United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2016 > May 18

Event Notification Report for May 18, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/17/2016 - 05/18/2016

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51916 51927 51928 51938 51939 51940

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 51916
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ALCOA WORLD ALUMINA ATLANTIC
Region: 4
City: POINT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: 05186
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/10/2016
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On May 10, 2016, the Agency [Texas Depart of State Health Services] received notification from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that the shutter on a Thermo Fisher Scientific Model 5176-SN B2578 density gauge, containing a 500 millicurie cesium-137 source SN MA3200, was found open during inventory/operational checks. It appears the weld had failed on the gauge. Open is the normal operating position of the gauge shutter. The gauge does not create an exposure hazard to the licensee's employees or a member of the general public. The licensee has contacted the service company who will inspect the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9399

To top of page
Part 21 Event Number: 51927
Rep Org: CURTISS-WRIGHT NUCLEAR DIVISION
Licensee: EMERSON VALVE AUTOMATION/HYTORK
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY GILL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 05/13/2016
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - POTENTIAL DEFECT APPLICABLE TO HYTORK XL1126 PNEUMATIC ACTUATORS

The following information was provided by Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division via fax:

"On March 16, 2016, Curtiss-Wright was notified by one of our commercial suppliers that they had received an Important Product Safety Notice (safety notice) from Emerson Valve Automation/Hytork concerning Hytork models XL1371 and XL1126 pneumatic rack and pinion actuators, manufactured after 2005 and before June 2015. Curtiss-Wright began evaluating any possible impact at that time. On May 11, 2016 Curtiss-Wright made the decision that the defect was reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. A total of four (4) Hytork XL1126 pneumatic actuators had been dedicated by Curtiss-Wright and provided as safety-related. Two (2) of the actuators were supplied to the PSEG, Salem Generating Station and the other two (2) were supplied to MOX Services. Both Salem Generating Station and MOX Services have been notified of this potential defect. Curtiss-Wright has not supplied any of the XL 1371 actuators.

"Emerson Valve Automation/Hytork states that there is a small possibility that a crack may develop in the actuator body under normal operation. The Emerson/Hytork investigation determined that a combination of actuator body structural design and material specifications along with manufacturer processes, could lead to material properties that are not within stated specifications. This condition may cause higher than allowable stresses to occur in the actuator body, which could lead to crack initiation. If a crack does develop and the actuator continues to operate, the crack may propagate to the end of the body and the end caps could be forcefully ejected. In addition to operational concerns, this condition may present a personnel safety hazard.

"Based on phone conversations with Hytork it was learned that only one model XL1126 actuator failure has been reported out of approximately 10,000 supplied. Hytork stated that the failed actuator was in a 'severe' (mechanical, operational) application with very high cycle frequency and likely experienced high impact loading.

"The list below identifies the affected customers, approximate ship dates, applicable purchase orders and actuator details.

PSEG/Salem, approximate date of shipment November, 2011, Customer PO Number 4500606542, Affected Equipment One Hytork EIA-XL1126-S80AH0 Actuator Damper Tag 1CAA14

MOX, approximate date of shipment June, 2014, Customer PO Number 10888-P-6374, Affected Equipment Two Hytork XL1126SR80 Actuators Catalog ID 14306 (HDE*AOD 0142B) & Catalog ID 14309 (HDE*AOD 0197B)

PSEG/Salem, approximate date of shipment September 2015, Customer PO Number 4500826720, Affected Equipment One Hytork EIA-XL1126-S80-A00 Actuator Damper Tag 2CAA14

"Hytork ceased production of the XL1126 and XL1371 actuators in June 2015 due to the described problem. Hytork is revising the design to connect the defect and will issue new model numbers for the re-designed actuators.

"Hytork expects to begin production of the new models in June of this year. Although Curtiss-Wright has successfully seismically tested two Hytork model XL1126 actuators under load, providing reasonable assurance that the actuators will survive and operate under normal and seismic loading, it is still recommended that the actuators be replaced as soon as practical. In the interim it is recommended that operating plants perform periodic (recommend weekly or if infrequently operated, following each operation) visual and/or soap-bubble inspections. The recommended actions provided below are considered to provide adequate indication of onset of this potential condition since instantaneous failures have not been identified and are not projected.

a) For all persons who are or could be in the area where the affected equipment is present, ensure they are warned of the potential danger.
b) Visually inspect all affected models for cracks, especially underneath the dual stroke adjustment pad and on top of the actuator body in the pinion area.
c) If you are unsure whether a crack is present, perform a soap bubble test.
d) If you identify a crack or leak, immediately remove this actuator from service.

"For additional information please contact the following personnel.

"Steve Willard, Engineering: 256-924-7463 (office); swillard@curtisswright.com (e-mail)
Tony Gill, QA Manager: 256-924-7438 (office); 256-426-4558 (cell); tgill@curtisswright.com (e-mail)"

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 51928
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROB MELTON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/13/2016
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2016
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EXISTING DESIGN INADEQUACY COULD PREVENT STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM OPERABLITY

"At 1200 [CDT] May 13, 2016, while the plant was operating at 100% power, it was brought to the attention of the River Bend Station Main Control Room staff that an existing design inadequacy could prevent both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) from performing its design function. Under certain specific conditions, the installed Masterpact breakers may not close to allow energization of the filter train exhaust fans. A start signal (reactor level 2, drywell pressure 1.68 psid, annulus high radiation, annulus low flow) combined with a trip signal within a certain time differential, could result in a failure of the breakers to close. As a result of this condition, both Standby Gas Trains were declared inoperable, which required entry into LCO 3.6.4.3 Condition C (requires entering Mode 3 in 12 hours). Declaring both trains of Standby Gas Treatment System inoperable resulted in loss of the safety function since a system that has been declared inoperable is one in which the capability has degraded to the point where it cannot perform with reasonable expectation or reliability.

"The Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) limits release to the environment of radioisotopes, which may leak from the primary containment, ECCS systems, and other potential radioactive sources to the secondary containment under accident conditions.

"At 1240 [CDT] May 13, 2016, one division of GTS, GTS 'A', was manually started from the Main Control Room. This action prevents the breaker failure mode, restored the operability of one train and restored the safety function of the GTS system. LCO 3.6.4.3 Condition A (restore Operability in 7 days) is currently entered for Standby Gas Train 'B'. During the 40 minutes of inoperability, both trains of Standby Gas remained available. At no time was the health or safety of the public impacted.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event that could have caused a loss of safety function to control the release of radioactive material. The Senior NRC Resident was notified."

* * * UPDATED AT 1341 EDT ON 05/17/16 FROM DAN PIPKIN TO RICHARD SMITH * * *

"Further review has determined that the design inadequacy discussed in EN #51928 could adversely effect the ability of the main control building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system to perform its design safety function, based upon a particular sequence of events occurring within a short window of time (approximately 75 milliseconds). River Bend has implemented compensatory actions to ensure operability of the main control building HVAC system."

The Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.

Notified the R4DO (Miller).

To top of page
Part 21 Event Number: 51938
Rep Org: NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC
Licensee: NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 3
City: MOUNT VERNON State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS STERBIS
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 05/17/2016
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A SIGNAL CONVERTER TRANSFORMER

The following report was received from the manufacturer via fax:

Nutherm International, Inc. reported on a defect found in "Moore Industries SCT Signal Converter (Part Number SCT/4-20MA/10-50MA/117VAC/UB) based upon the failure analysis of a failed component. The conclusion was that the wire insulation in T2 transformer was damaged by the transformer manufacturing facility during assembly. This damage reduced the insulation resistance and dielectric breakdown between the windings of the transformer. These damaged transformers were subsequently installed by Moore Industries into the signal converters. The failure of the transformer resulted in early, catastrophic failure of the signal converter.

"Moore Industries tested the transformers remaining in stock and found one (1) of the remaining two-hundred nineteen (219) transformers exhibited this condition. In all documented cases involving failure of this transformer, the impacted units had passed pre-installation functional testing but failed within four months after installation."

Affected nuclear power stations include: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and the Sequoyah Nuclear Station.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 51939
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DALE SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 05/17/2016
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2016
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Refueling

Event Text

REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE WITH THE REACTOR IN COLD SHUTDOWN

"On May 17, 2016 with the plant in Mode 4 [Cold Shutdown] during a refueling outage, personnel entered the drywell to perform a walkdown. At 0945 CDT, water was identified leaking from flexible hoses located at the inner elbow of MSL [Main Steam Line] B and MSL C. It was concluded that the leakage was from an elbow tap welded to the flexible hoses associated with flow instrumentation on MSL C and MSL B. Due to the refueling outage, the plant subsequently entered Mode 5 at 0955 and is currently in Mode 5 [Refueling] and 0 percent rated thermal power. The degraded component on MSL B was previously replaced in 2008 and on MSL C in 2007. The station has determined that this event is reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) as an event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded, as an 8-hour notification.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 51940
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 05/17/2016
Notification Time: 23:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2016
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - LOSS OF 1 B-B ELECTRICAL BUSS

"On May 17, 2016, at 1630 hours while restoring from a plant modification related to new 'loss of phase' circuitry, the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss de-energized resulting in a loss of voltage on the buss. The loss of voltage was caused by the loss of voltage relays that separated offsite power from the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss. At the time, the 1 B-B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for planned maintenance.

"In response to the loss of power on the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss, the operators entered abnormal operating instruction, AOI 43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, and started emergency diesel generators 1 A-A, 2 A-A, and 2 B-B. All equipment operated properly. The emergency diesel generators were not required to be paralleled to the boards.

"Offsite power was restored to the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss at 1802 hours on May 17, 2016. This condition did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, May 18, 2016
Wednesday, May 18, 2016