14:10 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
CNSC (CANADA) (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST DENSITY GAUGES
The licensee has determined that two food product density gauges, previously in storage, cannot be accounted for and are considered lost. The density gauges, installed by Berthold in January, 1992, were last inventoried in April, 2015. They were removed from service in 2008.
An extensive search of the facility was conducted and the devices were not located. It is believed they were sent out as scrap metal. Each gauge contained 30 mCi Cs-137 sources. Their serial numbers are 920-2-92 and 59-1-92.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/3/16 AT 1009 EDT FROM PEGGY DORTCH TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
Following an extensive licensee search of the warehouse, the gauges were found undamaged.
Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS EVENTS via email; notified CNSC (CANADA) via fax.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51961 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: TRONOX, LLC
Region: 4
City: HAMILTON State: MS
County:
License #: MS-149-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BENJAMIN CULPEPPER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/26/2016
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text MISSISSIPPI AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON LEVEL GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the state of Mississippi via email:
"Licensee reported a stuck shutter on an Ohmart/VEGA Model SH-F1 level gauge, during semi-annual checks of shutter operation. The failure was identified on 05/17/2016 by the licensee and was immediately reported to RSO. The RSO supposes stuck shutter failure was caused by age and oxidation. Licensee has contacted the manufacturer, Ohmart, for repair of shutter mechanism. Gauge remains in its normal operating position.
"Isotope(s): Cs-137
Activity: 10 mCi
Source Serial No. 0441GK
Source Model No. A-2102"
Mississippi Report Number: MS-16003 |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51963 | Rep Org: JANX INTEGRITY GROUP
Licensee: JANX INTEGRITY GROUP
Region: 1
City: KANAWHA HEAD State: WV
County:
License #: 21-16560-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FLICKINGER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/27/2016
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE UNABLE TO BE RETRACTED
Radiographers were performing an exposure when the guide tube disconnect failed and the guide tube disconnected from the camera. This prevents the source from being fully retracted into the camera. The division manager, trained in source retrieval, was able to get the source into the camera and into its shielded position. No overexposures occurred. The quick disconnect was replaced and tested and the camera was returned to service.
The camera was a SPEC-150 using a 62 Ci Ir-192 source. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51972 | Rep Org: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Licensee: SIGNAL TRANSFORMER
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/02/2016
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - NOT APPROVED CURRENT TRANSFORMERS INSTALLED IN SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT
The following was excerpted from the Ametek Part 21 Report received via email:
"Ametek inverter manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607, Ametek part number 80-310879-90 was inadvertently installed in several units from an unapproved supplier. The potential for this situation to occur exists for new equipment delivered between July of 2015 and May of 2016. Affected utilities and equipment serial numbers are identified below.
"Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone
96000067-0411, 96000067-0511, 96000067-0611, 96000067-0711
"Krsko Nuclear Power Plant
96000068-0211, 96000068-0311, 96000068-0411
"Exelon, Byron Station
96000075-0311, 96000075-0411, 96000075-0511, 96000075-0611
"Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting the following Report of a Potential Defect in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.
"To replace the transformers, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please our Client Services group at 1-614-846-7500. mailto: eric.phillips@ametek.com"
The potential problems include:
- Mag wire terminated with improper lug and tooling which may cause loss of feedback to static transfer function.
- Spot welded band around the core which has not been adequately seismically evaluated.
- 180 degree Celsius insulation system provided instead of the approved 200 degree Celsius and unapproved materials used which impacts the aging analysis.
* * * UPDATE FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/3/2016 AT 1103 EDT * * *
Serial numbers for KRSKO and Millstone are corrected as follows:
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone
96000068-0211
96000068-0311
96000068-0411
KRSKO Nuclear Power Plant
96000067-0411
96000067-0511
96000067-0611
96000067-0711
Notified the R1DO (Schroeder), R3DO (Hills) and Part 21 Group via email. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 51974 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2016
Event Time: 12:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
| Person (Organization):
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)
| Event Text ADMINISTRATIVE VERIFICATIONS OF VENTILATION CLEAN-OUT CONTAINERS WERE NOT PERFORMED
"Description of the Event: On June 2, 2016 at 1245 [EDT], it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that the two administrative verifications of ventilation clean-out containers were not performed.
"The Conversion Area nitric acid scrubber was scheduled for annual inspection and cleaning May 27 thru June 1. On May 18th, 25 disposable clean-out containers were obtained from the storeroom in preparation for the annual scrubber cleaning. The clean-out containers are used to collect special nuclear material (SNM) from scrubber and filter house cleanings. After obtaining new clean-out containers from the storeroom and prior to using them with SNM, one container from each lot is required to be measured by an operator to assure proper dimensions (IROFS STORAGE-GEN-126). An independent measurement by a process engineer to assure proper dimensions is also required prior to use with SNM (IROFS STORAGE-GEN-127). An additional 20 clean-out containers were obtained from the storeroom on May 31st.
"On June 2nd, a process engineer discovered that the measurement verifications were not performed. EH&S was notified of the event by phone and the 'Redbook' reporting system. (Redbook Issue #71225). At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment.
"The safety function of these IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] is to preclude using an incorrect container size. The ventilation clean-out containers are a standard stocked storeroom item. They have an approximate volume capacity of 1.5 gallons, providing a substantial safety margin to the minimum requirement of 5.7 gallons in the Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) which assumes an optimum uranium/water mixture and full 12-inch water reflection. The CSE also requires more than 64 close packed containers with an optimum uranium/water mixture; while the containers are limited to maximum array of 25 (IROFS STORAGE-GEN-112). Additionally, the clean-out containers remained spaced 18 inches apart at all times.
"Based on available IROFS, this accident sequence was unlikely, a failure probability of [10E-3], and not highly unlikely, a failure probability of [10E-4] or less. Therefore, this geometry accident sequence does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. As stated above, the actual configuration remained safe at all times. Also, no external conditions affected the event.
"Immediate Corrective Actions: The clean-out container dimensions were verified as correct.
"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #1003888517."
The Licensee will notify NRC Region II. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51975 | Rep Org: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING
Licensee: ABB, INC.
Region: 3
City: WELCH State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS A. CONBOY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - NOTIFICATION OF DEVIATION OF K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY TRIP LATCH
The following was received from Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant via fax:
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:
Thomas A. Conboy
Director of Site Operations
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company - Minnesota
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
ABB Inc.
BREAKER, CIRCUIT, SWITCHGEAR, 480, 3, 600
Type: K-600S EO
"Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Address on original purchase order:
ABB Power Distribution
455 Century Point
Lake Mary, FL 32772
Address on current Qualified Supplier List:
ABB, Inc. - Protective Relays & Switches
4300 Coral Ridge Dr.
Coral Springs, FL 33065
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
During surveillance testing of the D5 emergency diesel generator, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) observed the diesel room cooling fan (21 D5 DSL RM CLG FAN) did not start. The fan did not start because the supply breaker (BKR 211D) did not close to provide power to the fan. Visual inspection of the breaker identified the Secondary Trip Latch Assembly had an abnormal pin installation. The diesel room cooling fan assures operability of the emergency diesel generator that is necessary to assure the capability of shutting down the reactor and indefinitely maintaining it in cold shutdown.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained: May 31, 2016.
"In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components In use at. supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
Eleven ABB K-600S EO breakers with 86 Lock Out are on the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) site:
BKR 211D, 21 D5 DSL RM COOLING FAN
BKR 221D, 22 D6 DSL RM COOLING FAN
BKR 112C, MCC 1S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A
BKR 212C, MCC 2S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A
BKR 122C, MCC 1R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B
BKR 222C, MCC 2R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B
Five spares not Installed in plant.
"The corrective action which has been. is being. or will be taken: the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action: and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
PINGP entered the breaker failure into the Corrective Action Program.
PINGP replaced the two diesel cooling room fan breakers with breakers having no abnormally positioned pins in the secondary trip latch assemblies. PINGP inspected BKR 221D and found a satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assembly.
PINGP performed extent of condition inspections on the four pressurizer heater circuit breakers and found satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assemblies.
PINGP will revise Electrical Maintenance Procedure PE 4824, Receipt Inspect 480 Volt Breaker, to visually inspect K-600S EO circuit breakers for Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pin alignment. The revised inspection procedure will prevent recurrence since PINGP performs the inspection prior to installing 480V circuit breakers in the plant. The procedure change is expected to be completed by end of August.
Site Transmission and Distribution Coordinator and lead breaker (relay) technician are informed on this issue.
PINGP performed a past operability review and determined that the D5 emergency diesel generator would have performed its specified safety function for the time period reviewed.
PINGP returned the failed breaker to the manufacturer for evaluation. Additional corrective actions will be taken as necessary.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been. is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
Verify alignment of Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pins on K-6008 EO circuit breakers with 86 Lock Out.
Contact the K-600S EO manufacturer for additional advice.
"In the case of an early site permit. the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred:
Not applicable."
HOO Note: See EN #51976 for Part 21 received from ABB, Inc. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51976 | Rep Org: ABB, INC.
Licensee: ABB, INC.
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID C. BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/03/2016
Notification Time: 13:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2016
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - NOTIFICATION OF DEVIATION OF K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY TRIP LATCH
The following was excepted from a report from ABB, Inc. via email:
"This letter provides notification of a defect associated with the secondary trip latch, P/N: 716789E00, which is used in the 167710T01 & 167710T03 secondary latch bar assembly and assembly kit, respectively. These assemblies are used in low voltage K-Line 225-800 Amp and 1600-2000 Amp circuit breakers. The reported failure was caused by the pin in the secondary trip latch that the return spring attaches to not being installed properly. The pin hit the tab on the tripper bar when the latch returned to the reset position. This caused the breaker to trip open. This failure was reported by Xcel Energy Prairie Island Nuclear Plant and it is the only reported occurrence of a failure caused by the return spring pin being out of position. The secondary trip latch has been cast by the same since 1996. No other field failures or failures in the ABB Service facilities have been reported as a result of this pin being out of position. Information is provided as specified in 10CFR21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4).
"Notifying individual: Andrew Wall, Vice President & General Manager, ABB (Electrification Products Medium Voltage Service US), 2300 Mechanicsville Road, Florence, SC 29501
"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part numbers 716789E00 (secondary latch bar) and 167710T01 & 167710T03 (secondary latch bar assemblies). The secondary latch bar is available as an individual component and the secondary latch bar assemblies are utilized as components, as part of refurbishment kits, in K-Line operating mechanisms, in new K-Line breakers, and they may be replaced during a K-Line breaker refurbishment.
"Nature of the deviation: The pin that holds the return spring in place was not properly installed. The defect is believed to have occurred during the assembly process of the latch bar. The latch used in the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant circuit breaker was fabricated in 2013.
"Corrective actions include:
Quarantined and inspected PIN: 716789E00 and 167710T01/167710T03 assemblies in inventory. (Action complete)
Notified vendor of the issue via the ABB Supplier Corrective Action Request process. (Action complete)
Revised Critical Characteristic card for PIN: 716789E00 to incorporate measurement of the pin in question. (Action complete)
Conducted training with QA and Operations personnel for awareness (Action complete)
"Recommendations:
Because of the large potential variety of usages of the potentially affected circuit breakers, ABB (Medium Voltage Service) cannot determine if the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any licensee's facility if the circuit breaker fails to operate. It is recommended the Licensees inspect the in-service components at the next convenient maintenance opportunity and components in stock prior to installation. The pin should protrude 0.26 ( +/- 0.02) inches out of both sides of the section of the latch bar assembly.
If the latch is installed on a K-Line circuit breaker, the latch can be inspected from the bottom side of the mechanism without disassembly.
"Questions concerning this notification should be directed to the Quality Manager at the Medium Voltage Service Center in Florence, SC at (843) 413-4782 or Fax (843) 413-4853."
HOO Note: See EN #51975 for Part 21 received from Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51982 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BOTTORFF
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/05/2016
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2016
Event Time: 12:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 13 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text REACTOR TRIP AND ECCS ACTUATION CAUSED BY TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE FAILURE
"On June 5, 2016 at 1227 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in MODE 1 at approximately 12.5% power when a safety injection actuation occurred, followed by an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip. Preliminary data suggests that the #1 high pressure turbine governor valve failed open causing a steam header pressure rate of decrease safety injection [SI] actuation signal. As designed, the safety injection actuation caused both trains of the shared Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) to align to Unit 2, requiring WBN Unit 1 to enter Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.0.3 at 1227 [EDT]. Also as designed, Unit 1 annulus pressure momentarily increased, causing operation personnel to enter LCO 3.6.15 Condition B at 1240 [EDT]. At 1242 [EDT], after annulus pressure normalized, operations personnel exited LCO 3.6.15. At 1245 [EDT], Operations personnel secured safety injection and Unit 2 was stabilized in MODE 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. By 1349 [EDT], Unit 1 Operations personnel had restored both trains of EGTS to standby readiness, and exited TS 3.0.3. No primary safety barriers (RCS, containment and fuel clad) were challenged and no primary or secondary safety or relief valves actuated during the event. The Unit 2 plant trip was uncomplicated and safety equipment operated as expected.
"Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure, in normal shutdown power alignment. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 1 at 100% power.
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The MSIVs are shut with the steam generators (SG) discharging steam using the atmospheric dump valves. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Motor driven AFW pumps are running to maintain SG levels. RCS pressure remained above ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) discharge pressure. | |